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Title Insurance Corporation to have been involved in the above-
captioned matter: 
1. BUILDMART MALL, a Utah limited partnership; 
2. BUILDMART MALL, INC. (General Partner of Buildmart Mall); 
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11. JERRY MELLEN; 
12. COMPLEX FABRICATIONS, INC.; 
13. RICHARDS-WOODBURY MORTGAGE CORPORATION; 
14. TOWER FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION (now known as 
First Federal of Pittsburgh); 
15 DAVID V. JOHNSON dba GREAT SALT LAKE ELECTRIC; 
16. STAKER PAVING AND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC.; 
17. ACMOR DOOR DIVISION OF BUILDING SYSTEMS; 
18. MOULTON EXCAVATING, INC.; 
19. TENANT COORDINATION SERVICES, INC.; 
20. JACK VAN GERVEN, dba J & M CONSTRUCTION, INC.; 
21. MIKE FARNSWORTH PAINTING, INC.; 
22. UNIVERSAL CONCRETE, INC.; 
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25. SUPERIOR ROOFING & SHEET METAL COMPANY; 
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27. ASSOCIATED SPECIALTIES,INC.; 
28. LAWYERS TITLE INSURANCE CORPORATION; 
29. CULP CONSTRUCTION COMPANY; 
30. FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY; 
31. SEAL, KENNEDY AND FRANDSEN, a partnership; 
32. GREGORY L. SEAL, JERRY R. KENNEDY, and RONALD M. FRANDSEN, 
as individuals; and 
33. FIRST SECURITY REALTY SERVICES CORPORATION. 
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Although the above-mentioned parties were involved in 
the Lower Court litigation, and some were involved in three 
separate appeals before this Court (other than the instant appeal 
and cross-appeal), all of those appeals have since been 
dismissed, with prejudice and on the merits. The following are 
the only parties to the instant appeal and cross-appeal: Tower 
Federal Savings and Loan Association (now known as First Federal 
of Pittsburgh, and hereafter cited as "Tower") and Lawyers Title 
Insurance Corporation ("Lawyers Title"). 
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction in this matter is conferred upon this 
Court pursuant to UTAH CONST. Art. VIII § § 3 , 5 (1953, as 
amended); UTAH CODE ANN. §78-2-2(3)(j) (1953, as amended); Rules 
3 and 4 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court; and Rule 54(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This is an appeal from a 
final Order of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake 
County, Utah ("Lower Court"). The Honorable Raymond S. Uno, 
District Judge, certified as final his Order granting Lawyers 
Title Summary Judgment against Tower, pursuant to Rule 54(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The final Order was entered 
on September 6, 1988. Tower filed a Notice of Appeal on October 
5, 1988. Lawyers Title filed its Notice of Cross-Appeal on 
October 20, 1988. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ON CROSS-APPEAL 
1. Has Tower suffered any loss insurable under the 
Title Insurance Loan Policy purchased from Lawyers Title ("Tower 
Policy") due to the existence of the mechanic's liens foreclosed 
by the Lower Court, since those liens have been released? 
2. Was Tower's Third Amended Cross-Claim without 
merit and not brought in good faith as a matter of law, thereby 
entitling Lawyers Title to its costs and reasonable attorney's 
fees incurred in defending against Tower's Third Amended Cross-
Claim, pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §78-27-56 (1953, as amended)? 
If so, is Lawyers Title entitled to its costs and reasonable 
attorney's fees incurred in defending against Tower's appeal and 
in bringing its Cross-Appeal? 
3. Is Tower's appeal either frivolous or brought for 
delay, entitling Lawyers Title to damages and single or double 
costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, on appeal pursuant 
to Rule 33(a) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court? 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This litigation originated as an action for judicial 
foreclosure of mechanic's liens. The litigation expanded 
quickly, through various claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, and 
third-party claims, to include actions for declaratory judgment 
on indemnification rights, breach of title insurance policies, 
breach of payment bonds, liability on an attorney's opinion 
letter, and other assorted claims. The Lower Court trifurcated 
the litigation into (i) mechanic's lien and payment bond issues, 
(ii) a declaratory action on certain affidavit and indemnity 
agreements allegedly executed by and between the general 
contractor and the owner-developer, and (iii) the remaining 
claims, counterclaims, cross-claims, and third-party claims. 
Tower's contract and tort claims against Lawyers Title, and 
Lawyers Title's claim against Tower for attorney's fees and 
costs, fell within the third division of the litigation. 
After resolution by trial, summary judgment, or 
settlement, either at the Lower Court level or on appeal, all of 
the issues except for those between Tower and Lawyers Title have 
been resolved and have been dismissed with prejudice, including 
- 3 -
the release of all mechanic's liens. The only remaining aspect 
of the litigation is this appeal and cross-appeal. 
With the addition of the foregoing, Lawyers Title 
agrees generally with Tower's "Statement of Proceedings" except 
as specifically noted within this Brief. Tower has apparently 
included the "Nature of the Case," "Course of Proceedings, and 
"Disposition in the Lower Court" sections of its brief within its 
"Statement of Proceedings." As such, pursuant to Rule 24(b) of 
the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, Lawyers Title is not 
required to make its own Statement of the Case. 
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Statement of Facts1 
1. In or about May, 198 3, a Utah 1 imited partnership 
n a m e d TV; i l ; " i - - r t T ' : l ' " l - '1* • > 1 r ,p* - M -. v •" — f -: ' - ; • -
B u i l d m a r t K a i l ( " K a l i ' - , , - p r o p o s e d e n c i o ^ j s h o f p ^ n j HKI 1 I made 
u] ci r c t i . ! s t o r e s s e l l i n g c a s t o r L i i ! lm"j r a t . e r . a l n a~ i 
p r - . * - * " r. + *- . * . L^ *
 : . . ' - ,. r • : 
of Steven T i " ; , ^ *. r .* * L>c AJ u ,::'u: '\ . " 
?. Construction financing was obtaine:; by tht 
developer en ci al ..ut OetoLt.i ;, 19o3 trom l"t- ' rt.j.-ij-. .. .: 
Corporation ("UKLC") In the amount of $4 , 900, C •.'-. The .can was 
secured by a Deed ot Trust with Assignment of Rents. UMLC 
recorded the Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rents with tl le Salt 
I The following abbreviations are used throughout: the 
Record on Appeal, as paginated by the Court Clerk, is 
designated "R;" the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, entered by the Lower Court on January 20, 198 7, 
are designated as "Findings" or "Conclusions;" the 
deposition exhibits, which have generally been 
maintained serially throughout the Lower Court 
litigation in separate bound volumes rather than 
attached to each deposition, and which have not been 
paginated individually as part of the Record, are 
designated as "Dep. Exh. ;" some of the depositions 
themselves have been paginated with only one number (on 
their cover) - reference to them, will include their 
"Record" number and relevant pages. The depositions 
not paginated in the record will be identi fied only by 
their titles and relevant pages. 
Lake County Recorder on October 4, 1983. Findings 11, 13 (R 
4441-4483). 
3. The first labor was performed upon the Mall, and 
the first materials were furnished to the Mall, on October 22, 
1983. Finding 6 (R 4441-4483). 
4. In or about November, 1983, the developer applied 
with UMLC to expand the scope of the Mall construction project to 
include a second building to be known as the "Buildmart 
Distribution Center," and its attendant parking areas and other 
facilities and amenities (collectively the "Distribution Center" 
and the Mall shall be referred to as the "Project"). The 
developer requested that the original loan be increased to 
$7,750,000. The request was approved in principal by First 
Security Realty Services Corporation (as successor to UMLC) 
(hereafter cited as "FSRSC") in or about December, 1983. Finding 
15 (R 4441-4483). 
5. On June 27, 1984, the loan increase was 
memorialized in a Loan Modification Agreement between the 
developer and FSRSC, and the Distribution Center and related 
property were pledged as additional collateral. Finding 16 (R 
4441-4483). 
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6. Ir. September, '1 ,?>A . .L.j^trl:. Dcvolcrrert Feve 
Bonds ("IRBs") ::. the face arount cl $7,750,000 were sc/.d t:-
provide permanent financing for the Project - trr- : • :' f-nncing 
transaction wi"!. r.-c referred to herein a-, t.:^  '*_*!.: ..•;.:-.• 
Proceeds from the sale :..-; the 'IRBs- were borrowed t v thc aevelc 
and used to pav off the June 2"' . 19" 4 f ---".^r ..,-.,. 
loan from FSRSC, The IRB Loan was memorialized an ; secured Ly 
Loan Agreement, a ;:to, an Indenture of Trust. -; r-e'i :.: Tr:-4" 
and a Re payment ; r* *. * ^ ~ r . ,
 r.~v.->- . c : ] „ , . r ~ . ^  j (| 
4 4 411 -4 4 83) 
7. As part •-: rnt IRB Loar. i .rr* Security E 'rd- :f 
Letter c: v. r^ *-t, a^t _, Setter her 2d, 1 4, :r.r thr benefir of 
First Security's C c r r c m r e Trust Department whic; a:tci ar 
irJ-'-r.:,*: •' t r w t •' - -: • v * . - ;.+ .i - * • * * i. * 
Trust securin-j the IRL Loan ("IRB Irust Deed''; benefited th>; 
bondholders , ~2rst ^."urif; ar- t r a ^ ^ e :r;d'-r thf Indenture .; 
Trust Deed was recorded cr September 26, 1984 in the Salt Lake 
County Recorder's Office. Findings " • ci , „-
8. At the r e q u e s t of Rlcnaruu-n.juaiiurn i-n r tgage 
Corpora t ion ("Richards-Woodbury") , Lav/yers T i t l e ' s then local 
agent, Richmond Title Company ("Richmond Title") , prepared and 
delivered to Richards-Woodbury a Commitment for Title Insurance 
(the "Commitment") on or about November 23, 1984. The Commitment 
was dated November 23, 1984, and named Richards-Woodbury as the 
proposed insured. Deposition of Timothy Krueger, Volume I at 
165-66 (R 9612); Deposition of Timothy Krueger, Volume II at 10 
(R 9623). See Addendum "D." The Commitment provides, in 
pertinent part: 
LAWYERS TITLE INSURANCE CORPORATION . . . 
herein called the Company . . . hereby 
commits to issue its policy or policies of 
title insurance, as identified in Schedule A, 
in favor of the proposed Insured named in 
Schedule A . . . all subject to the 
provisions of Schedules A and B and to the 
Conditions and Stipulations hereof. 
* * * 
This Commitment is preliminary to the 
issuance of such policy or policies of title 
insurance and all liability and obligations 
hereunder shall cease and terminate six (6) 
months after the effective date hereof or 
when the policy or policies committed for 
shall issue, whichever first occurs, provided 
that the failure to issue such policy or 
policies is not the fault of the Company 
- 8 -
CON DITI ON S AN D S TI PI JI AT I ON S 
* i • i • 
3. Liability of n.c Company under this 
Commitment shall be only to the named 
proposed Insured and such parties included 
under the definition of Insured in the form 
of policy or policies committed for and onl y 
for actual loss incurred in reliance hereon 
in undertaking in good faith (a) to comply 
with the requirements hereof, or (b) to 
eliminate exceptions shown in Schedule B, or 
(c) to acquire or create the estate or 
interest or rn.ort.gage thereon, covered by this 
Commitment. In no event shall such liability 
exceed the amount stated in Schedule A for 
the policy or policies committed for and such 
liability is subject to the insuring 
provisions and the Conditions and 
Stipulations and the Exclusions from, Coverage 
of the form of policy or policies committed 
for in favor of the proposed Insured which 
are hereby incorporated by reference and are 
made a part of this Commitment except as 
expressly modified herein. 
4. Any action or actions or rights of action, 
that the proposed Insured may have or may 
bring against the Company arising out of the 
status of the title to the estate or interest 
or the status of the mortgage thereon covered 
by this Commitment must be based on and are 
subject to the previsions c*" this Commitment. 
The. Commitment expressly excluded thr- II-B Tr^st Deed from 
covf.ra';-' i ^  c: *!.•--•:•.•< !•• - >< : . « ; .,- -r- . correct 
corny of the- Commitment is attached hereto as Addendum "A". 
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9. On or about March 20, 1985, Tower, as assignee of 
Richards-Woodbury, made a loan in the principal amount of 
$750,000 (the "Tower Loan") to the developer. Finding 47 (R 
4441-4483). 
10. The Tower Loan was secured by a second lien trust 
deed ("Tower Trust Deed") on the Project dated March 13, 1985, 
and recorded on March 20, 1985 in the Office of the Salt Lake 
County Recorder. The Tower Trust Deed was expressly made subject 
to the IRB Trust Deed. A copy of the Tower Trust Deed is 
attached hereto as Addendum "B". 
11. Following the closing of the Tower Loan, Lawyers 
Title, through Richmond Title, issued the Tower Policy, naming 
Tower as the insured. Finding 48 (R 4441-4483). A copy of the 
Tower Policy is attached hereto as Addendum "C". 
12. The Tower Policy specifically excluded coverage of 
any loss or damage which might arise as a result of the existence 
of the IRB Trust Deed as follows: 
This policy does not insure against loss or damage by 
reason of the following: 
. . • • 
16. Deed of Trust from Buildmart Mall, a Utah 
Limited Partnership, as Trustor to First Security 
Bank of Utah, N.A., a National Banking Association 
authorized and doing business in the State of 
Utah, as Trustee and First Security Bank of Utah, 
N.A., the Trustee on behalf of the holders of 
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Sandy City, Utah Industrial Development Bonds, 
Series 1984, under an Indenture of Trust dated as 
of July 15, 19 84; First Security Bank of Utah, 
N.A., as a letter of credit bank, as Beneficiar-
ies, to secure $7,750,000.00, dated September 25, 
1984 and recorded September 26, 1984 in Book 5593, 
Page 1940 as Entry No, 3997400. 
See Addendum "C". Tl le Tower Policy further provides on its last 
page: 
11 Li abi 1 ity Li mi ted to this Po 1 icy 
This instrument together with a! 1 
endorsements and instruments, if any, 
attached hereto by the Company is the 
entire policy and contract between the 
insured and the Company. 
Any claim of loss or damage, whether or 
not based on negligence, and which 
arises out of the status of the lien of 
the insured mortgage or of the title to 
the estate or interest covered hereby or 
any action asserting such claim, shall 
be restricted to the provisions and 
conditions and s t i pu1at i o n s o f t h i s 
policy. 
1", r;o.-;cr and its a jc-r.tf v.rrc aware that the Tower 
F:: jfy specifically e >: c I u 1 < i c^veran^ f : v 1 o s s o r d a m a g e 
wh:.\\ :.-;:* J _-•.- J . ' • L A . I 'iii... : ::.- IRB I rust Dee .< I. 
Tower made th^ $75,0,' :-0 loan t- the developer knowing that the 
Tower ~ r ir*- Deed was subordinate to the IRB Trust Deed. 
D e p o i ; "' i I h u t e j 111 • 111 I a t 19 2 0 , 2 <J 3 1 4 5 ; D e p o s i t i o n o f 
Jeffrey Woodbury at 68-6 9; Deposition of Donald Spagnol e at 44, 
49/ 102-103. Copies of all deposition pages cited in this brief 
are attached hereto in the aggregate as Addendum "D". See also. 
Tower's Response No. 8 to Lawyers Title's Request for Admissions, 
a true and correct copy of which Responses are attached hereto as 
Addendum "E". 
14. Jeffrey K. Woodbury and his law firm, Woodbury, 
Bettilyon & Kesler, acted as counsel for Tower and for Richards-
Woodbury prior to the closing of the Tower Loan transaction in 
March, 1985. In acting as counsel for Tower and Richards-Wood-
bury, Jeffrey K. Woodbury and his firm were responsible for and 
did in fact obtain from Richmond Title the Commitment as well as 
the Tower Policy. Deposition of Jeffrey K. Woodbury at 6-11; 
Deposition of Earl Autenreith at 143. See Addendum "D." 
15. At or before the Tower Loan closing, Jeffrey K. 
Woodbury and his firm received from Gregory L. Seal, counsel for 
the developer, a title opinion letter dated March 13, 1985, 
addressed to Richards-Woodbury (a copy of which is attached 
hereto as Addendum "F") which disclosed a mechanic's lien in the 
amount of $57,075.26 asserted by Complex Fabrications, Inc. 
against the Project and discussed it at length (see pages 3 and 4 
thereof), together with the litigation referred to therein as the 
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" I _ I ^ * " . - : . ; . . ' Lcj . . l e l l ' r t i ' j I kiorclbUT1, »i I 
i:-» : c e A u e r d u : ' \ " 
1' :• . i : ; .• : r r t - *-;* Cc r j i * : - : 7 a)- r i c a t : c r , r J , I n * , i i e n 
i m m e d i a t e l y p r - u i t> "n< l e v - : : I c r : ' ' [ o : ; r i ; , t r . r e t c n r 1 . i e : \ : : 
f i i s t i 2 . - : r . r/> f i i ? i by ^ r r Mi 1 . —, r - P o c e m b e r 1 2 , 
I " . , . ' ' , . L . ; t.L _ ?, , • 
F d r r . £ - . : ; r : h i c r $ I , J L : . ^ en i : » : c h M , l^C.L a s Lnt ry K J . 
an.; t 1 - r ;, *rn f : l c 1 : ^ H a r r c r F>: : ava + : •* - f :: r $' \ 
Ma: a . *• a i.: t : . , - •_ ,. -^ c . ,Li_p ccj . -£ - : - - ' ~ -
t o g e t h e r v ; : t r i c o p i e s .,f tn-. C c r p l e x F a b r i c a t i o n s , : *~ . 
B i l l G i b s o n I i r : g a t i o n Lir P e n d e n s :* "v • »- • -» -*': 
a b o v e , a t t a c h e d h e r e t o c c l l e c t i v e i y a s Addenu. . ' .-• 
t h e Tower P o l i c y d i d n o t t a k e e x c e p t i o n t c t r . e l i e r ; s cr 
1 i t i g a t i o n r e f e r r e d t c :i :i i 11 i :i s p a r a g r a p 1 I o r 11 I e f o r e g o i n g 
paragraph 15, i t insured over all such matters, as Tower and 
their agents knew it would. Deposition, of Jeffrey Woodbury at 
12 8 - ] 3 0 ; D e p <::> = i t :i c • n o f E s i: 1 a i :i 1: e n :i : e :i 11: h • i I: 6 1 6 3 S ee Add en d u,n 
IV. Sometime after March : 'l, ic:z: , the developer 
defaulted * . . + :-.•':*;_ . i - - I ..*-. : t r . j - . : t. 
monthl y payments to io.-.e.:, .*c\.cr d_; r • rar.c any a/ticn after 
JGGcIT; 
rj r O 1 
:hou'":n 
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the developer's default to foreclose its lien against the 
Project. Lawyers Title's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for 
Summary Judgment against Tower ("Lawyers Title's Memorandum") at 
11, [^16 (not denied by Tower in its Memorandum in Opposition) .2 
18. Culp Construction Company ("Culp"), the 
developer's primary general contractor, commenced the litigation 
by filing its Complaint on or about September 3, 1985. 
19. By letter dated September 13, 1985, Tower tendered 
its defense of this litigation to Lawyers Title under the Tower 
Policy as required by paragraph 3(b) of the Conditions and 
Stipulations. Tower never gave Lawyers Title any notice of loss 
(such notice being required by paragraph 4 of the Conditions and 
Stipulations as a condition of Lawyers Title's having any 
liability under the Policy as to any loss claimed). Lawyers 
Title's Memorandum at 10, <|113 (not denied by Tower) . 
20. By letter dated October 17, 1985, Lawyers Title 
accepted the tender of defense from Tower subject to a 
reservation of rights. At Tower's request, the firm of Woodbury, 
Bettilyon & Kesler was appointed as the counsel to independently 
Lawyers Title's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for 
Summary Judgment against Tower has apparently been 
inadvertently left out of the Record and Record Index 
prepared by the Third District Court Clerk. 
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represei 11 Tower' s Interests, Lawyers , - Memoranduit* at 1 n . 
U14 (net denied iy Tower). 
I : . liie developer also dr ' -in • t *- • >* ^ : . : : :t ; - r.s 
under tnc i:-. Loan. As Trustee under tr<_ inutntuit of trts~, 
First Security initiated r.or.-ju ileiai 1 :. rec 1 csure proceeding 
against the ^rcjro* . c- Tm * T • • '<- : . ' t 
non-juo:cial trustee's sine, -* \.hich r^rst ;:e.ur.:\ I.J ;r *.e 
sur. oi $C,20'",CCJ an: acquired the Project. By operation cl
 Aaw, 
a". \\t' -\w ' > r *• .- first ] i en he] d 1 : y I i rst Securi* m 
including the lower "Irust Deed, were extinguished. Tower and its 
counsel faileJ to take any action to stop the foreclosure s~:ie or 
t
 j c : : * : * • ; . . t * ' ; . ^ L -: - t ; _: i -. . • . - : r ^  • ect. 
See, Tower's Response K;m ; cl 1 ^  Lawyer^ 'I .- 1i .equest 
±-z Admis£*.oi.L,, attached f^. retv do ^ ; : : Acder>du:: "3 -
22 . ; m . , i. .-.*.: J ement an x u : sn. ss J _ . : .: . . , laims 
"with prejudice was reached between a.: r-irties, exceit 
specifically for tl ie claims between Tr/kv " -•- % '-/ - r • " n] e oi I 
c: >n -. .X December 1 9, 1988, Al 3 claims remain.nj , r. t .* Lower 
Court, and all pending appeals excert this one, were dismissed 
with prejudice. All out standi ng rt -,l .i1 ' . > .. -'• Proje ::t 
were released as part of the settlement ; •:. &?.~t. , 9598-9 601, 
9 6 0 2-09. 
ARGUMENT SUMMARY 
Tower argues that there are genuine issues of material 
fact with respect to three causes of action: breach of contract, 
breach of an implied contractual obligation of good faith and 
fair dealing, and negligent misrepresentation. As a matter of 
law, however, there has been no breach of contract and 
consequently there has been no breach of any implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing. Lawyers Title defended Tower 
against the adverse mechanic's lien claims and has been 
successful in obtaining their release through settlement. 
Lawyers Title had the option to settle these claims under 
paragraph 5 of the Conditions and Stipulations of the Tower 
Policy. Any claim for indemnity under the Tower Policy was 
premature in the Lower Court given that the underlying adverse 
claims were still being litigated, and any such claim is now moot 
as the adverse claims have been settled. 
Tower's claim for "negligent misrepresentation" is 
confused. First, Tower argues that Lawyers Title had a duty to 
disclose all record information to Tower and the failure to do so 
rendered Lawyers Title's actions negligent. However, Tower does 
not purport to sue Lawyers Title for "negligence." Even if it 
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d i d , L a w y e r s i i L i e owed Towcn :. d.n r ~. - - <-* . r k . c 
records and any search actun.*^ pc-riorr.c ; v.\u u ^ J j c t - J solely 
and exclu?; \ i ! \ for Lawyers I : t , e ^ c * :. JSC in det erir; ni n-; 
vhrtlirr - •* t v . ' * •-''•» - -- ' - r t : * *. ' • " * » 
i n s u r e t i t l e and a c t u a l I^ i s s u e i t s l o a r p c i : c y . 
S e c o n d , 7c nr r i r y l i c r t h a ~ t h " C r ' i t r . e n t , v i~ :ch Tower 
e r r a n t ^ ^ . . . . . ' . . • ' * ] « ; * p- : i t / , / p u i pc : *. * < ', > 
represent what tne stnto cl t,t:e wa.,-. However, the only 
"representat icn" nadc in tn<; Cc r.r.itr-: nt was thtt Lawyers litle 
woi. .; i... .- ,. !--• j- r-..:..;:.,L-^::jbury s.i]c:r tc tne 
limitation. , exclusions. ccr:.:;t ionr, an-; st i p JL! at ions thereat. 
Lawyers 7; t : c di': ireciselv t; n. The- lower ;- : ' - w-*- -•? .<= : as 
pror - L~ J .. ' - .,r::tr*"_:v nereicro, eve: y statement •. onta ined 
in tne Corraltrcnt war' tr^c . 
Third . a-v rr ' : -r •• t , 1 - - -* * - : / . -
"abstract c: : ' ..-* : :\ .. cj . :\::.:. w ^  ^tifi^a nrn: n ro °: 
reliance is reflected in the record. Tower's vague references to 
unspecified fact.- * ' } <• : - *'!:••:..: .- .; . 
indeec , the undisput*. I i^tn reflect i^ r-hance Ly Tower. 
Finally, whether viewed througn a contract cr r.-rt 
lens, Tower'*, . -
 :- . • . 
foreclosure L'2 1 ir^t ^Ouiii, o; tne p n , : i n n pc*c J scmr.ng 
the IRB Loan. Tower knew of the IRB Trust Deed and both the 
Commitment and Tower Policy specifically excepted the IRB Trust 
Deed from coverage. As such, any allegedly undisclosed liens 
were not the cause of Tower's loss. 
Although they sought recompense for the loss they 
suffered as a result of the developer's default on their loan, 
Tower would not bring any action against their mortgage broker, 
Richards-Woodbury, who represented to them the benefits of 
entering into this loan, nor their own counsel, Earl Authenreith 
and Jeffrey Woodbury, upon whom they relied to determine the 
state of the title, either personally or through the obtaining of 
an attorney's opinion letter. 
Tower did not bring any claims against Lawyers Title 
until two years into this litigation, and at that time only 
asserted tort claims. After those claims were dismissed upon 
Lawyers Title's Motion, Tower amended its Cross-claim for the 
third time to include contract actions against Lawyers Title. 
Those claims were dismissed through Summary Judgment. 
Any claims Tower asserted against Lawyers Title have 
been determined by the Lower Court to be meritless. Tower's 
continuing attempt to assert baseless claim against Lawyers 
Title, particularly in the context of Tower not bringing claims 
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against parties against whom Tower would have legitimate factual 
and legal bases, supports a finding that Tower's claims against 
Lawyers Title were not brought in good faith. Accordingly, 
Lawyers Title is entitled to its costs and reasonable attorney's 
fees incurred in having to defend against Tower's claims at the 
Lower Court level, and having to defend this appeal, as well as 
bring a Cross-appeal for its Lower Court level attorney's fees 
and costs. 
ARGUMENT 
I* Lawyers Title Has Not Breached A Contractual Obligation To 
Tower Under Either The Commitment Or The Tower Policy. 
A. Tower has no privity of contract with Lawyers Title 
under the Commitment. 
The undisputed facts reflect that Richards-Woodbury, 
the mortgage broker that negotiated with Tower to obtain a loan 
of $750,000 to the developer in March, 1985, requested a 
commitment for title insurance from Lawyers Title. The 
Commitment was prepared for and delivered to Richards-Woodbury. 
The Commitment names Richards-Woodbury, not Tower, as the 
proposed insured, not Tower. See Addendum "A" hereto. Any 
contractual obligations Lawyers Title had under the Commitment 
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ran to Richards-Woodbury, not to Tower; Tower cannot assert a 
breach of contract claim against Lawyers Title under the 
Commitment. Hooper v. Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Co., 427 
A.2d 215, 217 (Pa. 1981); Gaines v. American Title Insurance Co., 
136 Ga. App. 162, 220 S.E. 2d 469, 471 (1975). 
B. All of the liens that Tower alleges Lawyers Title 
failed to disclose in the Commitment were recorded 
after the Commitment was issued. 
The Commitment was issued on November 23, 1984. All of 
the liens that Tower claims Lawyers Title failed to disclose in 
the Commitment were recorded on December 12, 1984 or later. This 
is reflected in Exhibit "M" to Tower's Brief, the Affidavit of 
Keith Ellertson. Tower has not and cannot cite to any lien of 
record as of the date of the Commitment to which the Commitment 
failed to take exception. Accordingly, even if Tower was in 
privity of contract with Lawyers Title under the Commitment, 
there are no facts in the record by which Tower can prove a 
breach of contract under that Commitment. Moreover, a policy was 
issued as agreed in the Commitment. All of Lawyers Title's 
obligations under the Commitment were performed. 
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C. Tower has not and cannot cite to any facts in the 
record showing a breach of any express contractual 
obligation by Lawyers Title to Tower under the Tower 
Policy. 
Tower fails to cite any provisions rr ol ligations in 
the Tower Policy which Lawyers Title has failed to fulfill. 
Instead, Tower restates its tort claim as a "breach of contract" 
action. Tower claims that, prior to underwriting it^ loan to the 
developer, it needed to obtain a "title abstract/' that Lawyers 
Title was engaged to prepare an "abstract of title,ff and that 
Lawyers Title breached an implied contractual obligation to 
abstract title by failing to exercise the skill and care 
necessary to discover and report in the Tower Policy ail liens of 
record relating It i\c property. 
The only contract between Tower and Lawyers Title is 
the Tower Policy. There is no provision in the Policy by which 
Lawyers Title agreed to abstract title or search the public 
records. Nowhere in the Tower Policy is there any language that 
expresses or implies that it is anything other than wha+ it 
purports to be, an insurance policy. Lawyers Title simply 
contracted to insure Tower as follows: 
SUBJECT TO THE EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE, THE 
EXCEPTIONS CONTAINED IN SCHEDULE B AND THE 
PROVISIONS OF THE CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS 
HEREOF, LAWYERS TITLE INSURANCE CORPORATION, 
a Virginia corporation, herein called the 
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Company, insures, as of Date of Policy shown 
in Schedule A, against loss or damage, not 
exceeding the amount of insurance stated in 
Schedule A, and costs, attorneys7 fees and 
expenses which the Company may become 
obligated to pay hereunder, sustained or 
incurred by the insured by reason of 
2. Any defect in or lien or encumbrance on 
such title; . . . 
See Tower Policy, attached hereto as Addendum "C." 
The contract of title insurance (the Tower Policy), and 
the language in the policy itself, are the sole source of the 
obligations between Lawyers Title and Tower. Brown's Tie and 
Lumber v. Chicago Title Company of Idaho, 764 P.2d 423, 425-426 
(Idaho 1988) ; Anderson v. Title Insurance Company, 103 Idaho 875, 
655 P.2d 82, 85-86 (1982). To impose an obligation to examine 
title on the title insurer would require this Court to rewrite 
the Tower Policy. Lawyers Title did not have a contractual duty 
to Tower to ". . . exercise the skill and care necessary to 
discover and report all claims and/or liens of record relating to 
the property." Shotwell v. Transamerica Title Insurance Company, 
91 Wash. 2d 161, 588 P.2d 208, 213 (1978) (citing Maggio v. 
Abstract Title & Mortgage Corporation, 277 App. Div. 940, 98 
N.Y.S. 2d 1011, 1013 (1950)). 
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The Tower Policy is a contract for indemnity under 
which Lawyers Title is obligated to indemnify Tower against 
losses sustained in the event that an insured risk occurs. 
Lawyers Title did not represent in the Tower Policy thdt an 
insured risk would not occur. Lawyers Title did not represent to 
Tower, expressly or impliedly, that the title to the property was 
as set forth in the Tower Policy. Rather, Lawyers Title simply 
agreed that it would pay for any losses resulting from, or would 
cause the removal of, any cloud on Tower's title within the 
policy provisions. 
The Tower Policy was not a summary of the public 
records and Lawyers Title did not purport to supply such 
information. To the contrary, Lawyers Title entered into a 
contract of indemnity. Lawrence v. Chicago Title Insurance 
Company, 237 Cal. Rptr. 264, 266-7 (Cal. App. 1987). As long as 
Lawyers Title defended any adverse claim or obtained lien 
releases or discharges, Lawyers Title would fulfill its 
contractual obligations. That is precisely what has happened in 
this case. 
It is undisputed that as soon as Tower requested that 
Lawyers Title defend this litigation, Lawyers Title provided a 
defense. Throughout this litigation, Lawyers Title paid the fees 
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of Tower's independent counsel. The litigation was hard-fought 
and extended over three years, resulting in a global settlement 
and release of all mechanic's lien claims against the Project. 
Tower has not and cannot point to any contractual obligation 
under the Tower Policy that Lawyers Title has failed to fulfill. 
As a matter of law, and based upon the express provisions of the 
Tower Policy, Tower has no claim against Lawyers Title for breach 
of contract. 
Realizing that Lawyers Title has complied with its 
contractual obligations under the Policy, Tower argues that 
"[t]he evidence will disclose that [Lawyers Title] was retained 
to prepare an abstract of title . . .." First, Tower's mere 
promise to produce such evidence, without more, fails to raise 
fact issues in response to a Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Second, Tower has not provided the Court with evidence of any 
contractual undertaking by Lawyers Title other than the 
Commitment and Policy. For example, there is no evidence that 
Lawyers Title agreed or promised to abstract title or render a 
title opinion.3 Indeed, there is no evidence that either 
It is doubtful that Lawyers Title could ever render an 
opinion as to the state of title to the Project, as 
this would probably constitute the unauthorized 
practice of law. 
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Richards-Woodbury or Tower ever requested these services. All 
that was requested from Lawyers Title was a commitment and 
policy. Both were issued. Neither has been breached. 
For the Court to impose an implied contractual 
obligation on Lawyers Title to abstract title would require the 
Court to rewrite the insurance contract between Lawyers Title and 
Tower. There is no evidence in the record that Lawyers Title 
held itself out to Tower or Richards-Woodbury as anything other 
than a title insurer. There is no evidence that Lawyers Title 
represented itself to be an abstractor or an attorney. There is 
no evidence that Tower or Richards-Woodbury expressed any desire 
that Lawyers Title abstract title or render an opinion as to 
title. In fact, the title opinion of Gregory Seal, an attorney 
not employed by Lawyers Title, was obtained by Tower, and 
subsequently Tower sued him in the Lower Court litigation because 
of his faulty title opinion. He has since settled with Tower. 
There is simply no evidence that Lawyers Title contracted with 
Tower to abstract title to the Project, and therefore Tower's 
claim of breach of contract was correctly dismissed by the Lower 
Court. 
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II. Lawyers Title Has Not Breached An Implied Covenant Of Good 
Faith And Fair Dealing To Tower Under The Tower Policy. 
Tower asserts that Lawyers Title's implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing required Lawyers Title to discover 
and report all liens and encumbrances of record against the 
Project. Tower has cited no case law to support this argument. 
The only cases Tower cites regarding any covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing concern post-loss, claim matters. None speak 
even remotely of any such covenant arising prior to the time a 
policy is issued. Moreover, this covenant merely required 
Lawyers Title to perform its express obligations in good faith. 
There is no such express obligation to search title. Finally, if 
a title insurer has an implied obligation to search, abstract, or 
examine title, the provisions of the policy become superfluous. 
Any time an insured suffers a loss which is not specifically 
excepted but is otherwise excluded, the insured can avoid the 
policy limitation by suing on the implied covenant. Once again, 
Tower is attempting to "shoe-horn" a tort claim of abstractor's 
liability into a contractual cause of action. 
Tower claims that it ". . . had the right to expect 
what it bargained for, that is, a complete and accurate 
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Preliminary Title Report upon which it could reply [sic] in its 
determination whether to loan monies to Buildmart Mall" (Tower's 
Brief at 38) , However, Tower never bargained for a ''Preliminary 
Title Report," The Commitment was issued to Richards-Woodbury, 
as requested. No request for a "preliminary title report," much 
less an abstract of title, was ever made to Lawyers Title. There 
is no evidence whatsoever that Tower expected anything other than 
what it got. 
Despite Tower's protest that the issue of breach of an 
insurer's duty to act in good faith is generally a factual issue, 
it is hornbook law that when there are no genuine issues of 
material fact with regard to the insurer's actions, there is no 
factual issue to be submitted to the fact finder. 
Tower again fails to cite any facts in the record that 
support even a reasonable inference that Lawyers Title breached 
its obligation of good faith and fair dealing. Instead, Tower 
makes the following bare assertion: "In the instant case, 
discovery has adduced material factual issues in support: of 
[Tower's] breach of contract claims against [Lawyers Title] which 
must be tried, for which reason Summary Judgment was 
inappropriate" (Tower's brief at 39 . 
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Contrary to the bald allegations of Tower, which have 
no support in the record, Lawyers Title has acted fairly and in 
good faith, within the purview of the Tower Policy, toward its 
insured by issuing the Policy, accepting defense of the claim 
against Tower not withstanding no written claim of loss, paying 
all costs of Tower's defense, and protecting Tower's security 
interest in the Project (Tower's Trust Deed) subject only to the 
superior first lien Trust Deed of First Security by litigating 
and ultimately settling all mechanic's liens on the Project, 
In light of Tower's inability to refer the Court to 
material facts in the record with regard to Lawyers Title's 
alleged breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, and because bald allegations of such disputes of fact 
are insufficient to successfully rebut a Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Tower's claim for breach of some unspecified implied 
contractual obligation of good faith and fair dealing must fail 
as a matter of law. Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 
317, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265, 273, 274, 276 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 211-212 (1986); 
Robinson v. Intermountain Health Caref Inc., 740 P.2d 262, 264 
(Utah App. 1987). 
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III. Tower's Claim Of Negligent Misrepresentation Against Lawyers 
Title Falls As A Matter Of Lav, 
A. There Is no evidence of any misrepresentation. 
Tower demonstrates a critical misunderstanding of the 
tort of negligent misrepresentation. Negligent misrepresentation 
is not a species of negligence, but fraud. Regardless of whether 
a party owes another any duty of care, a misrepresentation made 
negligently may give rise to liability in certain circumstances. 
The "negligent" portion of the claim simply denotes a reduction 
in the scienter required for fraud. See, Jardine v. Brunswick 
Corp., 18 Utah 2d 378, 423 P.2d 659, 662 n.2 (1967). However, 
under any fraud action there must be a false statement or 
misrepresentation. Tower fails to point to one in this case. 
The Commitment does not purport to represent what the 
status of title is, but rather the terms and conditions under 
which Lawyers Title would insure title. Lawyers Title issued the 
Policy exactly as promised in the Commitment, thereby rendering 
every statement in the Commitment true. The Policy cannot, of 
course, misrepresent itself. These being the only two statements 
or communications by Lawyers Title either directly or indirectly 
to Tower, there are no identifiable misrepresentations. This 
action collapses upon itself on the facts of this case. 
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B. Lawyers Title did not owe a duty to Tower to abstract 
title. 
To the extent Tower means to prosecute a negligence 
action and not a negligent misrepresentation action, it has 
failed again to demonstrate error by the Lower Court. There is a 
split of authority throughout state and federal courts in the 
United States with regard to whether title insurance companies 
can be held liable in tort to their insureds on the basis of what 
has become known as "abstractor's liability." Quite simply, in 
those states accepting such a theory, the courts have held that 
the insurer owes a duty to the insured to examine title to the 
insured property or estate with reasonable care. A close study 
of the subject and the opinions reveals, however, that a title 
insurer is not a title abstractor nor an attorney. Moreover, 
courts in recent decisions and at least one legislature have 
moved away from imposing such liability on an insurer. 
Abstractors of title are different than title insurers. 
Abstractors of title research the chain of title to a piece of 
real property, whether in the public records or elsewhere, and 
provide their customers with an orderly arrangement of the 
materials and facts of record affecting title. See, e.g., 
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OKLA. STAT. tit. 74 §273.11(1) (Supp. 1984). Title 1 of the Utah 
Code comprehensively regulates abstracts of title and those 
persons engaged in that business. See, UTAH CODE ANN. §1-1-1, et 
seq. (1953, as amended). Neither Lawyers Title nor its agent 
qualified as an abstractor. There is no evidence that Tower or 
Richards-Woodbury believed they did. In fact, Tower's own 
attorney understood these differences between an abstractor and a 
title insurer. See, Dopoi it IUH ot i-,at 1 An t Jiwni e 11 h at 1 "1^ -133. 
In American First Abstract Co. v. Western Information 
Systems, Inc., 735 P.2d 1187 (Okla. 1987), the court addressed 
whether services provided by the defendant constituted an 
abstract of title. For a fee, the defendant would provide copies 
of record documents to its customer. After noting the statutory 
definition set forth above the court also noted that the 
definition was not in effect when the alleged acts occurred. The 
court then essentially adopted the Black's Law Dictionary 
definition of "abstract of title," which reads, in part: 
A condensed history of the title to land, 
consisting of a synopsis or summary of the 
material or operative portion of all the 
conveyances, of whatever kind or nature, 
which in any manner affect said land, or any 
estate or interest therein, together with a 
statement of all liens, changes, or 
liabilities to which the same may be subject, 
and of which it is in any way material for 
purchasers to be apprised. 
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BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 10 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). The Oklahoma 
Supreme Court then held that the defendant's activities did not 
constitute the abstracting of title because (1) the defendant did 
not purport to compile all record information, and (2) there was 
no warranty as to completeness or accuracy. American First 
Abstract Company v. Western Information Systems, Inc., 735 P.2d 
at 1188-99. 
Title insurance companies have historically provided, 
and continue to provide, protection in the form of 
indemnification against losses sustained in the event that 
specific contingencies occur. Lawrence v. Chicago Title 
Insurance Company, 237 Cal. Rptr. 264, 266 (Cal. App. 1987). Any 
search a title insurance company makes is undertaken solely for 
its own protection as indemnitor against losses covered by its 
policy. Horn v. Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation, 89 N.M. 
709, 557 P.2d 206, 208 (1976). This threshold distinction was 
pointedly drawn in Tamburine v. Center Savings Ass'n, 583 S.W.2d 
942 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) as follows: 
There is a vast difference in a situation 
where a party employs an abstract company to 
make a title investigation and a situation 
where a party contracts a title insurance 
company for a title policy insuring title. 
The difference between abstract companies and 
title insurance companies is well-defined. 
It has been said that: 
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"The former are concerned primarily 
with the compilation of data, 
affecting the title to particular 
tracts of land, to enable an 
examiner skilled in land law to 
evaluate the title; while the 
latter have evolved as corporate 
insurance companies to guarantee 
(with specified exceptions) the 
status of such title and to insure 
against existing defects which may 
beset it." (citation omitted) 
Title insurance is a contract of indemnity 
(citations omitted). In the absence of some 
special circumstances, the relationship 
between the parties is limited to that of 
indemnitor and indemnitee. 
Id. at 947. 
The only duty a title insurance company hat to its 
insured is to indemnify him against loss suffered by defects in 
title pursuant to the terms of the title policy. Mary Ellen 
Sandlie Trust v. Pioneer National Title Insurance Company, 64 8 
S.W. 2d 761, 762 (Tex. Civ. App. 1983). The policy of title 
insurance does not constitute a representation that defects in 
title will not occur. The insurer does not represent expressly 
or impliedly that the title is as set forth in the policy; it 
merely agrees that it will pay for any losses resulting from, or 
it will cause the removal of, a cloud on the insured's title 
within the policy provisions. The title policy is not a summary 
of the public records and the insurer is not supplying 
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information. To the contrary, it is giving a contract of 
indemnity. Lawrence v. Chicago Title Insurance Company, 237 Cal. 
Rptr. at 266-67; Brown's Tie and Lumber v. Chicago Title Company 
of Idaho, 764 P.2d at 426-427 (the Idaho Supreme Court noted that 
it was a long-standing rule in Idaho that only abstractors of 
title, not title insurers, could be found negligent); Anderson 
v. Title Insurance Company, 655 P.2d at 85-86; Arapahoe Land 
Title, Inc. v. Contract Financing, Ltd., 472 P.2d 754, 756 (Colo. 
App. 1970) ; Roscoe v. U.S. Life Title Ins. Co. of Dallas, 105 
N.M. 589, 734 P.2d 1272 (1987); Devlin v. Bowden, 97 N.M. 547, 
641 P.2d 1094 (N.M. App. 1982); Securities Service, Ins. v. 
Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 20 Wash. App. 664, 583 P.2d 1217 
(Wash. App. 1978); Horn v. Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation, 
557 P.2d at 208. See also, Edwards v. St. Paul Title Ins. Co., 
563 P.2d 979, 980 (Colo. App. 1977) (any liability of title 
insurer to insured must rest on insurance contract). No tort 
cause of action exists against a title company for failure of the 
company to discover defects in title prior to the issuance of the 
title policy. Stone v. Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation, 537 
S.W. 2d 55, 65 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976); Prendergast v. Southern 
Title Guarantee Company, Inc., 454 S.W. 2d 803, 807 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1970). 
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Tower cites certain cases that have painted title 
insurance companies with the same broad liability brush as 
abstractors of title. The cases cited by Tower are either 
distinguishable, outdated, inapposite, or miscited. More 
importantly, the adoption by this Court of their reasoning would 
greatly expand the obligations of title insurers in Utah beyond 
the most liberal reading of the agreements between the insurers 
and their insureds. 
In its attempt to persuade this Court to engraft 
abstractor's liability onto a title insurance company's 
contractual obligations under a title insurance policy, Tower 
relies heavily on Heyd v. Chicago Title Insurance Company, 218 
Neb. 296, 354 N.W. 2d 154 (1984). The Heyd court in turn relied 
upon the Kansas Supreme Court's analysis in Ford v. Guarantee 
Abstract and Title Company, 220 Kan. 244, 553 P.2d 254 (1976) in 
reaching its decision. However, the Ford case is distinguishable 
from the case at bar in that the title insurance company in Ford 
held itself out to the public, and assumed the same duties, as an 
abstractor of title. Moreover, the title company disbursed 
plaintiffs' monies to eliminate clouds on the title to the 
property without taking adequate steps to ensure that the monies 
would be correctly applied. The Ford court held not so much that 
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the title company was liable for its negligent failure to 
discover defects in the title but that it was grossly negligent 
in disbursing the purchasers' monies without obtaining clear 
title. Anderson v. Title Insurance Company, 103 Idaho 875, 655 
P.2d 82, 84 (1982). In short, the Heyd court imposed 
abstractor's liability on a title insurer without understanding 
the factual context in which the Kansas Supreme Court made its 
determination. 
Tower also relies upon the well-traveled case of 
Jarchow v. Transamerica Title Insurance Company, 48 Cal. App. 3d 
917, 122 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1975), for the proposition that title 
insurers have the duty of an abstractor of title. Jarchow was 
superceded by White v. Western Title Insurance Company, 221 Cal. 
Rptr. 509, 710 P.2d 309 (1985). White affirmed Jarchow's holding 
that a title insurer has an abstractor's duty to search the 
public records on behalf of a client. However, the court in 
White specifically noted that in 1982, the California Legislature 
amended its Insurance Code to provide the following: 
"Preliminary Report", "commitment", or 
"binder" are reports furnished in connection 
with an application for title insurance and 
are offers to issue a title policy subject to 
the state of exceptions set forth in the 
reports and such other matters as may be 
incorporated by reference therein. The 
reports are not abstracts of title, nor are 
any of the rights, duties or responsibilities 
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applicable to the preparation and issuance of 
an abstract of title applicable to the 
issuance of any report. Any such report 
shall not be construed as, nor constitute, a 
representation as to, the condition of title 
to real property, but shall constitute a 
statement of the terms and conditions upon 
which the issuer is willing to issue its 
title policy, if such offer is accepted. 
CAL. INS. CODE §12340.11 (West 1968, as amended). The White 
court, in applying Jarchow to the facts of the case, noted that 
the commitment before the court was issued prior to the passage 
of §12340.11 and that that section did not apply retroactively.. 
By passing §12340.11, the California Legislature squarely 
rejected the court's holding and reasoning in Jarchow. 
Subsequently, in a well-reasoned and thorough opinion*,, 
the California Court of Appeals re-examined the concepts of tittllQB 
insurer liability and abstractor's liability. In Lawrence v. 
Chicago Title Insurance Company, 237 Cal. Rptr. 264 (Cal. App. 
1987) , the court noted the White opinion as well as CAL. INS. 
CODE §12340.11, and sharply criticized the California Supreme 
Court's ruling in White: 
Because a title insurance policy does not 
constitute a representation of title, and 
because a preliminary title report, as 
opposed to an abstract of title, generally 
constitutes no more than a statement of the 
terms and conditions upon which the insurer 
is willing to i^sue its title policy . . ., 
liability for negligence based upon the 
preliminary title report in addition to 
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liability under the policy does not seem 
supportable. Nevertheless, we are bound by 
our Supreme Court's statement that liability 
for negligence may arise from the preliminary 
title report. 
Id. at 268. Of course, as discussed above, the Commitment 
prepared by Lawyers Title was issued to Richards-Woodbury, not 
Tower. Further, it was a Commitment for title insurance — not a 
title report. Finally, it is undisputed that, as of November 23, 
1984, Lawyers Title correctly stated the condition of the title 
in the Commitment issued to Richards-Woodbury. 
Tower claims that the Washington Supreme Court has 
recognized the duty of a title insurance company to use due care 
in searching the public records prior to issuing title policies. 
In fact, the Washington Supreme Court has refused to make a 
determination either way on this issue, primarily because it 
feels that " . . . the record is devoid of any evidence, factual 
or empirical, of the practices, intentions, expectations or 
consequences of adopting or rejecting the various theories of 
liability or nonliability. In absence of a full adversary review 
of such evidence, caution is warranted when considering a 
departure from long established precedent." Transamerica Title 
Insurance Company v. Johnson, 103 Wash. 2d 409, 693 P.2d 697, 700 
(1985) (the long-established precedent referred to by the Court 
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was that title insurers have no such duty)* Sea also, Shotwell 
v. Trans|iinerica Title Insurance Company, 91 Wash. 2d 161, 588 
P,2d 208, 211 (1978), In Securities Service, supra, the 
Washington Court of Appeals seemingly rejected abstractor's 
liability, preferring to uphold the terms of the contract. 
Tower cites Williams v. Polqar, 391 Mich. 6, 215 N.W. 
2d 149 (1974) in support of its argument to persuade this Court 
to impose on title companies a duty to search the public records. 
In fact, not only was Polgar an abstractor case, rather than a 
title insurer case, but the court said "[I]t should be noted that 
this action is premised on negligence in title search; an 
abstractor is not converted into a title insurer by virtue of our 
decision today.7'' Id. at 156. 
Finally, Tower parades Moore v. Title Insurance Company 
of Minnesota, 148 Ariz. 408, 714 P.2d 1303 (Ariz, App. 1985), as 
one of its most persuasive arguments in attempting to convince 
this Court to impose abstractor's liability on title insurers. 
However, the Arizona Court of Appeals' dicta regarding this duty 
is based upon the same shaky ground as Tower's other cited 
precedent* The Arizona Court of Appeals relied upon the Heyd 
case as well as the Jarchow case. For the reasons discussed more 
fully ab, those cases are either outdated or < ed flawed and 
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patchwork reasoning in coming to their determinations. The Moore 
case is not helpful in this Court's determination of whether a 
title insurer in Utah should be saddled with the duties of an 
abstractor. This is particularly true given that the case was 
decided on the fact that the plaintiffs had not relied on the 
preliminary title report in closing the transaction. Id. at 
13 08. As such, the court's statements regarding abstractor's 
liability were unnecessary to its determination. 
Lawyers Title suggests that the analyses of the courts 
in immediately-surrounding jurisdictions are sound and should be 
followed by this Court. For example, the Idaho Supreme Court 
very recently faced this precise issue and determined that only 
abstractors of title can be found negligent due to a flawed 
search of the public record, and title insurers owe no duty to 
their insureds to conduct a reasonable search of title before 
issuing a policy. This is true despite the fact that the Idaho 
Insurance Code expressly compels the insurer to examine title 
before issuing its commitment or policy. Brown's Tie and Lumber 
v. Chicago Title Company of Idaho, 764 P.2d 423, 427 (1988); 
Anderson v. Title Insurance Company, 103 Idaho 875, 655 P.2d 82, 
86 (1982). 
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It is also significant to note that in Utah, there are 
separate statutory provisions and regulations for abstractors of 
title and for title insurance companies. UTAH CODE ANN. §1-1-1 
et seq. (1953, as amended) sets forth an extensive scheme for the 
regulation of title abstractors. Separate and apart from the 
regulation of abstractors of title is the regulation of title 
insurance companies under the Utah Insurance Code. Title 
insurance is defined at UTAH CODE ANN. §31A-1-301(82) (1953, as 
amended) as: 
the insuring, guaranteeing, or indemnifying 
of owners of real or personal property or the 
holders of liens or encumbrances on that 
property, or others interested in the 
property against loss or damage suffered by 
reason of liens or encumbrances upon, defects 
in, or the unmarketability of the title to 
the property, or invalidity or 
unenforceability of any liens or encumbrances 
on the property. 
Other relevant provisions throughout the Utah Insurance 
Code concern annual reports (§31A-23-313); authorized activities 
(§31A-23-307) and underwriting rules (§31A-20-110). In short, 
the Utah State Legislature has determined that there is a 
distinction between abstractors of title and title insurance 
companies, a distinction which is at the heart of the rulings of 
the Idaho, Washington, New Mexico, Colorado and California 
Courts, as well as the California State Legislature. Sound 
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precedent and the differing principles of title insurance versus 
abstracting compel the conclusion that title insurance companies 
have no duty to search the public records for purposes of giving 
a legal opinion with regard to the state of a proposed insured's 
title. The purpose of a title search by a title insurance 
company is to determine whether it will insure title, not to 
report defects of record therein. Currently, title insurance 
companies in Utah have no duty to search a title prior to issuing 
a policy, and no such duty should be created. This Court need 
not suffer under the misconceptions of the California Supreme 
Court in Jarchow. Quite simply, the California Supreme Court 
went too far. 
C. Even if the Court determines that Lawyers Title had a 
duty to search the records for defects of title prior 
to issuing the Tower Policy, there is no evidence in 
the record that Tower relied upon the Tower Policy in 
making its underwriting decision to fund its $750,000 
loan to the developer. 
Nowhere in its Brief does Tower discuss its reliance 
upon the Commitment or the Tower Policy in making its 
underwriting decision other than in its Statement of Facts (%% 24 
and 25). There are no other citations to the record with regard 
to any reliance on the part of Tower. The citations to the 
depositions of Jeffrey K. Woodbury, August F. Brand, and E. Earl 
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Autenreith contain nothing more than self-serving and conclusory 
statements. In fact, none of these witnesses say anything from 
which it could be inferred that they relied upon Lawyers Title to 
abstract title or give a legal opinion as to its status. If they 
expected these services from Lawyers Title, why did they obtain 
and rely upon a legal opinion from Gregory Seal? On the other 
hand, the extensive record before this Court shows an exceptional 
nonchalance on the part of Tower in making its underwriting 
decision. As part of that nonchalance, there appeared to be no 
review of either the Commitment or the Title Policy, let alone 
any reliance thereon. 
Tim Krueger, President of Lawyers Title's then local 
agent, Richmond Title Company, testified in his deposition that 
no one from Richards-Woodbury or Tower ever requested information 
from him with regard to the existence of any liens on the insured 
property, other than what was set out in the Commitment or the 
Title Policy. Deposition of Timothy Krueger, Volume II at 74 (R. 
9623) . Jeffrey K. Woodbury, counsel for both Tower and Richards-
Woodbury throughout the Tower Loan transaction process, admitted 
in his deposition that he never reviewed the Tower Policy until 
after the loan closed and funded, and he may not have even looked 
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at the Tower Policy at that point. Deposition of Jeffrey K. 
Woodbury at 23-24. 
In discussing his reliance on various documents during 
the course of the Tower loan transaction, he stated that he 
relied on the Tower Policy for insurance over mechanic's liens 
that might be asserted against the property, and relied upon the 
attorney's opinion he obtained from Gregory Seal with regard to 
the state of the title of the insured property, particularly 
because there might be some things that a title company may not 
know that an attorney would. Id. at 14, 69-70. Deposition of 
Earl Authenreith at 93-94. He and Tower's Pennsylvania counsel, 
Earl Authenreith, knew construction was ongoing prior to the 
Tower Loan closing, and that such construction could give rise to 
mechanic's liens, but their title insurance would pay them off. 
Deposition of Jeffrey Woodbury at 73-74. In retrospect, Woodbury 
said that Gregory Seal's opinion letter should have recognized 
the possibility of mechanic's liens arising from currently-unpaid 
bills of materialmen on the project. Deposition of Jeffrey 
Woodbury at 160; Deposition of Earl Authenreith at 93. 
Even if this Court adopts abstractor liability for 
title insurance companies, Tower cannot successfully oppose a 
Motion for Summary Judgment without citing disputed material 
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facts on the issue of reliance. In trying to persuade this Court 
to adopt abstractor liability for title insurance companies, 
Tower relies heavily upon Moore v. Title Insurance Company of 
Minnesota, 148 Ariz. 408, 714 P.2d 1303 (Ariz. App. 1985). While 
the Arizona Court of Appeals spoke in dicta of abstractor 
liability for title insurance companies, it ultimately held that 
the defendant title insurer was not liable to the plaintiffs. 
The plaintiffs' theory in the Moore case was similar to that of 
Tower in this case, in that the plaintiffs claimed that had they 
known of certain liens of record that the title insurer 
negligently failed to reveal in the title policy, they would not 
have entered the transaction at issue. The Moore court 
determined that in fact the plaintiffs did not rely upon the 
title policy in making their determination of whether to enter 
the transaction, and therefore any negligence on the part of the 
title company was not the proximate cause of the plaintiffs' 
damages. Id. at 1307. 
Similarly, in Groswird v. Hayne Investment, Inc., 184 
Cal. Rptr. 123 (Cal. App. 1982), the California Court of Appeals, 
still acting under Jarchow, determined that the title insurer was 
not liable to the plaintiff for negligent misrepresentation in 
the title policy because the plaintiff did not rely upon the 
- 45 -
title policy in making its transactional decision. In so 
holding, the court noted that it was necessary to show that the 
title insurer's negligence contributed in some way to plaintiff's 
injury, so that "but for" the defendant's negligence the injury 
would not have been sustained. If the harm would have occurred 
anyway, whether the defendant was negligent or not, then the 
defendant's negligence was not a cause in fact and could not be 
the legal or proximate cause of that harm. Id. at 126. The 
court went on to note that even if a title insurer's negligence 
is a cause in fact of a plaintiff's damages, other causes can 
supercede that cause, relieving the title insurer from liability. 
Whether an intervening act is a superceding cause is usually a 
question of fact; however, on undisputed facts, the question is 
one of law. Jd. at 127. See also, Transamerica Title Ins. Co. 
v. Johnson, 693 P.2d 697 (Wash. 1985); Shotwell v. Transamerica 
Title Ins. Co., 588 P.2d 208 (Wash. 1978). 
In the instant case, there are no facts in the record 
to which Tower can point to show that they relied upon the Tower 
Policy or the Commitment in making their determination to fund 
the $750,000 loan, out of which they claim their damages stem. 
Indeed, the undisputed facts show quite the opposite. Tower's 
local counsel testified that there were several material factors 
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contributing to Tower's decision to close the Tower loan: (1) 
there was a pending sale of the Project that would repay the 
Tower Loan quickly; (2) First Security, the lienholder senior to 
Tower, had title insurance covering potential mechanic's liens; 
(3) Tower had Gregory Seal's opinion letter as to the state of 
the title, which opinion had almost no exceptions in it; and (4) 
First Security held a first lien trust deed which secured a loan 
ten times the size of Tower's loan, and Tower believed First 
Security would not allow mechanic's liens to interfere with their 
first position. Deposition of Jeffrey Woodbury at 45-47, 106-
107; Deposition of Gregory Seal at 100 (R. 9610); Deposition of 
Earl Authenreith at 87. As discussed above, Tower only relied on 
the Tower Policy to insure over mechanic's liens filed against 
the Project, which it did. Whether or not Lawyers Title was 
negligent in searching the title prior to issuing the Tower 
Policy is irrelevant, because Tower failed to rely upon anything 
Lawyers Title did. 
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D. Even if Tower relied upon the Tower Policy, such 
reliance was unjustifiable because Tower was well aware 
of certain liens on the Project prior to the loan 
closing. 
As noted in the Statement of Facts above, Tower's 
counsel was aware of at least one mechanic's lien against the 
property prior to closing, as well as a lis pendens recorded 
against the property. Tower's local counsel, Jeffrey Woodbury, 
and Tower's Pennsylvania counsel, Earl Authenreith, knew that 
construction was ongoing on the Project prior to the loan 
closing, and that such construction could give rise to mechanic's 
liens. Deposition of Jeffrey Woodbury at 73-74. Notwithstanding 
that knowledge, Tower decided to go ahead with the closing. 
Tower felt comfortable that any liens recorded against the 
Project, or that might arise in the future, would be covered by 
the title policy they were purchasing from Lawyers Title. Id. 
See also. Deposition of Earl Authenreith at 64-65. This was a 
reasonable expectation of their protection under the title 
policy, and in fact Lawyers Title has litigated, and ultimately 
paid over $1,1000,000 to obtain the release of, the liens that 
were recorded against the Project. Tower's claim that, had they 
known of certain other liens that were recorded against the 
property after the Commitment was issued and before the closing 
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of their loan, they would have refused to close the loan, simply 
is not supported by the undisputed evidence in the record and is 
contrary to the testimony of Tower's own agents. Therefore any 
reliance by Tower on the Tower Policy as to the state of the 
title of the Project was unjustified, in light of Tower's 
knowledge of the true state of title. 
E. Even if Tower justifiably relied upon the Tower Policy 
with regard to the state of the title of the Project, 
any defects in the title were not the proximate cause 
of Tower's loss under its loan. 
Tower's damages were caused by the developer's default 
on the IRB Loan, and First Security's subsequent foreclosure of 
the IRB Trust Deed, not by any breach of duty by Lawyers Title 
under the Tower Policy. As noted in the Statement of Facts 
above, the developer defaulted on its obligations under the IRB 
and Tower loans. Tower's security for its loan was a second lien 
trust deed recorded against the Project. When First Security 
initiated its non-judicial foreclosure action on the Project, 
Tower failed to take any steps to stop the foreclosure action, to 
bid in at the sale of the Project during the foreclosure action, 
or to in any other way protect its security interest in the 
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Project. First Security's foreclosure of the superior IRB Trust 
Deed extinguished Tower's inferior second lien Trust Deed. 
The possibility that Tower would suffer a loss due to 
the foreclosure of the IRB Trust Deed was not a matter for which 
coverage was provided to Tower under the Tower Policy. To the 
contrary, it was a risk the Policy specifically excluded from 
coverage. Any damages Tower has suffered were caused by the 
developer's default on its loan obligation to Tower and First 
Security's foreclosure action, which extinguished Tower's 
security interest in the Project. 
This very issue was faced by the Court in Schuman v. 
Investors Title Ins. Co., 338 S.E.2d 611 (N.C. App. 1986). There, 
the plaintiffs made a loan to "Roger Baker, Inc." to purchase a 
tract of land. The plaintiffs agreed that the deed of trust 
securing repayment of the debt would be subordinate to a deed of 
trust to secure a construction loan from the bank. The deed was 
inadvertently made to "Roger Baker" individually instead of the 
corporation. The corporation's attorney recorded this deed and a 
deed of trust from the corporation to the plaintiffs' attorney as 
trustee. A few days later a deed from Roger Baker to the 
corporation was recorded. The deed of trust in favor of the 
plaintiffs was not recorded a second time. The first deed of 
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trust securing the plaintiffs' loan was therefore outside the 
chain of title. The corporation then executed a deed of trust to 
the bank to secure the construction loan. When the corporation 
defaulted, the bank foreclosed. The foreclosure left no proceeds 
for the plaintiffs, who were rendered in a second lien position. 
The plaintiffs sued both attorneys and the title 
insurer which issued a policy insuring that the corporation had 
title and that plaintiffs7 deed of trust was a first lien. The 
court of appeals affirmed a directed verdict for the title 
insurer because even "... if the record title had been as it was 
insured to be the plaintiffs would be in the same position in 
which they are. They were not damaged because the record title 
was not as it was insured to be." Id. at 613. The cause of the 
loss, i.e., foreclosure by the bank, was due to a matter 
expressly excluded from coverage. Id. 
The cause of Tower's loss was First Security's 
foreclosure of its first lien Trust Deed securing the IRB Loan. 
This matter was expressly excluded from coverage under the Tower 
Policy. Tower is in the same position it would have been had 
record title been as insured. Tower has not suffered a loss 
compensable under either the Policy or in tort. See also, 
Blackhawk Production Credit Ass'n v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 14 4 
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Wis. 2d 68, 423 N.W. 2d 521, 525 (1987) (mortgagee must establish 
its actual loss by proving that sufficient value existed in the 
land upon which it held a security interest and that its value 
was encumbered by the superior undisclosed lien). 
Tower's local counsel (Jeffrey Woodbury) and 
Pennsylvania counsel (Earl Authenreith) were aware of Tower's 
risk in the event that First Security would initiate foreclosure 
proceedings on its first lien Trust Deed: 
Any other title problems or concerns? I 
think I mentioned in my testimony yesterday 
that I did have a discussion with Mr. 
Authenreith regarding the nature of a second 
lien in this case, wherein we discussed 
generally the nature of a second lien in this 
type of project and the necessity that the 
only way for [Tower] to protect themselves, 
other than obtaining the insurance protection 
that we were obtaining and documenting the 
way we were documenting was to be willing to 
— the only other area of protection that 
they needed was that they would be willing to 
pay off the underlying encumbrance should the 
underlying encumbrance feel a need to 
foreclose at sometime in the future, and we 
discussed that issue with him, but that was 
the nature of the transaction — the risks of 
the transaction, rather than any specific 
problem. 
Deposition of Jeffrey Woodbury at 155-56. See also. Deposition 
of Earl Authenreith at 21-22, 144-145. 
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IV. Tower's Third Amended Cross-claim Was Not Brought In Good 
Faith And Is Meritless. Lawyers Title Is Therefore Entitled 
To Its Costs And Reasonable Attorney's Fees Incurred In This 
Litigation Pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §78-27-56 (1953, As 
Amended) And Rule 33(a) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court. 
During the course of this extended litigation, Tower 
has never brought an action against the three parties against 
whom Tower would have strong factual and legal bases: Richards-
Woodbury, the mortgage broker that persuaded Tower to loan 
$750,000 to the developer, and Tower's own legal counsel, Jeffrey 
Woodbury and Earl Authenreith. August Brand, vice president and 
manager of the commercial loan department of Richards-Woodbury, 
and the person most familiar with the Tower Loan at Richards-
Woodbury, testified in his deposition that in pitching the loan 
to Tower, he provided Tower with a loan summary, including the 
loan amount, the terms of the loan, the appraised value of the 
Project, First Security's first mortgage and equity in their 
loan, the financial statements and net worth of the borrowers, 
pictures of the Project, and the fact that a potential sale of 
the Project was in the making. Deposition of August Brand at 14. 
He told Tower that the loan was a good investment that he could 
recommend without hesitation and that, as it was a second 
mortgage, the interest rate at fourteen and one-half percent (14 
1/2%) was an attractive return for Tower. Id. at 23. 
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Notwithstanding Richards-Woodbury's cheery representations as to 
the investment, Tower has refused to bring a claim against them. 
As discussed above, Tower relied entirely upon its 
local counsel and Pennsylvania counsel, Jeffrey Woodbury and Earl 
Authenreith, respectively, to either obtain an attorney's opinion 
as to the state of title of the Project or to determine it for 
themselves. Notwithstanding that reliance, and notwithstanding 
Tower's claim in their brief that had they known the state of 
title at the time of the Tower Loan, they would not have made the 
loan, Tower has not seen fit to sue either of their counsel. 
On or about August 17, 1987, Tower filed its second 
Amended Cross-claim, which for the first time asserted claims 
against Lawyers Title. This filing occurred almost two years 
after the litigation had commenced. 
On December 28, 1987, the Lower Court dismissed Tower's 
seventh and eighth causes of action under its Second Amended 
Cross-claim, which alleged fraudulent and negligent 
misrepresentation against Lawyers Title. Tower than moved to 
amend its Second Amended Cross-claim. At the February 11, 1988 
hearing on Tower's Motion to Amend, the Lower Court indicated 
that it was persuaded that Tower did not have any cause of action 
against Lawyers Title, as a matter of law. However, the Lower 
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Court noted the discovery was still ongoing in the litigation, 
and he would allow Tower to amend its Second Amended Cross-claim 
and utilize the remaining discovery period in an attempt to find 
facts that might support the causes of action alleged in Tower's 
proposed Third Amended Cross-claim, 
Tower's Third Amended Cross-claim was substantially 
identical to its Second Amended Cross-claim, with the addition of 
a cause of action alleging breach of implied contractual 
obligation of good faith and fair dealing. Its so-called "breach 
of contract" cause of action is substantially identical in its 
wording to the misrepresentation allegations made against Lawyers 
Title in Tower's Second Amended Cross-claim. In fact, Tower's 
seventh cause of action in its Third Amended Cross-claim is a 
tortious misrepresentation claim in "breach of contract" 
clothing. Tower's negligent misrepresentation cause of action 
under its Third Amended Cross-claim is identical to its negligent 
misrepresentation cause of action in its Second Amended Cross-
claim, which was dismissed on December 28, 1987. In fact, at the 
February 11, 1988 hearing on Tower's Motion to Amend, Tower's 
counsel admitted the same. It was meritless then, and it is 
meritless now. 
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Tower's cynical effort to skirt the Lower Court's 
December 28, 1987 dismissal of Tower's claims in its Second 
Amended Cross-claim against Lawyers Title must be recognized for 
what it is. There was no basis to its Third Amended Cross-claim 
against Lawyers Title, it was brought without merit, and it was 
clearly not brought in good faith. In the seminal case on "bad 
faith" attorney's fees in Utah, Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149 
(Utah 1983), the court examined UTAH CODE ANN. §78-27-56 (1953, 
as amended), which provides for an award of attorney's fees to a 
prevailing party in the event that an action was without merit 
and not brought in good faith. The court defined "without merit" 
to mean either frivolous or having no basis in law or fact. 
Because none of Tower's claims against Lawyers Title have any 
basis in law or fact, Lawyers Title has satisfied the first prong 
of §78-27-56. 
The Cady court then determined that in order to 
establish lack of good faith, a party must prove that one or more 
of the following factors was lacking: 
(1) an honest belief in the propriety of the 
lawsuit in question; 
(2) no intent to take unconscionable 
advantage of others; and 
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(3) no intent to, or knowledge of the fact that the 
lawsuit in question will, hinder, delay or defraud 
others. 
While this prong of §78-27-56 is somewhat more intangible, it is 
fulfilled by the evidence of Tower's advocacy in this litigation. 
Tower refused to bring actions against the two or three 
parties against whom Tower has factual and legal bases for 
complaint, and instead brought suit against Lawyers Title to try 
to obtain some sort of "nuisance" settlement. In light of the 
lack of merit to its claims, Tower had to lack an honest belief 
in the propriety of its lawsuit, and knew that its lawsuit would 
hinder or defraud Lawyers Title. Accordingly, Lawyers Title has 
satisfied the second prong of §78-27-56, and Lawyers Title is 
entitled to its costs and reasonable attorney's fees incurred in 
having to defend against Tower's Third Amended Cross-claim. See, 
Cadv v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151-152 (Utah 1983); see also, 
Lutz, "Attorneys Fees In Bad Faith, Meritless Actions," 1984 UTAH 
L. REV. 593. 
Tower's Brief has failed to put any meat on the bones 
of its Third Amended Cross-claim. There are no citations to the 
record to support Tower's claims of factual disputes with regard 
to their claims of breach of contract, breach of implied 
contractual obligation of good faith and fair dealing, and 
- 57 -
negligent misrepresentation. The case law cited in support of 
their argument to support a cause of action of negligent 
misrepresentation against title insurers in Utah is ill-reasoned, 
outdated or inapposite. Accordingly, Tower's appeal is 
frivolous. 
Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395 (Ut. App. 1987), is the 
first Utah Appellate Court decision attempting to wrestle with 
Rule 33(a) of either the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals or 
the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. The Eames court looked to 
Cadv v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149 (Utah 1983), for some guidance and 
then determined that in order to obtain attorney's fees and costs 
on appeal pursuant to Rule 33(a), a party must show that the 
appeal was frivolous as well as in bad faith. Eames v. Eames, 
735 P.2d at 397-398. 
Subsequently, in O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306 (Ut. 
App. 1987), the same panel of the Utah Court of Appeals that sat 
in Eames concluded that in Eames they had wrongfully required bad 
faith before attorney's fees could be awarded. The court 
determined that bad faith was only required at the trial court 
level, under UTAH CODE ANN. §78-27-56 (1953, as amended), and 
that such a subjective standard was inappropriate for an 
appellate court. Accordingly, the Utah Court of Appeals 
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determined in O'Brien that in order for a party to obtain 
attorney's fees on appeal, it must only show that the appeal was 
taken either frivolously or for delay. The court went on to 
state: 
For purposes of Rule 33(a) of the Rules of 
the Utah Court of Appeals we define a 
"frivolous appeal" as one having no 
reasonable legal or factual basis as defined 
in Rule 40(a) [of the Rules of the Utah Court 
of Appeals]. An appeal brought for delay is 
one marked by dilatory conduct or conduct 
designed to mislead the court and which 
benefits only the appellant. 
Id. at 310. 
In light of Tower's procedural and substantive advocacy 
in this litigation, Tower's appeal is frivolous, and Lawyers 
Title is entitled to attorney's fees and costs on appeal pursuant 
to Rule 33(a) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
CONCLUSION 
Lawyers Title has breached neither an express nor 
implied obligation under the Commitment or the Tower Policy. 
Lawyers Title had neither a contractual nor common law duty to 
abstract title or render a title opinion for Tower. Lawyers 
Title has made no representation either directly or indirectly to 
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Tower which was false. Tower did not rely, justifiably or 
otherwise, on anything Lawyers Title did. Lawyers Title has 
fulfilled all obligations to Tower. No covered loss has been 
suffered by Tower. No cause of action exists against Lawyers 
Title. Tower's appeal should be dismissed and the Lower Court's 
Summary Judgment affirmed. Lawyers Title is entitled to recover 
its attorneys' fees and costs incurred on the Lower Court level 
and on appeal, as well as its attorney's fees and costs incurred 
in bringing this cross-appeal, from Tower. 
DATED this 2nd day of June, 1989. 
TIBBALS, HOWELL, MOXLEY & WILKINS 
By 
Jeffrey R. Oritt 
FIGARI & DAVENPORT 
Mark T. Davenport 
Doug K. Butler 
Attorneys for Respondent and Cross-
Appellant Lawyers Title Insurance 
Corporation 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 2nd day of June, 1989, I 
hereby caused two true and correct copies of Respondent and 
Cross-Appellant's Brief to be hand-delivered to the following 
counsel of record: 
John P. Ashton, Esq. 
Brian S. King, Esq. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
City Centre, Suite 900 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and caused two true and correct copies of Respondent and Cross-
Appellant's Brief to be delivered by placing the same in the 
United States mail, postage prepaid, to the following counsel of 
record: 
John A. Kincaid, Jr., Esq. 
John R. O'Keefe, Jr., Esq. 
KINCAID & McGRATH, P.C. 
2 Gateway Center, 19th Floor 
Pittsburgh, PA 15222 
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ADDENDUM A 
M 
11 U 
Jaujyers T^le Insurance Corporation 
National Headquarters 
Richmond. Virginia 
COMMITMENT FOR TITLE INSURANCE 
SCHEDULE A 
NOVEMBER 2 3 , 1984 88:00A.M. ffective Oaie 
'oficy or policies to be Issued: 
i) 
D ALTA Owner's Policy—Form B-1970 (Rev. 10-17-70) 
D ALTA Residential Title Insurance Policy—1979 
roposed insured: 
3) ALTA Loan Policy, 1970 (Rev. 10-17-70) 
'roposed insured: 
HARD3-W00DBURY MORTGAGE CORP. 
Case hl9±± 
Amount Sm 
750,000.00/1191.00 Amount $ 
:) 
roposed injured: 
Amount $. 
itte to rESE SIMPLE estate or interest in the land 
(escribed or referred to in this Commitment is at the effeaive date hereof vested in: 
LDMART MALL, A UTAH LIMITED PARTNERSHIP 
he land referred to in this Commitment is described as follows: 
SEE EXHIBIT "A" ATTACHED HERETO 
EXHIBIT NO-
Countersigned" Commitment 
Schedule A—Page 1 
3-208333 
Tht< 
NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS 
RICHMOND. VIRGINIA 
SCHEDULE A-4
 gQntU 
EXHIBIT "A" LEGAL DESCRIPTION 
BEGINNING on the Northerly line of Sandy Parkway at a point which is North 
0*02'25" East 1066.977 feet and East 638.748 feet from the Northwest Comer of 
Section 1, Township 3 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian and 
running thence South S ^ S ? ^ " East 522.115 feet along said street to a point 
on a 440.471 foot radius curve to the right; thence along said curve for an arc 
distance of 361.372 feet (chord bears South 37#22,46,f East 351.322 feet; thence 
continuing along said street South 12#57'35,f East 204.761 feet; thence North 
72*05,59" East 108.000 feet; thence South 18#09'27" East 170.000 feet; thence 
North 77•02l25l, East 263.450 feet to the Westerly line of the D. & R.G.W. 
Rail-road right-of-way; thence North 08*03^l" West 859.000 feet along said 
right-of-way; thence South 81#56f39,t West 30.000 feet; thence North 44#20,00M 
West 234.704 feet to a point of tangency with a 80.00 foot radius curve to the 
righc; thence along said curve for an arc distance of 60.505 feet (chord bears 
North 22*40,00" West 59.073 feet); thence North 01#00'00M West 281.994 feet; 
thence South 89*0r27" West 688.790 feet; thence South Q•28,46,, East 41.171 
feet; thence North 8905O,46" West 11.724 feet to the proposed centerline 
extended of Allen Street; thence South 208.519 feet to a point of tangency with 
a 515.935 foot radius curve to the right; thence along said curve for an arc 
distance of 270.506 feet; thence South S O ^ ^ S " West 25.000 feet to the Point 
of BEGINNING. 
Subject to an Easement for joint use of parking and driveways located on, over 
and across the following described property: 
BEGINNING at the Southwesterly corner of said property and a point which 
is North 198.544 feet land East 1506.434 feet from the Northwest Corner of 
Section 1, Township 3 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian and 
running thence North 77#02,25" East 100.00 feet; thence North 17#54,01M West 
143.611 feet; thence South 72#Q5f59" West 100.235 feet; thence South 18#09I27M 
East 135.000 feet to the Point of BEGINNING. 
Which easement is reserved for the joint use of the aforedescribed property and 
for the use of that property immediately abutting to the West. 
03S 0 999 OOOO. 
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National Headquarters 
Richmond. Virginia 
S C H E D U L E B — Section 1 
Requirements 
The following are the requirements to be complied with: 
Item (a) Payment to or for the account of the grantors or mortgagors of the full consideration for the estate or interest 
to be insured. 
Item (b) Proper instrument(s) creating the estate or interest to be insured must be executed and duly filed for record. 
to-wit: 
1. Mortgage or Deed of Trust from Buildmart Mall, a Utah Limited Partnership, to 
secure your loan. 
2. Reconveyance of that Trust Deed from Buildmart Mall, a Limited Partnership, as 
Trustor to Richmond Title Company, as Trustee and S.B.K. Partnership and H. 
Shirl Wright, as Beneficiary to secure $175,725.00, dated June 19, 1984 and 
recorded June 28, 1984, in Book 5568, Page 2596, as Entry No. 3960987. 
The Beneficial interest hereinunder assigned to Foothill Thrift by that certain 
Assignment of Trust Deed recorded, July 18f 1984, in Book 5574, Page 1856, as 
Entry No. 3969216. 
Subordination Agreement dated September 25, 1984, executed by Buildmart Mall, a 
7 Limited Partnership, to S.B.K., Partnership & H. Shirl Wright, recorded 
(
 September 26, 1984 as Entry No. 3997402 in Book 5593 at Pae« 1977. 
^7 
This commi tment is inval id unless 
the Insuring Provisions and Sched-
ules A and 8 are at tached 
p.inn Mo 91 an (B \\ 
Schedule 8-Section 1 Pnge 1-Commitment N n B P ~ 2 Q 8 5 5 3 
RICHMOND. VIRGINIA 
^ 
SCHEDULE B-Section 2 
Exceptions 
The policy or policies to be hsued wi l l contain exceptions to the following unless the same are disposed of to 
the satisfaction of the Company: 
1 . Rights or claims of parties m possession not shown by the public records. 
2 . Easements, or claims at easements, not shown by the public records. 
3i) Discrepancies, conflicts in boundary lines, shortage in area, encroachments, and ony facts which 
o correct survey and inspection of the premises would disclose and which ore not shown by the 
public records. 
'T!] Any lien, or right to 0 lien, for services, labor or material heretofore or hereafter furnished, im-
posed by law and not shown by the public records. 
^57} Defects, liens, encumbrances, adverse claims or other matters, if any, created, first appear ing in 
the public records or attaching subsequent to the effective date hereof but prior to the date the 
proposed insured acquires of record for value the estate or interest or mortgage thereon covered 
by this Commitment. 
Taxes for the year 1984 are delinquent if they were not paid by November 30 
1984 as to the following: ' 
In the amount of $9,104.60 ^3 to Sidwell No* part of 21-36-377-004; 
In the amount of $36.32 as to Sidwell No. part of 21-36-304-016; 
^ ^_ In the amount of $7.75 as to Sidwell No. part of 21-36-304-017;' 
^tr~ and In the amount of $15.51 as to Sidwell No. part of 21-36-304-020 
NOTE: Salt Lake County Treasurer Telephone No. 535-7404. 
7. Subject to an easement and right-of-way in favor of Utah Power and Light Company 
for electric transmission and distribution facilities along a line described as 
follows: Beginning 450 feet South and 760 feet West, more or less, from the 
North Quarter Corner of Section 1, Township 3 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian; thence North 9#46f West 660 feet, more or less, thence North 
B*12* West 787 feet; the width of said easement is not disclosed. Contained in 
that certain Easement dated July 1, 1980 and recorded November 13. 1980 in Book 
'176 Page 1132 as Entry No. 3501386. 
-? Exceptions numbererll r h m 4 i n r i , are hereby omi»tedA s tQ ^LTA L o a n Policy 
The Owner's Policy to be issued, if ony. shall coniom ihe following items in addition to the ones set forth above: 
(1) The Deed of Trust, if any, required under Schedule B—Section 1, Item lb). 
(2) Unpatented mining claims; reservations or exceptions m patents or in Acts authorizing issuance 
thereof; water ngnts, claims or title to water. 
i'3i Any and all unoaid taxes, assessments and unredeemed lax sales. 
Schedule B—Section 2—Page 1—No. 
RICHMOND. VIRGINIA 
SCHEDULE J L z L _ . c o n t U 
8. Subject to a perpetual easement over the North 20 feet of Lots 5B and 6A in 
favor of Salt Lake County, to bring any and all machinery and equipment upon 
y\ I said property for the purpose of widening, extending, operating, maintaining, 
y .repairing and keeping in satisfactory condition, a waterway in Salt Lake County 
.v> 'Surveyor1 s Office, Midvale Storm Drain, as contained in that certain Easement 
¥ / recorded March 15, 1966 in Book 2439, Page 407, said Easement affects the 
v Northerly line of that property described in Schedule MA,f hereof which is 
vested in Buildmart Mall, a Limited Partnership. 
9./ Subject to an Easement for Utilities, 14 feet in width along and immediately 
/ adjoining easterly Sandy Parkway, a dedicated street, as reserved in the 
dedication of said street. 
10. Trust Deed from Buildmart Mall, a Limited Partnership, as Trustor to Richmond 
Title Company, as Trustee and S.B.K. Partnership and H. Shirl Wright, a*s 
/% Beneficiary to secure §175,725.00, dated June 19, 1984 and recorded June 28, 
/ 1984, in Book 5568, Page 2596, as Entry No. 3960987. 
The Beneficial interest hereinunder assigned to Foothill Thrift by that certain 
Assignment of Trust Deed recorded, July 18, 1984, in Book 5574, Page 1856, as 
Entry No. 3969216. 
Subordination Agreement dated September 25, 1984, executed by Buildmart Mall, a 
Lixited Partnership, to S.B.K., Partnership & H. Shirl Wright, recorded 
September 26, 1984 as Entry No. 3997402 in Book 5593 at Page 1977. 
11. Subject to all unrecorded leases and to the terms and conditions thereof. 
Richmond Title Company is to be provided a copy of said leases prior to 
closing. 
12. An Agreement dated July 10, 1984 by and between Buildmart Mall, a limited 
partnership and Daw, Inc., Employees Pension and Profit Sharing Plan. Given to 
v create a temporary easement for ingress and egress for the use and benefit of 
V that property which lies to the North of and immediately adjoining subject 
property described in Schedule "A" hereof. Said easement is 1 rod in width and 
shall be located over and upon the Westerly portion of subject property. This 
easement shall automatically terminate at such time zs a road is dedicated to 
the public use or improvements are made to establish a road. '7 
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13. Subject to right of way over the Westerly 25 feet of subject property described 
in Schedule "A" hereof for the extension of Allen Street, being more 
particularly described as follows. Said Extension is to be dedicated to the 
public at a future date. 
BEGIN on the Northerly line of Sandy Boulevard at a point which is North 
00#02,25M East 1066.977 feet and East 638.748 feet from the Northwest Corner of 
Section 1, Township 3 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian and 
running thence South 59a57,35" East 50.000 feet to a point of tangency with a 
25.000 foot radius reverse curve to the right, thence along said curve for an 
arc distance of 39.270 feet (chord bears North 14#57,35M West 35.355 feet) to a 
point of tangency with a 540.935 foot radius curve to the left, thence along 
said curve for an arc distance of 283.613 feet (chord bears North 15*01,12M 
East 280.376 feet), thence North 225.312 feet to a point of tangency with a 
25.000 foot radius curve to the right, thence along said curve for an arc 
distance of 38.844 feet (chord bears North 44 #J0 ,43" East 35.053 feet), thence 
/ South 89#or27" West 38.201 feet, thence South 00a28,46H East 41.171 feet; 
/ thence North 89*50'46" West 36.724 feet; thence South 208.587 feet to a point 
/ of tangency with a 490.935 foot radius curve to the right, thence along said 
curve for an arc distance of 257.398 feet (chord bears South 15°01,12M West 
254.460 feet) to a point of tangency with a 25.000 foot radius curve to the 
right, thence along said curve for an arc distance of 39.270 feet (chord bears 
South 75•02,25,, West 35.355 feet) to the Northerly line of Sandy Boulevard, 
thence South 59#57,35" East 50.000 feet along said Northerly line to the Point 
of BEGINNING. 
14. A non-exclusive Right of Way over the Easterly 30 feet and a Right of Way 30 
feet in width, over and through the parking lot in the Southerly portion of 
subject property, being* more particularly described as follows: 
BEGIN on the Easterly line of Sandy Boulevard at a point which is North 
00*02,25H East 326.883 feet and East 1350.455 feet from the Northwest Corner of 
Section 1, Township 3 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian and 
running thence North 72#Q5,59" East 350.000 feet to a point of tangency with a 
64.976 foot radius curve to the left, thence along said curve for an arc 
distance of 90.900 feet (chord bears North 32*01,19M East 83.667 feet) to the 
/ Westerly right of way line of the D.&R.G.W. Railroad, thence North 08*03,21M 
f/vJ) West 517.185 feet along said right of way to a point of tangency with a 154.768 
f W foot radius curve to the left, thence along said curve for an arc distance of 
Jr 97.993 feet (chord bears North 26°li,40M West 96.365 feet), thence North 
44#20,00M West 234.704 feet to a point of tangency with an 80.000 foot radius 
curve to the right, thence along said curve for an arc distance of 60.505 feet 
(chord bears North 22#40,00" West 59.073 feet), thence North 01#00,00M West 
257.017 feet to a point of tangency with a 55.000 foot radius curve to the 
left, thence along said curve for an arc distance of 86.370 feet (chord bears 
North 45°59l16,f West 77.765 feet), thence South 89a01,27M West 663.540 feet, 
thence South 00*28'AO11 East 30.001 feet, thence North 89#01f27M East 663.801 
feet to a point of tangency with a 25.000 foot radius curve to Che right, 
thence along said curve for an arc distance of 39.259 feet (chord bears South 
45*59'17" East 35.348 feet), thence South 01°00,00M East 257.017 feet to a 
point of tangency with a 110.000 foot radius curve Co Che left, thence 
CONTINUED ON RIDER 
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14. CONTINUED 
along said curve for an arc distance of 83.194 feet (chord bears South 
22*40,00" East 81.225 feet), thence South.44*20'00" East 234.704 feet to a 
point of tangency with a 124.768 foot radius curve to the right, thence along 
said curve for an arc distance of 78.999 feet (chord bears South 26#11,4011 East 
77.686 feet), thence South 08#03,21M East 517.185 feet to a point of tangency 
with a 34.976 foot radius curve to the right, thence along said curve for an 
arc distance of 48.931 feet (chord bears South 32*0i,18" West 45.037 feet), 
thence South 72*05'59" West 347.407 feet to the Easterly line of Sandy 
Boulevard, thence South 12*57f35" East 30.112 feet along said Easterly line to 
the point of BEGINNING. 
15. A Right Of Way Easement 16 feet in width in favor of Mountain Fuel Supply 
Company, a corporation of the State of Utah, it's successors and assigns, to 
lay, maintain, operate, repair, inspect, protect, remove and replace pipelines, 
^ valves, valve boxes and other gas transaction and distribution facility through 
l^.and across subject property described in Schedule "A" hereof along center lines 
• V. as shown on the plat attached thereof. 
TOGETHER with all rights and privileges incident thereto, as recorded August 
2*% 1984, Entry No. 3985384, Book 5585, as Page 599. 
Corrective Easement dated September 11, 1984 and recorded October 23, 1984 in 
Book 5600, Page 934 as Entry No. 4007245. 
16. Subject to an Easement for joint use of parking and driveways on, over and 
across the following described property: 
BEGINNING at the Southwesterly corner of said property and a point which 
is North 198.544 feet~and East 1506.434 feet from the Northwest Corner of 
Section 1, Township 3 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian and 
running thence North 77*02,25,f East 100.00 feet; thence North 17*54f01H West 
143.611 feet; thence South 72*05,59M West 100.235 feet; thence South 18*09,27M 
East 135.000 feet to the Point of BEGINNING. 
Which easement is reserved for the joint use of the subject property and for 
the use of that property immediately abutting to the West. 
17. Deed of Trust from Buildmart Mall, a Utah Limited Partnership, as Trustor to 
First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., a National*Banking Association authorized 
and doing business in the State of Utah, as Trustee and First Security Bank of 
Utah, N.A., the Trustee on behalf of the holders of Sandy City, Utah Industrial 
Development Bonds, Series 1984, under an Indenture of Trust dated as of July 
15, 1984; First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., as a letter of credit bank, as 
Beneficiaries, to secure $7,750,000.00, dated September 25, 1984 and recorded 
September 26, 1984 in Book 5593, Page 1940 as Entry No. 3997400. 
-? 
• ) 
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18. UCC-1 Financing Statement wherein Buildmart Mall, appears as Debtor and First 
/ Security Bank of Utah, N.A., as Trustee under an Indenture of Trust dated as of 
July 15, 1984, appears as Secured Party, recorded September 26, 1984 in Book 
*~ 5593, Page 1974 as Entry No. 3997401, 
19• Subjecc to terms, conditions and special assessments of the Special Improvement 
District for the Southridge Industrial Development by and through Sandy City, a 
Municipal corporation. 
20. Said property is located within the boundaries of Midvale City, Sandy City and 
Sandy Suburban Improvement District and is subject to all assessments and 
service charges levied thereunder. 
03S 0 999 OOOO. I 
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C O M M I T M E N T FOR T I T L E I N S U R A N C E 
LAWYERS TITLE INSURANCE CORPORATION, a Virginia corporation, herein called the Company, for valuable 
consideration, hereby commits to issue its policy or policies of title insurance, as identified in Schedule A. in favor of the 
proposed Insured named in Schedule A. as owner or mortgagee of the estate or interest covered hereby in the land 
described or referred to in Schedule A. upon payment of the premiums and charges therefor all subject to the provisions 
of Schedules A and B and to the Conditions and Stipulations hereof. 
This Commitment shall be effective only when the identity of the proposed Insured and the amount of the policy or 
policies committed for have been inserted in Schedule A hereof by the Company, either at the time of the issuance of this 
Commitment or by subsequent endorsement. 
This Commitment is preliminary to the issuance of such policy or policies of title insurance and all liability and 
obligations hereunder shall cease and terminate six (6) months after the effective date hereof or when the policy or 
policies committed for shall issue, whichever first occurs, provided that the failure to issue such policy or policies is not the 
fault of the Company. This Commitment shall not be valid or binding until countersigned by an authorized officer or agent. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company has caused tms commitment to oe signeo and sealed, to become valid when 
countersigned by an authonzed officer or agent of the Company, ail in accordance with its By-Laws. This Commitment is 
effective as of the date shown in Schedule A as "Effective Date." 
CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS 
1 . The term "mortgage.** when used herein, shall include deed of trust, trust deed, or other security instrument. 
2 . If the proposed Insured has or acquires actual knowledge of any defect. lien, encumbrance, adverse claim or other 
matter affecting the estate or interest or mortgage thereon covered by this Commitment other than those shown in 
Schedule B hereof, and shall fail to disclose such knowledge to the Company in writing, the Company shall be relieved 
from liability for any loss or damage resulting from any act of reliance hereon to the extent the Company is prejudiced 
by failure to so disclose such knowledge. If the proposed insured shall disclose such knowledge to the Company, or if 
the Company otherwise acquires actual knowledge of any such defect, lien, encumbrance, adverse claim or other 
matter, the Company at its option may amend Schedule B of this Commitment accordingly, but such amendment shall 
not relieve the Company from liability previously incurred pursuant to paragraph 3 of these Conditions and 
Stipulations. 
3. Liability of the Company under this Commitment shall be only to the named proposed Insured and such parties 
included under the definition of Insured in the form of policy or policies committed for and only for actual loss 
incurred in reliance hereon in undertaking in good faith (a) to comply with the requirements hereof, or (b) to eliminate 
exceptions shown in Schedule 3. or(c) to acquire or create the estate or interest or mortgage thereon covered by this 
Commitment. In no event shall such liability exceed the amount stated in Schedule A for the policy or policies 
committed for and such liability is subject to the insuring provisions and the Conditions and Stipulations and the 
Exclusions from Coverage of the form of policy or policies committed for in favor of the proposed Insured which are 
hereby incorporated by reference and are made a part of this Commitment except as expressly modified herein. 
4. Any action or actions or rights of action that the proposed Insured may have or may bring against the Company 
arising out of the status of the title to the estate or interest or the status of the mortgage thereon covered by this 
Commitment must be based on and are subject to the provisions of this Commitment. 
Jaiuyers Tide Insurance (Jrporation 
President 
Attest: 
Re*, VS^w-uJ^ 
* Secretary 
ADDENDUM B 
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T^ITH ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS 
THIS TRUST DEED, made this .*!?]}. day of ;5r5v... 
3UILIKAPT MnLL. a Utah l isdtad partnership 
between 
whose address is . . .J^Easc.Sroacv^v^ S u i t - 300,_SaU Late _Cit, . 
., u TRUSTOR, 
Clan 
I S u e * * ukd .Number) ( G t * > ( ) u u i 
RICHMOND TITLE 3 Utah corporation. 2nd m such capacity herein uiil.-j TRUSTEE ar.d 
RICHARDS-WOODBURY MORTGAGE CORP . a Utah corporation, jnd m such car-.uy herjm c-'!sU 
BENEFICIARY. 
WITNESSETH: That Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE I \ TRUST. ~ITH 
nO^"EH OF SALE, the following described property, situated in—Sai£..L£t*3 Cou»-:y. S:a:e of TiaK: 
See E z h i b i t "A" at tached hereto $ 
m <* 
2 . ^ 2 - C3 
Z* r 
5> i K C 
*** 
— 
—\ V^ 
m 
j 
v» 
^ 
251 
C=3 
— 0 0 0 
§2= 
—
• z 
—* * £< 
[: DEPOSITION ] 
i EXHIBIT 1 
liSev, — 
0 0 
-a 
e*» 757 
, 
T o c e i b * ' »»th »n bwiio.nei. f ixture* (wxludinc bat * • * 'Waited ta heating, air caadmaaiac f lumbinc. and t i rc tnta l f i t t v m a a * rrwt^o«j»f). 
and iinor«««rn«nu i h i r n * and »U *»at«r n t f l u . nchc* e i way. easement». rent*, i i w n , proltu. I K M M . teneramia k i ^ r t m a r d u . armiecc*. i W 
appurtenance* ihereunta ^ * t o a p o { . a*** er hereaiter esed «t cflieycd with tatd prapertT. • * »«r P*« i i * j W . SUBJECT H O W E V E R , ta ta« n c h c 
p«wcr B A 4 i i a i M n t T berewaftax ftrrcn u aaW cdnteered oaaa E e a e f c u n ' ta cal led *a4 appir tvjca r t a u , tasaaa. 1 * * praOta; 
FOR T H E P U R P O S E O F S E C U R I N G ( I ) payw«aa • * th« iadebtcdnest «»»de«etd by » peaaataaarr aatt oi «*«« date k a r m a . Ui tkc ariacipaJ 
«.„, •( jETgTJ^PRSD FIFTY THOUSMS) AND tTyiOQTKS r^tm_ lg750.000.00 , 
made br Truatar. payable ta the erder el Befteticiarr ec the u o « <n the meaner and «n«b latcrcac w d ether charges ea t h e m * «et farts, •••* 
anr eatentieaa and/er renew»1» or a te t j i cauent tbcreal; 12) (he jcrfarmance e( eaeb tcreeaent 0/ T n n u r heirm n n t i i w d : ( J ) the P * T * » * M 
• ( such ««duien«l leaat ar advmaccs »* h«r«a{ter B M T b« aiade ta Tm^iar. ar hts Mccrtaart t cutf t t t . when evidenced be • aramucerr aata ar 
.^,> . g ( . . . . t S i t i h r » i r » . » w - ^ by this T r a x Deed: »*^ U l »he p a m e s t a< ail N B I cxaeaded ar advaaee^ a« Seaef ^ *anr —•<*» ar ?ar* 
M S * A I I A T U J 1 *.B u T ^treTM, u ^ r j i s r >nui m i M a t UMraaa *» herein pravioeo. 
TO PROTECT THE SECURITY OF THIS TRUST DEED. TRUSTOR AGREES: 
( • ) T a ca«amen<c canairaciiaw aea«wa«lT «a4 ta P M U M %»»»« » u H restaaaUc JiUCn 
eilicaua^u Mtu lactar f ta Beaeftctftrr. « « • 
( b ) T a « I U « SeaaTtci&ry ta iaipeet u i 4 «rar<rt7 «< » n »'"»« d"»nnC c*«mrari:aa. 
ta ca«af«lrtiaa ia are*#Uantc * M J I r'»i 
Trustee, uoaa pre*rftt»ti»n ta it »f an affI.U»«t «%c»«»«< Mr n«nr/Jc«»rf. ^tf«««c fac;r- f t n i «K«».*ic a J* f - M ! t •»* T - j «»^ wmi»r iK.% 
pararraph. i t aathanuEd ta «cc*pt aa irae *•** eaweiaMve * U faa« a*»d t u i e m e m t i h r m a , ana ta aet tnerea«i KerranUer 
APIM.««1 (£*m~-m*mm I -
EXHIBIT NO. b 
r*»»r !»•«« •« - * » W «ati«.iaeter* ia ••** 
i.ir>c<ar peemfHlr - h e n 4 « f . a m | t n , peWict ef •**** * • • " *• * * H '»» the Uencnctarv. •« w . „ , 
shall in ftp e«ent Ve retpansiplc far th* i»f (»r.**<r •» < • " " • * snbttanee el aer ne4*cv ei insurance, ee far t in -nr* er tefftcicncr «4 
an* .n*«,aftce eemeany , * j * , , ^ ,
 l # the insneenet herein pre**ded. (a event ef less. Tnrsie* thail gt»c immediate naticr I * Beneficiar* » « * mav 
mate pre*/ ef let*. ,„«<
 w h .mmrance twmi-m* em*€ttn»4 is bereW i v l H t f t i f ^ $*4 directed te mak» peemcnt («., m n (aas directly (• Brarfw*ery 
mstetd ei <• Trastee «*4 S e w * * , , , * i m n i K »nd »he interanee prercedt. «r any part i M i w f . may be applied bf Bcnci*c»ery. at its eptme te t e -
redwtttea el the Maechteencas aereay N m M «r ' • I I M resaeeetien ee repair ef the preaerty damaccd. 
The Plenef.eiarw „ heree* M l w n t » a ta settle all i « w r » » ^ C ! M M « M 4 eeileet alt .atneence fends aceremc «• the benefit W i W T n 
end/ce Beneficiary, and t« fecihtaie ta t cfrfUrtM* ei sach i a « K M c « . the Tranter heresy aethertaaa the BcacfMnery ta 
»<» and «eit»re alt a r t v a r r aad preen* pre . l t e i less, eieama. werveea and all ether deeaasenta necessary far er naeidemel t« the 
ei •**>• M w i t t t . end .1 necessary «• .avoteie sach preeeedinee » l i » w canity at may be necessary far the cmlcctana mt each . _ 
•a r « w « t all ' R w n n r f p m u ^ « M J I * mate n r D cemeeem«aa and/cr •ettlements aa na«r be aumad m u u i f r anal edniahia. **4 *
 M C n . 
« a a i m • •U caah, «« ita awn
 mmmm M M A|«M«aaT^*><aci (a# T r w i a r . • » r «»^ ail atofta. eaweka. «r aalMr nmn 
I N I M €*««« I M Tr»war «r •«»•
 N » M t w f N ***** a# Michaacf W ««« a # M » « n » a i « rfannharf tkaa aMtr t f wfciinajn far i 
w a i i f i f M I * C T a4 n w r w t , • pmi**r a i iMnraiat* %tamri br aawafcarjtft««Mftc« emmrr. tat 5 « » ^ K i a r r ««il
 M tm»Uc^ la d iar f« ana5 carflact a 
la imnai iaa Im far **cA mttwirmMa) m a« i w f a m wan ! • rae*«4 | . t « e a w p w i a i t tli« QcwWtciarr fav addm—>ai d«nr« i aa>a5 ravaa^ a«vt^ 
M | » r m t n X H » I M < bv wck I ^ M I I M W A . I M Mial fc« shait bacwua a art «4 I R I makbtcalMai 4 w fraan Traa aajal f w w i l a u i W »»U 
W i a i n K#rrt>r M t w r t »r iktt Oraal W Tnrat a»4 «*U M W i a i t • » • * aWaaa»4 ««* thv Bcftcfioar*. Fatlar* » M y aaaal («• « M H MamaM 
thai! c*«»»tiia)t« a aWaaii mmdtf tbra irrnn. Att M a w m t d paUio« W ia»«ranr« akait M • • mck aaaawwta. ui tmck (mm* a*4 ««it M i a n < ar «ajca) 
a n f m c a j earr»«n at o u r M laajiHiM by aaiai as m»j M aatia/actarr ta) i W B*r*i*€i*ry. 
1 T a ddJ»rT ta. M V far a*aj Maimaia « M ) I S s W t c i a r y m*tl ihm %m4tbt*4*rm atc«rc4 WrrVr b pan! ia> fai l , mtk trUtmet W m k aa Baaaa-
fatjarr aaaf rtm,***. I M M M | atMtraca a4 (H i * a# Miweica ni u t U u n a r M a i aMa t« ra ia i iM thrrrta, $mf o u n M i a t . m w i n ar aapaiaiajwa, 
4. T a appear ia w*W oWcnaJ awr aciM« ar sraccc^iaic avrpartii if ta affcei th« ar rantr HcraW, I M tttlc w »a«4 p i a p u n . ar H M rit>t« ar 
f~m a i BanciKtarr a* T n m r r ; a«U ti^via' B«nc<iciar7 •< Trvatct elect t t aiaa i w i r w ar M<««ai M y taxh actwn ar arac«««uitv ta par ail 
can* an4 a a t n m , i M i » 4 t * f e«M •< ruaiaaca a i uU« aaa1 t t t a m c r i ( t t t anal a uaaawaala taaa lajOMTH by Bcaaianarr mr Tnmaa. 
5. Ta par a< Iratt 10 daw arfact «Wlia>a«n*rr all l a act **4 asanaanefit* affectinc saia] araaartr. iaclaajinf all la—niwiaii mmmm «•««• raiw. 
fa*«« itack tmd all ranrv a i f c w w r m t aaal chac fn (ar «a««r. afaartcaant ta ar aaaa ia cawaactiaa m d i aata* praaart i ; ta prr. «a«i« aac. all r*> 
caaiarancca. ehar t ru aaal itens * « a l a i c m t . an aaiai praparty mt aav part thercal, ^aica at aay tiaat aaaaar ta ba pnar ar laaanar aarcta: aaal ta 
pay ail casta, f e n . aaal c ipame* a i lata T m a c 
fa additiaa ia the ment.nir paymanta aa ?ra-»»^c«d m taia* nate. the T n u t a r afreet ta par ta the Bencnctary at the ttroa mt each refa)ar tattalU 
m m payment, "reserre" payments ia saca aaaaamt at are •ntimatta! froat time la tuaa ay Beneficiary ta be nervtsary ta aracr ta accamalat^ 
aecotary f««ndi ta par taaev l a r u a w u . «ao tataraace preintaait pnar ta daa date* thereat, tnaj taia^ "reaerve" pavmran art herray ptrdtrd 
ta the Brnahnary at aediiwMai «arar«iy far the full nvrfarmaare ai this deed af t n m ana1 the na»c ^acarea* hcrrhr. TKa "reaar^r* pavaarata «a 
accvfiwiaiea may INT » i i n d r a » * i*y the Brmrfinary far the payment mi taaea. atvuraaata. mr lataraace prcmnwa* aaa aa the prrraiacs, TV* 
Brnri irtary m»* at *n+ lime, •wheat aataec, aaply taid "rracrve" naymenta ta lhe payment ei aar aaaia dae mmdtt the ttrmt mi thit deed mi 
tnr»t and the natc tcc«r*d Heretry ar cither a( them Truster % faiiare ta par Mid "reserve* pertacms shall caaamete a aeiaait mn4tt this tnrst. 
!a rase • / default and lebseaacnt sale el the premrsca ia aexardaaec hcrr*«th. mr if beneficiary sceptres the prapartT ataer»«se titer mrfaait. 
Brar i i r tarr . at the time el the cammenctmcat ai sach pracecdtntA, mr t t the time the prepcrty it e t h e r i s e acaaircd, shall appff at a credit 
aa the ladcbtednna secared hrrcay, the beiaace then remaining sccamalated aa "rcaerre"* payment*. 
6. Sha«U Tntstar fail ta make aay payment mr ie 4m any act at herein pramded. then Beneficiary mr Treatee. bat wtheec ealic,attea sa ta 
dm and wttheet natire ta er demand apan Tnutmr »m4 wxheat rdeaaiaf Traster frara aar eaiifatiea hereai. muy Make ar da the same in *erh 
manner and ta sec* extent as cither may deem necessary ta pretext the see a m y hereaf. 3en«{iciary mr Trastee beiaf sathartard ta cater eean said 
property far sach parpeacs: cammencc. appear m and defend aay settee e r proceedtne, parpentnt; ta affect the sccunry hereai er (he rights mr 
pawrrt of Beneiinsrr mr Trastee: pay. perehase. cantest. er cam premise any encamnranre. charge mr lien which ia tile ;adement mi either 
appetn te be prter ar •eoener hereta: and ia e s c m t i n f anr sarh papers, incur any liability, expend whatever tmaanu ia its aasetete discretian 
tt may deem necessary Se t t lo r , inciuatnf bat net limited, ta cast ei endenre ei Utic, cmnieyment e i ceeasci. aad payment ei hit rcasanaale fees. 
7. T a pa* immcdiatfly tnd • | iha«< drmana1 alt rams ctpenned hereander try Bencficiarr er Trastee, with interest frem date mt etpeneUtwre 
at the rate set tczzn in trie Noce -nut pe»a. and iw rcfMiymcni ihercaf thail l*c iceared hereay: and te pay alt Traateea aad Attac< 
arrs fee* aa te the maa*m«ja am corns mt sach fees pcrmtiied ta be esecsecd ta Trasiar wader applicable law. 
8. At Benefieiar»"% cntiea. the Tntstar )e«ntly aad severally a trees tm pay a "Tate ehanfe'" a i f i V ^ e r cent ( 5 % I *i the lata! ameant e i 
the manthly mstaiUacnt repaired ta be paid by the abe«c descnaed Pramissary Nate and ihe alercsaid menthly " i t j e n e " pat menc. »nen 
said ac(rc(a ie manihtv pavment it paid more than fifteen (-1$) ears after the dae date thefcai. ia caver the estra expense laverved ia han-
dime delinquent payments, Tnrstat s faslarc ta pay said "lata charts * thail ceaatitetc a def aait aadcr the trast, 
IT IS MUTUALLY ACRCSO THAT: 
f . Shaeld said preaerty mr aay part theraai Uc taken mr dsmaced by reaaaa e i aay paulic tmpra»ement mr caaacmwanaa prarredinc. mr 
da ma red by fire, er carthaaakc, er ta any ether manner. Bencficiarr shall ba entitled, ta all cnmpcnaatian. awards, and ether payments er relief 
therrfer. and shall be entitled at its aetata ta cammence. appear in aad presccate in t o mwn name, aay actsaa er acaceedinft, er ta make aay 
car*premise ar settlement, ta cenaeruea wnh tach U k i a f mr damafc, 
ta appfymc the praceeda ml aay awarei an accaant mt the indebtedimaa sccared hereav. Beneficiary shall tax entitled ta cntlrct.aat mi the 
araceeds ef the a»«rd a premtam mm the aaaaaat prepatd at the same rate as thaacn the Traatar had erected at the taaa ei sach eeoltcatrea ei 
areceeds te prepay the ladeateoneaa ia aecardance wsa> the terma ei the note secared hereay. a* if the Traatar then has an seen cieetiaa. at the 
first raccced»n« date en which the Traatar eaaid sa elect. Alt sach canspensatraa, ewerea. damafea. nthta ei acxaaa, aad araceeds. iMlad inc 
the praceeds el any peWtea ei fire ana1 ether insarskca affecuat; said preaerty. are hereay aamenea1 ta Beneficiary, ana , after dedecttnf iherefmm 
ail its expenses avciadinf atserncy s feet, axay elect ctthcr ta reieaae any maniea sa recessed by iC ar apply the sasaa an aay laaWatedncse aacarad 
hereay. T r a i l e r s f ,m > ta execata sach farther asaipitaeais a i any c w p a w i a i w , award, dansafxav anal n g h a a i actian anal aeaaeada aa Bene* 
H o a r y mr Trastee mar reaaira. 
10. At any time and frem time ta tune nnea written reaaest a i Ben eficiary. paymem e i ita fees aad presematsaa e i this Treat Deed and tha 
nate far rndarsemant ( ta case e i fai l reenneeyanca. far canceilatien and m e n u a a * . vitheet aifecttag the Uamiuy ai any pcrsea far the p e y 
aarm a i the tnneatedneaa secared hereay. Traatee may (a> cansent ta the making, a i any map ar plat ai saad preaerty: (b ) jean as frta<tn« 
any easement mr creatine, aay rcs imuna thereen: ( e ) jmnt ia any ranaraaaattaa ar ether tfTcesnent aifecuaf Una Trast Deed er the hen er 
charce thereei: (d> grant an extensaaa mr aaaaifkanan mt the terms e f Una treat deed apen written reaaest e i the beeefieiarr: <c) raeanvey. 
smheat warranrr, «Q er aar part mi said aeanerty. The grantee in any recanreyanca may be described at *»he perma ar persana entitled therrta, 
and the recitals theretn e i aay matters mr I ecu thail be cmaJaan* t r a t f af the trathfeJncaa ihereai. Traatar a^reas ta pay faasanaaae Traateea 
fees far aay a i the servscni mcananad in thai naragraph. 
U . Aa edditieaal setamy. Traatar herebe aaxecne * • Beajcfkiary, darsag the cantmaenca ml these orasu. aB rears* tarwea, rayahiea, and 
•rai i ta e i the peaaeny aifected by that Tnrat Deed »m4 mi aay peraenal preaerty lecated therean. Until Traatar snail deiaait m the paynaent a i any 
aad»aicd»w*f - v e i r d herrhe mr m the prrfarmam*e mi aay u n i a t w harraadar. Traatar ahail hawe the nana sa aaal cat aM each raata, heme*, 
raralties. and pralita earwed pr»«c te delawlt aa they became dae aad peyeetc. If Traatar shall eefeeit aa aiaaamia. Tramar a right ta eeileet any 
ei tach mantes shall cease ana! Beneficiary shall have the right, wnh er wttheet taking pesacaaicn af the praparty affected hereay, ta eeiiect and 
retain all rentt. raya»*>«*. imaex, aad pra i iu . Fatlara ee diacaattnaancc a f Beneficiary at aay tune mr frees tanc ta tiase ta catlect aay sach maaies 
shell net in say manner affect the snasevnem cniertemeat by Beneiictary ei the nghl . pawer, and aathanty ta eeileet use same, Nathing un tamed 
herein, nm* the cttrcise ei the n K ht by Beneficiary ta eeileet, shall be, e r ba n i u t . f i d te be. aa affirmeuan by Beneiictary mt any tenancy, lease er 
• * . . _ . . „ . « . ^ . ^ . . ^ . ^ ., u , * *4* f — j ^ , ,««. . i „.» . , . — a fSm llmm mr rherca af una Trant Dead In any sach tenancy, leant er eptsen. 
12. Should the Trustor se l l , transfer or oonvey any portion of the 
Property, or any building or iaprovenient now or hereafter located thereon, or 
any interest what-ever therein to any person, firm, or corporationf or should 
the Trustor permit or suffer the occupancy of any portion of the Property by 
anyone for a term in excess of forty (40) years, whether as a tenant or other-
wise, without, in each instance having first obtained the prior written ^ consent 
of Beneficiary, or i ts successors and assigns, to such sale, transfer or" con-
veyance, then each such occurrence shall be deemed a default by Trustor, and the 
entire indebtedness secured by this Trust Deed, at the option of Beneficiary, 
shall beoortn* ijimeaiately due and payable, and thereupon, the Beneficiary may 
demand immediate payment in full of said indebtedness and may exercise all legal 
limits to collect said indebtedness, including but not limited to foreclosure of 
this Trust Deed, Beneficiary's consent to such sale, transfer or conveyance 
shall not b* unreasonably withheld and shall be given only if the following ccn-
diLiun;* am ua.-L u> Ucncliciuiy's satisfaction: 
Co) The proposed purchaser of the Property satisfies Beneficiary's tr.en 
ixistmg credit requirements for loans of the nature and amount of the lnzectsdness 
ividenced by the aoove-described Note; and 
(c) Beneficiary shall have approved the terms of the proposed sal-2, 
:ransfer or conveyance of the Property to the proposed transferee. 
:eneficiary hereby consents to allcw Trustor to transfer, sel l and convey Limited 
'artnersmp interests provided that the Borrower provides sufficient evidence and 
issurances that said transfers, sales or conveyances are being made in accordance witn 
:he laws of the State of titan and the United States of America, where applicable. 
** fo— " ^ ^ / i * 1 1 ^ J « « « * trrwwmdtr. IfcW.ci.cy mmy •! «»r ri»n« wiitmmt M t « c mk*r \m ^ v w . W • « ! * . «r W • Tr*n*+r »• br 
f
^
 w
. ** • tmmn ITrwnm hti.tiiy C W W N « | t* iW i f ^ M M m W Be*«<M*t«rr „ ••«*
 m m t r | , M * ^mkmmt rrtnrd t« tttc U*mrn*cr •! t«* 
! ! I ! 2 ! T TLii md*}**4**,m h w ^ r ! • « • • • * e ~ ~ < I M «*W uh« p H i r a M W »HJ ptvtwrtr M « « T ^ *er«W. .• ,M — - m , « , f«, «r 
* T T c * " m *r , • . r t , , , *• ' " " ^ •«* *•'»"• »•*'•*»« i »^r t»tf .*«« »m4 «*t»*4. •«< •»»'* «W — « , Ic» c*«i ..W t . » r ~ n W • , - * . . . • • 
« * c^icctM.. , *r .«4» ( m w u M t attorfirr, f*^ • ( « • .»y , MjcUe4j.ru wr«r*4 ferefcy. w * m wmtk «r*« M Be^Kury ««y 4eterm*~ 
^ k J 1 T k * r m * T f •* •" "•* , , k i * « I " 1 " " - •* « • * P"H»-«T. ih#. c«11«ctt«i W MM* rem*. . « •* • M * prW..t, •* iKe p*rr«tft rf fir* »nA 
TH7 T T * " * " *•**'«• •» «•«!•«««••«• «r «~.»i* Ur «»y u k m ( or 4»m«ce •* MM! pf*pcrtr. «»4 ik* t f f r t e t M or rri*w. t h m < •• •!•€«• 
»••< >•*! «M cure «r ««t»c »*y «*«*«•*« «r nM*cc •< <Jcf««it heroiufer «r u^mlidwe «ay ret daw ; 
. . . ^ W 7 1 ? Ufmn " V * T r - * , "^"'"T »• Pf^mwlf enf.rce . « T H«ht Herr^cr tfc.J! MM • p w U •» . M i m W MCJI nCht .1.4 tk* 
15. Ti^ a is of the ecsence hereof. All sums secured hereby shall LTTweciaiely 
:«ccme cue and payaale at the option of Beneficiary upon the occurrence of any of the 
IcLLcwL-^  events: (a) Trustor defaults in the payment of any indebtedness secured 
•.ereby or Ln the perfornance of any agreement hereunder; (b)-Trustor generally faiLs 
:o pay i ts dents as they tecome <5XIQ, admits in writing its inability to pay its 
5ebts, or makes a general assignment for the benefit of creditors so that it causes a 
"aterial impairment of the security; (c) Trustor caraences any case, proceeding, or 
other action seeking reorconizaticn, arrangement, adjustment/liquidation, dissolu-
:icn, or composition of i t or i t s debts under any l2w relating to bankruptcv, 
Lnsolvency/ reorganization, or relief of debtors, or seeking appointment of"a receiver, 
irustee, custodian, or ocr.er similar off ic ia l for it or for all oc any substantial 
:art of its property; (d) Trustor takas any action to authorize any of the actions 
set forth in (b) or (c) above; or (e) any case, proceeding, or other action against 
Trustor is cennienced seeking to have an order for relief entered against Trustor as 
:ebtor, or seeking reorganization, arrangement, adjustment, liquidation, dissolution, 
)r ccnpcsition of Trustor or i t s deots under any law relating to bankruptcy, 
Insolvency, reorganization, or relief of debtors, or seeking appointment of a 
receiver, trustee, custodian, or other similar official for i t or for all or any 
substantial part of its property, and such case, proceeding, or other action either 
results in the entry of an order for relief against Trustor which is not fully stayed 
;ithin seven (7) business days after the entry thereof, or remains undismissed for a 
Period of sixty (60) days. In the event of any such default. Beneficiary may execute 
3r cause Trustor to execute a written notice of default and of election to cause the 
Property to be sold to satisfy the obligations hereof, and Trustee shall cause such 
KJtice to be recorded in each county wherein the Property or some part or parcel 
ihereof is situated. Beneficiary also shall deposit with Trustee, the above-
!escribed tote and ai l documents e/idencing expenditures secured hereby. 
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20. Trustor shall not, without the prior written consent of Beneficiary, create, 
permit, or suffer to exist, and, at Trustor's expense, will defend the Property and 
take such other action as is necessary to remove any lien, claim, charge, security 
interest, or encumbrance in or to the Property, or any portion of the Property. No 
secondary financing will be permitted except the pre-approved secondary financing and 
unless the arount and terms of said intended financing is revealed prior to the 
acceptance of this 7cu£t Deed and is approved in writing by Lender. 
•r.ct foct-h in th* Mote 
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*set forth in tha JiDte 
TRUSTOR: 
BUILDMART MALL, a Utan liroitea 
partnership by i t s Generai Partner 
BUILDMART MALL INC-U7AH, a Dtan ccrpcrat: 
3 y : 
Steven P, U c r y r / P r i b i a a n t 
STATS OF U T A H 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
On t h i s n-h &L0*1 
appeared STEVEN P. QJ 
BUILDMART MALL INC-O' 
instrxaaent as Genera, 
nershi?/ known to me 
d a ^ ^ f t ^ X K ^ y ^ ^ f , before me personally 
r__wn t^a%me t o be the Presicent of 
be-^orpo^atrbn that executed tne witnin 
to/tnetfsiafcsaiLpMART MALLf a l imitea part-
es fte^I^,E?xr^^ w^° 3^c^ <=^ ted tne within 
"instrument on behalf ^ f fine corporation tnecein namea, and 
acknowleaged to me th%; sux^ h corppratfon executed the witnin 
^/S^^tawSoOc^a resolution or i t s boar a instrument pursuant to 
of d i r e c t o r s . 
tarv ^Fuoixc re^Taing 
My Commission Expires: 
Notary^Fuoixc res aing at 
^LC. Utah 
EXHIBIT "A" 
BOUNDARY DESCRIPTION 
Begin on the Northerly line of Sandy Parkway at a oomt wnicr. 
is North 0°02,25'' East 1066.977 feet and East 638.748 feet from 
the Northwest corner of Section lf Township 3 South, Range 1 
West, Salt 'Lake Base and Meridian and running thence Soutn 
59°57,35H East 522.115 feet along said street: to a point on a 
440.471 foot radius curve to the right, tnence along said curve 
for an arc distance of 361.372 feet (cnord bears South 37022,4oM 
East 351.322 feet); thence continuing along said street Soutn 
12057,35,f East 204.761 feet; thence North 72°05'59" East 108.000 
feet; thence South 18°09'27" East 170.000 feet; thence North 
77°02,25n East 263.450 feet to the Westerly line of the D6RG;; 
Railroad rignt-of-way; thence North OB^S^l" West 859.000 feet 
along said right-of-way; thence South 81°56*39" West 30.000 feet; 
thence North >44°20'GO" West 234.704 feet to a point of tangency 
witn a 80.00 foot radius curve to the eight; thence along said 
curve for an arc distance of 60.505 feet (chora bears North 
22o40,00,, West 59.073 feet); thence North 01oQ0,0QM West 281.994 
feet; thence South 89°01'27H West 638.790 feet; thence South 
0o23'46M East 41.171 feet; thence Nortn 89°50'46" West 11.724 
feet to the proposed centeriine extended of Allen Street; thence 
South 208.519 feet to a point of tangency with a 515.935 foot 
radius curve to the right; thence along said curve for an arc 
distance of 270.506 feet; thence South 30°02,25" West 25.000 feet 
to tne point of beginning. Contains 19.751 acres, more or less. 
Sub]ect to an easement for joint use of parking and drive-
ways, on, over and across the following described property: 
Begin at tne Southwesterly corner of said property and a 
point which is Nortn 198.544 feet and East 1506.434 feet from the 
Northwest corner of Section 1, Township 3 South, Range 1 West, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian and cunning thence North 77°02,25'' 
East 100.00 feet; thence North^ 17°54'01* West 143.611 teet; 
thence South 72°05,59" West 100.235 feet; thence South 18o09,27w 
East 135.000 feet to the point of beginning. Contains 0.320 
acres, more or less. 
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ADDENDUM C 
jQuryers line insurance vurpuiauua 
National Headquarters 
Richmond, Virginia 
Policy Number 
82-00-472531 
SUBJECT TO THE EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE THE EXCEPTIONS CONTAINED IN SCHEDULE B ANO THE PROVISIONS OF 
THE CONDITIONS ANO STIPULATIONS HEREOF, LAWYERS TITLE INSURANCE CORPORATION, a Virginia corporation, herein 
called the Company, insures, as of Date of Policy shown in Schedule A. against loss or damage, not exceeding the amount 
of insurance stated in Schedule A. and costs, attorneys' fees and expenses which the ^Company may become obligated to 
pay hereunder, sustained or incurred by the insured by reason of: 
1. Title to the estate or interest described in Schedule A being vested otherwise than as stated therein; 
2. Any defect in or lien or encumbrance on such title; 
3. Lack of a right of access to and from the land; 
4. Unmarketabihty of such title; 
5. The invalidity or unenforceability of the lien of the insured mortgage upon said estate nr interest extent fn the »Yfgnj 
that such invalidity or unenfnrr0*h, i?tv nr claim thereof, arises out of the transaction evidenced by the insured mortgage 
and is based upon (a) usury, or (b) any consumer credit protection or truth in lending law; 
6. The priority of any lien or encumbrance over the lien of the insured mortgage; 
7. Any statutory lien for labor or material which now has gained or hereafter may gain priority over the lien of the 
insured mortgage, except any ^H r h l ?»n a r t < mQ f r w m * n tmrrm,«m«n» * n th#» ^^ contr^^d for and 
commenced subsequent to Date of Policy not financed m whole or in part by proceeds of the indebtedness 
secured by the insured mortgage which at Date of Policy the insured has advanced or is obligated to advance; 
or 
8. The invalidity or unenforceability of any assignment shown in Schedule A. of the insured mortgage or the 
failure of said assignment to vest title to the insured mortgage in the named insured assignee free and dear of 
all liens. 
IN WITNESS WHEREur ine v-ompany nas causea inis roiicy to oe signeu ana seaiea, to oe vena wnen ^cneouie A is countersigned 
by an authorized officer or agent of the Company, all in accordance with its By-Laws. 
Igiuyers Title InaujShce (prporatton 
President 
EXHIBIT NO. <- A"** 
• Secretary. 
r \ , Jj-ld^ RECEIVED SE? I 6 1885 e C G O U 
Policy 32 Utho m U S A Cover Sheet 
035-0-082 0006/1 ALTA loan Policy - 1970 (R«y 10-17-701 Cooyrigm 1969 
uyers Title Insurance Corporation LOAN POLICY 
Schedule A 
CASE NUMBER 
191-S 
GATE Of POUCY 
MARCH 20
 f 1985 
810:50 A.M. 
AMOUNT Of IMSUIUMCS 
$ 750,000.00 
THE POLiOr NUM8ER SHOWN k 
ON THIS SCHEDULE MUST mi 
AGREE WITH THE PREPRINTED W] 
NUMBER ON THE COVER SHEET f 
POUCY NUMBER 
82-00-472531 
ame of Insured: 
:0WER FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION 
J>># •**•*» «v> tntmrm*t rmtmrrmd to harmin i* at Date of Poliev vnsted im 
BUILD MART MALL. A UTAH LIMITED FAKXTCKSaUP 
The estate or interest in the land described in this Schedule and which is encumbered by the insured mortgage \s: 
FEE SIMPLE 
The mortgage, herein referred to as the insured mortaaoe. and the assignments thereof, if any, are described as follows: 
Trust Deed with Assignment of Rents from Buildmart Mall, a Utah Limited Partnership, as 
Trustor to Richmond Title, a Utah Corporation, as Trustee and Richards-Woodbury Mortgage 
Corp., a Utah Corporation, as Beneficiary, to secure $750,000.00, dated March 13. 1985 and 
recorded March 20, 1985 in Book 5638, Page 757 as Entry No. 4063300. 
Assigned to Tower Federal Savings and Loan Association by Assignment of Trast Deed, dated 
March 13, 1985 and recorded March 20, 1985 in Book 5638, Page 762 as Entry No. 4063301. 
Security Agreement by and between Buildmart Mall, a Utah Limited Partnership and 
Richards-Woodbury Mortgage Corp., a Utah Corporation, dated March 13, 1985 and recorded 
March 20, 1985, in Book 5638, Page 764 as Entry No. 4063302. 
Assignment of Rents and Leases by and between Buildmart Mall, a Utah Limited Partnership, 
as Assignor and Richards-Woodbury Mortgage Corp., a Utah Corporation, as Assignee, dated 
March 13t 1985 and recorded March 20; 1985 in Book 5638, Page 793 as Entry No. 4063305. 
The land rmfemd to in this policy is described as follows: 
SEE EXHIBIT "A" LEGAL DESCRIPTION 
liH0i%{ & »fu *£<\ fcl 
RICHMOND TITLE COMPANY 
gOl^Z^Co 
/ ' CAumtrsmnatur&Auinonxsd Otltcm or Aqmi* 
Policy 82 (Rev 2/79) Utho m U S A . 
035-0-082-0500/1 
Issued sttLocation} 
This Policy ts invalid unless the cover 
sheet and Schaduie 8 are attecned. ALTA Loan Policy 1970 (Rav. 10-17-70) Cooyr*M 1969 
0€OOJ2 
LEGAL DESCRIPTION 
BEGINNING on the Northerly line of Sandy Parkway at a point which is North 
0*02'25H East 1066.977 feet and East 638.748 feet from the Northwest Corner of 
Section 1, Township 3 South, Range 1 Vest, Salt Lake Base and Meridian and 
running thence South 59#57f35,, East 522.115 feet along said street to a point 
on a 440.471 foot radius curve to the right; thence along said curve for an arc 
distance of 361.372 feet (chord bears South 37#22,46ff East 351.322 feet; thence 
continuing along said street South 12*57'35" East 204.761 feet; thence North 
72*05' 59" East 108.000 feet; thenca South 18#09t27ff East 170.000 feat; thance 
North 77#02f25tf East 263.450 faet to the Westerly line of the D. & R.G.W. 
Rail-road right-of-way; thence North 08*03,21,f West 859.000 feet along said 
right-of-way; thence South 8I#56f39" West 30.000 feet; thence North 44#20,00" 
West 234.704 feet to a point of tangency with a 80.00 foot radius curve to the 
right; thence along said curve for an arc distance of 60.505 feet (chord bears 
North 22*40f00" West 59.073 feet); thence North 01•00,00f, West 281.994 feet; 
thence South 890Ol,27,t West 688.790 feet; thence South 0#28f46" East 41.171 
feet; thence North S ^ S O ^ " West 11.724 feet to the proposed centerline 
extended of Allen Street; thence South 208.519 feet to a point of tangency with 
a 515.935 foot radius curve to the right; thence along said curve for an arc 
distance of 270.506 feet; thence South 30•02,25,, West 25.000 feet to the Point 
of BEGINNING. 
Subject to an Easement for joint use of parking and driveways located on, over 
and across the following described property: 
BEGINNING at the Southwesterly corner of said property and a point which 
is North 198.544 feet and East 1506.434 feet from the Northwest Corner of 
Section 1, Township 3 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian and 
running thence North 77#02f25" East 100.00 feet; thence North H ^ ' O l " West 
143.611 feet; thence South 72#05,59" West 100.235 feet; thence South 18#09,27M 
East 135.000 feet to the Point af BEGINNING. 
Which easement is reserved for the joint use of the aforedescribed property and 
for the use of that property immediately abutting to the West. 
ScheduU-A Page_2a£2_.No. f| f\ 
350 9990000 1 
0i 
ORIGINAL 
1191-f KLBCH 20, 1983 
010:50P.M. 
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ON TH1 COVER SMCETr-— ' f 
Schedules —Parti 
82 -00 -4725 
This policy does not insure against loss or damage by reason of the following* 
1. Rights or claims of parties in possession not shown by the public records. 
2. Easements, or claims of easements, not shown by the public records. 
3. Discrepancies, conflicts in boundary lines, shortage in area, encroachments, and any facts which a correct survey and insoecuon. 
of the premises would disclose and which are not shown by the public records. 
4 Any hen. or right to a lien, for services, labor, or material heretofore or hereafter iumtshed. imposed by law and not shown by the 
public records. 
5. Taxes for the year 1985 now accruing, not yet due and payable. 1984 Taxes were paid 
as to the following 1984 Sidwell Noa. part of 21-36-377-004; part of 21-36-304-016; 
part of 21-36-304-017 and part of 21-36-304-020• 
6. Subject to an easement and right-of-way'In favor of Utah Power and Light Company for 
e l e c t r i c transmission and d i s t r ibut ion f a c i l i t i e s along a l ine described as fo l lows: 
Beginning 450 feet South and 760 feet West;-more or l e s s , from the North Quarter 
Corner of Section 1, Township 3 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; 
thence North 9*46f West 660 f e e t , more-or l e s s , thence North 8*12' West 787 f e e t ; the 
width of said easement i s not d i s c l o s e d . ' Contained in that certain Easement dated 
July 1, 1980 and recorded November 13, 1980 in Book 5176 Page 1132 as Entry No. 
3501386. 
7 . Subject to a perpetual easement over the North 20 feet of Lots 5B and 6A in favor of 
S a l t Lake County, to bring any and a l l machinery and equipment upon said property for 
the purpose of widening, extending, operating, maintaining, repairing and keeping in 
s a t i s f a c t o r y condit ion, a waterway in Salt Lake County Surveyor1• Off ice , Midvale 
Storm Drain, aa contained in that certain Easement recorded March 15, 1966 in Book 
2439, Page 407, said Easement a f f e c t s the Northerly l ine of that property described 
in'Schedala HAW hereof which i s vested in Buildmart Mall,"a Limited Partnership. 
8 . Subject to an Easement for U t i l i t i e s , 14 f ee t in width along and immediately 
adjoining eas ter ly Sandy Parkway, a dedicated s t ree t , as reserved in the dedication 
of said s t r e e t . 
Exceptions numbered 1-4 inrlnaiv* are hereby omitted. 
SCHEDULE B - PART II 
In addition to the matters set forth in Part I of this Schedule, the title to the estate or interest in the land described or referred to 
in Schedule A is subject to the following matters, if any be shown, but the Company insures that sucn matters are subordinate 
to the lien or charge of the insured mortgage upon said estate or interest: 
SEE EXHIBIT WB" ATTACHED HERETO 
OC0014 
ALTA Loan Poiicv-1 970 (R«v 10-17-70) CapvnQto 1969 
Iatuyere Tllle Insurance Corporation 
NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS 
RICHMOND. VIRGINIA 
SCHEDULE_5l i_contd. 
Trust Deed from Buildmart Mall, a Limited Partnership, as Trustor to Jlirh^qnA 
Title Company, AS Trustee and S.B.K. Partnership and H. Shirl Wright, as 
Brteticiary to secure $175,725.00, dated June 19, 1984 and recorded June 28, 
1984, in Book 5568, Page 2596, as Entry Mo. 3960987. 
The Beneficial interest hereinunder assigned to Foothill Thrift by that certain 
Assignment of Trust Deed recorded, July 18, 1984, in Book 5574, Page 1856, as 
Entry No. 3969216. 
Subordination Agreement dated September 25, 1984, executed by Buildmart Mall, a 
Limited Partnership, to S.B.K., Partnership & H. Shirl Wright, recorded 
September 26, 1984 as Entry No. 3997402 in Book 5593 at Page 1977. 
Subordination Agreement dated Kerch, 1985, executed by S.B.K. Partnership, H. 
Shirl Wright and Foothill Thrift and Loan, recorded March 20, 1985 in Book 
5638, Page 804 as Entry No. 4063306. 
Subject to all unrecorded leases and to the terms and conditions thereof. 
An Agreement dated July 10, 1984 by and between Buildmart Mall, a limited 
partnership and Daw, Inc., Employees Pension and Profit Sharing Plan. Given to 
create a temporary easement for ingress and egress for the use and benefit of 
that property which lies to the North of and immediately adjoining subject 
property described in Schedule "A" hereof. Said easement is 1 rod in width and 
shall be located over and upon the Westerly portion of subject property. This 
easement shall automatically terminate at such time as a road is dedicated to 
the public use or improvements are made to establish a road. 
suoiecc co right of way over the Westerly 25 feet of subject property described 
in Schedule MAM hereof for the extension of Allen Street, being more 
particularly described as follows. Said Extension is to be dedicated to the 
public at a future date. 
BEGIN on the Northerly line of Sandy Boulevard at a point which is North 
00#02,25" East 1066.977 feet and East 638.748 feet from the Northwest Corner of 
Section 1, Township 3 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian and 
running thence South 59*57f35" Kaat 50.000 feet to a point of tangency with a 
25.000 foot radius reverse curve to the right, thence along said curve for an 
arc distance of 39.270 feet (chord bears North 14#57,35" West 35.355 feet) to a 
point of tangency with a 540.935 foot radius curve to the left, thence along 
said curve for an arc distance of 283.613 feet (chord bears North 15*01f12" 
East 280.376 feet), thence North 225.312 feet to a point of tangency with a 
25.000 foot radius curve to the right, thence along said curve for an arc 
distance of 38.844 feet (chord bears North 44°30,43M East 35.053 feet), thence 
South 89°01f27,f West 38.201 feet, thence South O O ^ ^ " East 41.171 feet; 
thence North 89#50,46,f West 36.724 feet; thence South 208.587 feet to a point 
of tangency with a 490.935 foot radius curve to the right, thence along said 
curve for an arc distance of 257.398 feet (chord bears South 15*01f 12,f West 
254.460 feet) to a point of tangency with a 25.000 foot radius curve to the 
right, thence along said curve for an arc distance of 39.270 feet (chord bears 
South 75°02,25" West 35.355 feet) to the Northerly line of Sandy Boulevard, 
thence South 59a57,35" East 50.000 feet along said Northerly line to the Point 
of BEGINNING. 
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13. A non-exclusive Right of Way over the Easterly 30 feet and a Right of Way 30 
feet ill Width, over ana through the parking lot in the Southerly portion of 
subject property, being more particularly described as follows: 
BEGIN on the Easterly line of Sandy Boulevard at a point which is North 
OO^Ol'lS'9 East 326.883 feet and East 1350.455 feet from the Northwest Corner of 
Section 1, Township 3 South, Range I West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian and 
running thence North 72*05*59" East 350.000 feet to a point of tangeney with a 
64.976 foot radius curve to the left, thence along said curve for an arc 
distance of 90.900 feet (chord bears North 32#01,19M East 83.667 feet) to the 
Westerly right of way line of the D.&R.G.W* Railroad, thence North 08*03f21H 
West 517.185 feet along said right of"way to a point of tangeney with a 154.768 
foot radius curve to the left, thence"along said curve for an arc distance of 
97.993 feet (chord bears North 26#ll,4Qfi West 96.365 feet), thence North 
44°20,0Q" West 234.704 feet to a point of* tangeney with an 80.000 foot radius 
curve to the right, thence along said curve for an arc distance of 60.505 feet 
(chord bears North 22°40,00" West 59.073 feet), thence North 01°00,00,f West 
257.017 feet to a point of tangeney with a 55.000 foot radius curve to the 
left, thence along said curve for an arc distance of 86.370 feet (chord bears 
North 45*59' 16" West 77.765 feet), thence South SrOl'lV9 West 663.540 feet, 
thence South 00*28,40" East 30.001 feet, thence North 89<,01l27,, East 663.801 
feet to a point of tangeney with a 25.000 foot radius curve to the right, 
thence along said curve for an arc distance of 39.259 feet (chord bears South 
45*59f17" East 35.348 feet), thence South 01*00f00" East 257.017 feet to a 
point of tangeney with a 110.000 foot radius curve to the left, thence along 
said curve for an arc distance of 83.194 feet (chord bears South 22*40,00,f East 
81.225 feet), thence South 44*20'00" East 234.704 feet to a point of tangeney 
with a 124.768 foot radius curve to the right, thence along said curve for an 
arc distance of 78.999 feet (chord bears South 26*11,40" East 77.686 feet), 
thence South OS^OS^l" East 517.185 feet to a point of tangeney with a 34.976 
foot radius curve to the right, thence along said curve for an arc distance of 
48.931 feet (chord bears South 32*01f18" West 45.037 feet), thence South 
72*05*59" West 347.407 feet to the Easterly line of Sandy Boulevard, thence 
*<mth 12#57,35w East. 30*112. fx5*t„aloa^e«ii> «Mt*rl*ai««.Urthm point of f 
jffr/gK^ ttrvjjr gg«^»nt» 16-feet^fn width in favor of Mountain Fuel Supply 
Company ^ 'corporation of tfce State'of Utah, it's successors and assigns, to 
lay, maintain, operate, repair, inspect, protect, remove and replace pipelines, 
valves, valve boxes and other gas transaction and distribution facility through 
and across subject property described in Schedule "A11 hereof along center lines 
as shown on the plat attached thereof. 
TOGETHER with all rights and privileges incident thereto, as recorded August 
27, 1984, Entry No. 3985384, Book 5585, as Page 599. 
Corrective Easement dated September 11, 1984 and recorded October 23, 1984 in 
Book 5600, Page 934 as Entry No. 4007245. 
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15. Subject to an Easement for joint use of parking and driveways on, over and 
across the following described property: 
BEGINNING at the Southwesterly corner of said property and a point which 
is North 198.544 feet and East 1506.434 feet from the Northwest Corner of 
Section 1, Township 3 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian and 
running thence North 77*02,25" East 100.00 feet; thence North 17#54,01ff West 
143.611 feet; thence South 72*05,59" West 100.235 feet; thence South 18#09,27,f 
East 135.000 feet to the Point of BEGINNING. 
Which easement is reserved for the joint use of the subject property aad J*JLS 
the use of that property immediately 'ibuttin* to tbim ¥•*£'. 
16. Deed of Trust from Buildmart Mall, a UtaH Limited Fartnera&ip, as Traator to 
First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., a National Banking Association authorised 
and doing business in the State of Utah, as Trustee and First Security Bank of 
Utah, N.A., the Trustee on behalf of the holders of Sandy City, Utah Industrial 
•n^^7^pma^f» ^ ^ 3 . Series l?flAl uqder an Indenture of Trust dated ^a of July 
15, iQftAflFirqr S»*»uritv Bank of Utah, N.A.,/as a letter of credit bank, as 
Beneficiaries, to secure */, /3U,UUU.U0, uatred September 25, 1984 and recorded 
September 26, 1984 in Book 5593, Page 1940 as Entry No. 3997400. 
17. UCC-1 Financing Statement wherein Buildmart Mall, appears as Debtor and First 
Security Bank of Utah, N.A., as Trustee under an Indenture of Trust dated as of 
July 15, 1984, appears as Secured Party, recorded September 26, 1984 in Book 
5593, Page 1974 as Entry No. 3997401. 
18. UCC-1 Financing Statementjvherein Buildmart Mall, appears as Debtor and Young 
Electric Sign Company, appears as Secured Party, filed October 3, 1985 as 
-Filing No. 989327. 
19. UCC-1 Financing Statement wherein Buildmart Mall, a Ut. Ltd. Part. (General 
Partner Buildmart Mall Inc.), appears as Debtor and First Security Bank of 
Utah, National Association, appears as Secured Partyt filed January 11, 1985 aa 
?ilin» No. 0G1921-
20. UCC-1 Financing Statement wherein Builmart Mall, a Ut Ltd. Part., appears aa 
Debtor and Richards-Woodbury Mortgage Corp., appears as Secured Party, recorded 
March 20, 1985 in Book 5638, Page 787 as Entry No. 4063303. 
21. UCC-1 Financing Statement wherein Buildmart Mall, a Ut Ltd, Part., appears as 
Debtor and Richards-Woodbury Mortgage Corp., appears as Secured Party, recorded 
March 20, 1985 in Book 5638, Page 790 as Entry No. 4063304. 
22. Subject to terms, conditions and special assessments of the Special Improvement 
District for the Southridge Industrial Development by and through Sandy City, a 
Municipal corporation. 
23. Said property is located within the boundaries of Midvale City, Sandy City and 
Sandy Suburban Improvement District and is subject to all assessments and 
service charges levied thereunder. 
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Trust Deed from Buildmart Mall, a Limited Partnership, as Trustor to Richmond 
Title Company, AS Trustee and S.B.2C. Partnership and H. Shirl Wright, AS 
Beneficiairy, to secure $175,725.00, dated June 19, 1984 and recorded June 28, 
1984 in Book 5568, Page 2596 as Entry No, 396098. 
The Beneficial interest hereinunder assigned to Foothill Thrift by that certain 
Assignment of Trust Deed recorded July 18, 1984 in Book 5574, Page 1856 as 
Entry No. 3969216. 
Subordination Agreement dated September 25, 1984, executed by Buildtaart **11, a 
Limited Partnership, to S.B.K. Partnership & H. Shirl Wright, recorded 
September 26, 1984 as Entry No. 3997402 in Book 5593 at Page 1977, 
Subordination Agreement dated March, 1985 executed by S.B.K. Partnership, H* 
Shril Wright and Foothill Thrift and Loan, recorded March 20, 1985 in Book 
5638, Page 804 as Entry No. 4063306. 
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4. Notice of Losa—Limitation of Acmn 
In addition to the nonces required under paragraph Jib} of these Condi 
tions and Stipulations, a statement in writing of any ioss or damage for 
which it is ctaimed the Company <s liable under this policy shall be 
furnished to the Company within 90 days after such ioss or damage shall 
have been determined and no right of action shall accrue to an insured 
claimant until 30 days after such statement snail have bmen furnished. 
Failure to furnish such statement of loss or damage shall terminate any 
liability of the Company under this poncy as to such loss or damage. 
5. Options to Pay or Otherwise Settle Claims 
The Company shall have the option to pay or otherwise settle for or m 
the name of an insured claimant any claim insured against or to terminate 
ail liaoiiity and obligations of the Ccmoany hereunder by paying or 
tendering payment of the amount of insurance under this policy together 
with any costs, attorneys fees and exoenses incurred up to the time of 
such payment or tender of payment by the insured claimant and 
authorized by the Comoany. in case loss or damage ts claimed under this 
policy by an insured, the Company snail have the further option to 
purchase such indebtedness for the amount owing thereon together with 
ail costs, attorneys fees and expenses which the Company is obligated 
hereunder to pay if the Company oilers to purchase said indebtedness as 
herein provided, the owner of such indebtedness snail transfer and 
assign said indeoteoness and the mortgage and any collateral securing 
the same to the Company upon payment tnerefor as herein provided. 
6. Determination and Payment of Loss 
(a) The liability of the Company under this poiicyshail in no case exceed 
the least of* 
(t) the actual ioss of :he insured claimant: or 
(ii) the amount of insurance stated m Schedule A or if aopltcaoie 
the amount of insurance as dehnea m paragraph 2{a) hereof, or 
(in) the amount of the indebtedness secured by the insured mortgage 
as determined under paragraph 3 hereof, at the time the loss or 
damage insured against nereunder occurs, together with interest 
thereon 
(b| The Company will pay. in addition to anv loss insured against by this 
policy, all costs imposed upon an insured in litigation earned on by the 
Comoany for sucn insured and ail costs, attorneys fees and expenses m 
litigation carried on b\ sucn insured with the written authorization of the 
Company 
(ci When liability, has been dennitefy fixed m accordance witn the 
cpnditions of this policy, the loss or damage shall be pavaoie witnm 20 
days thereafter 
7. limitation of Liability 
No claim shall arise or be maintainable under this policy (a| if the 
Company, after having received notice of an alleged defect, lien or 
encumbrance insured against hereunder, by litigation or otherwise, 
removes such defect, lien or encumbrance or establishes the title, or the 
lien of the insured mortgage, as insured, within a reasonable time after 
receipt of such notice: (b) in the event of litigation until there has been a 
final determination by a court of competent turtsdiction. and disposition of 
tit aooeais therefrom adverse to the tttte or to the lien of the insured 
0*009*90. a* *t»u##d. i t provided tn per agraoft 3 Hereof, or to for liability 
votumat* *f*urned fry en tfieured in ttuawtg erry ctwoi or *t#tt wttftout 
**^Sfl*v*fcJGits^jfiatfn<*<i5iu**e*^^ jraursraar afforded hereunder exceptw die mmtwnt that fuch peymontar 
feducetne amount of tfte indebtedness secured by tne ensured rnartoeojeu 
insured mortgage shall terminate ail liability ot tne ugm»«ny VM.<rw% «-
provided m paragraph 2(a) hereof. 
|b) The liaoiiity of the Comoany shall not be increased by additional 
principal indebtedness created subsequent to Oate of Policy, except as to 
amounts advanced to protect the lien of the insured mortgage and 
secured thereoy. 
No payment shall be made without producing this poicv for 
endorsement of such payment unless the policy be lost or destroyed, m 
which case proof of loss or destruction shall bo furnished to the 
satisfaction of the Company. 
9. Liability Noncumuiative 
If the insured acquires title to the estate or interest in satisfaction of the 
indebtedness secured by the insured mortgage, or any part thereof, it is 
exoresslv understood that the amount of insurance under this policy shall 
be reduced bv any amount the Comoany may pav under any policy insuring 
a mortgage hereafter executed bv an insured which is a charge or lien on 
the estate or interest descnoed or reierreH to m Schedule A, ^nd the 
amount so paid shall be deemed a payment under this policy 
10. Subrogation Upon Payment or Settlement 
Whenever the Comoany snail have seated a daim under this policy, ail 
right of subrogation shall vest in the Company unaffected by any act oi the 
insured claimant, exceot that the owner of the tndeotednesa secured by 
the insured mortgage" mey release or substitute the personal liability ot 
any deotor or guarantor, or extend or otherwise modify the terms o* 
payment, or release a portion of the estate or interest from the lien of thf 
insured mortgage, or release any collateral security for the indeotedness 
provided sucn act occurs prior to receipt by the insured of nonce of an 
claim of title or interest adverse to the title to the estate or interest or tn 
priority of the lien of the insured mortgage and does not result in any los 
of priority of the lien of the insured mortgage. The Company snail o 
subrogated to and be entitled to ail rights and remedies wrnch sue 
insured claimant would have had against any person or property > 
resoect to such claim nad this policy not oeen issued, and if requested C 
the Comoany. such insured claimant snail transfer to the Comoany a 
ngnts and remedies against any person or property necessary in order 
perfect such ngnt of suorogation and shall permit the Comoany to use t. 
name of such insured claimant tn any transaction or litigation mvoivir 
such rights or remedies. If the payment does not cover the ioss of sue 
insured claimant, the Company shail be subrogated to such rights ar 
remedies in the proportion wnicn said payment bears to the amount of sa 
loss, but such subrogation shail be <n subordination to the insun 
mortgage. If loss of priority should resuit from any act of such msur» 
claimant, such act shall not void this policy, but the Company, tn tn 
event, shall be required to pay only that part of any losses insured agair 
hereunder which snail exceed the amount, if any. lost to the Company 
reason of the impairment of the right of subrogation. 
11. Liability Limited to this Policy 
This instrument together with ail endorsements and ot* 
instruments, if any. attached hereto by the Company is the entire pou 
and contract between the insured and the Company. 
Any claim of loss or damage, whether or not based on negligence. a< 
which arises out of the status of the lien of the insured mortgage or of f 
tttte to (he estate or interest covered hereby or any action asserting sue 
Claim, inail be rmmtnamd to ttm nrawiMin*,end condition*mnd ototilmuor 
-liereym. or-ettartedrftereto signed by either tr 
?r*ck*erflL* Vice ftemtoent. the Secretary, en AsatMtam Secretary. 
m&dsttr% oncer of authorized **an*tory of the Camoanv. 
12. Nodes*. Where Sent 
..Att notices required to be given the Company and any statement 
writing required to oe furnished the Company shall include the numc 
3f this policy and shail be addressed to its Corporate Headquane 
5630 West Broad Street. Richmond. Virginia 23230, Mailing adcire 3
 0 Box 27567. Richmond. Virginia 23261. 
lau *ers Title Insurance (orDoratton 
National Headquarters 
Richmond, Virginia 
A 
STEVE URRY 
A University of Utah. 
Q Did you graduate? 
A No. 
Q How many years did you attend? 
A Three and three quarters. 
Q Did you major in any particular subject? 
A Yes. Marketing and business. 
Q And that was undergraduate? 
A Right. 
Q Do you have any post-graduate education of any kind? 
A No. 
Q Are you familiar, Mr. Urry, with a limited 
partnership entitled Buildmart Mall? 
A Yes. 
Q How are you familiar with that? 
A It was a limited partnership that was formed to 
build the Buildmart project. 
Q How were you involved in the limited project 
Buildmart Mall? 
A I was a limited partner. 
Q Who were the general partners in the limited 
partnership? 
A The general partnership was Buildmart Mall, 
Incorporated. And in that the officers were myself as 
president; Gregory Seal, I believe, was vice-president; and 
9 
I think, that yoi i n lade ti : ,e choice to go with Shirl Wright & 
Associates rather than Peterson Enterprises; is that what you 
said? 
A T.\. - : : . - . : . 
Q Okay, "War: ;: at at oat that time that Buildmart 
Mall, Inc. 'Jr.ai. wus termed w i^*a tti:;t. cor.et.iire lati-r? 
A We. •... .:dmart Mall, Incorporated was formed by 
myself, whica wab ta reserve the namef because we r.ad spent the 
money to put z~-\tc*-:-* - • -:*-.:-.-. r :: :. ... . -^incs of 
that nature. A;,a, primarily, ^ : ; t-- \.- : z z: tr.e na~e and 
that was why ::; *aa incorporated and registered. 
Thereafter J M . pnoi to cIoama r ^ai^dr^art Y?.1?. 
Inc. gave permission to Buildmart Mall, Ii: • 'z. : * ase the 
name, and that's why that corporation was --•"-• -•-*•.* , zs 
formed t»»i t: •. .osinq of tne loan foe the partnership 
purposes, 
Q Okay . {J \ • t i * i <* i r a n J t \i e r oor i "C i u 11'jn called 
B u i1dma r t Mall, In c, • 
A That's right, 
Q Was th. * - . : a t i ^ ; i iiii J I U H J in any way in tl le 
l i m i t e d p a r t n e r s h i p B a i i c - a r t Mall? 
A No. 
Q . ...edge, is Buildmart Ma21 T-~ 
corporation :n J;XG standing presently? 
A Uo, ii'a nut. 
21 
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165 
finalizing it, and so I had to go by their office and pick it 
up. I can't remember which document it was. It seemed to me 
it was like a UCC-1 or something. It was something of that 
nature. 
Q It wasn't an attorney's letter, opinion letter? 
A It could have been. I can't remember, I'm sorry. 
Q Maybe I should backtrack a little bit and tell me 
when you first learned of the Tower transaction and then step 
through your involvement with it that way. 
A Okay. Steve Urry and Shirl had contacted me. I 
can't remember which one first* They indicated they were 
arranging financing for a loan in the approximate amount of 
$750,000. Okay? 
Q Now, I take it they were doing it on behalf of 
BuildMart — 
A Yes. 
Q — partnership? 
A Yes, as BuildMart. Whatever entity, BuildMart. 
Q Whatever BuildMart entity it was? 
A Yeah, not individually, and that the transaction was 
being put together at Richards^Woodbury. As I recall, August 
Brand was the one that had originated the transaction. 
Q August Brand? 
A Yes. He's their commercial guy over there. 
Q Of Richards-Woodbury? 
166 
A Yes. We issued a commitment up to Richards-
Woodbury, to them, and, you know, the transaction proceeded 
along those lines. Does that j;ur: •. ..<; ^ ,ei;r:on? 
Q Yes, part of i;. ::. issuing the commitment, tell 
me, t i f," t nt j I i
 f wb> V-, u get these affidavits and 
indemnification agreements? Is it at the couui titmei it stage or 
is it at r. ;>. policy stage? 
t , • pri c T , usual ] y either at the closing or 
just prior to t:;- closing. 
Q S o : * 6 i Liie L ::: *.- --•• 
A Year - ?ojrp timer ^ - * J.1 
get them maybe a w^e:. <* L a. n:-^  n in advance cf the closing. 
If you know th»- < *' - ^ • m ^:ur, v^- _ have it 
executed so that . • - .es, J. .:•;' - , : • worry 
about at closing. •.-. Iw - .. • ^^pediiei: tr,* entire 
:" '• |>li - out ui. L U W L s ~uc , At that 
time, * d< r. ': kri1 v% , ;• seemed ¥r> ™e that t;.*. I *• 
transaction, that one we signed a few days earlier, and the 
reason tor thai j. , J: ! recall, Stcvo T'liy was going out of 
town the day that was supposed to tile. Right at or around 
m a t tune he war qoinq out of town. 
Q ^ou i:icjneu it a Im-v, iLv - trail j^ r thai i it was 
supposed to close? 
A Yeah. He provided it to t is. 
Q Do you recall what :a^ ^ r, - .. , : .- :.*-:*.*:.:•• :fs 
TIM KRUEGER VOL. II 
GREAT DEAL WITH THEM, AS I RECALL. THERE WAS ONE INSTANCE 
THAT, I THINK I SPOKE WITH A DIANE UP THERE, AND THAT WAS 
BECAUSE WE WERE TRYING TO DO DIFFERENT CLOSINGS. BUT WHETHER 
IT WAS ON THIS ONE OR SOME OTHER, I CAN'T REMEMBER. 
Q YOUR RECOLLECTION, THOUGH, IS THAT THE PR, THE 
COMMITMENTS REQUESTED BY SHIRL WRIGHT WERE FOR THE TOWER 
LOAN? 
A IT COULD HAVE COME DIRECTLY FROM 
RICHARDS-WOODBURY, BUT ULTIMATELY SHIRL WOULD HAVE DIRECTED 
IT, IF IT BE THROUGH THEM OR WHOEVER, TO COME TO ME, BECAUSE 
I WAS THE ONLY ONE WHO WAS FAMILIAR WITH THIS MASS OF LAND 
THAT WAS OUT THERE AT THAT TIME. 
Q SO IS IT FAIR TO SAY THAT IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN 
RICHARDS-WOODBURY? IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN SHIRL WRIGHT THAT 
REQUESTED IT? 
A YES. 
Q WHEN YOU SAY YOU ARE THE ONE WHO WAS MOST 
FAMILIAR, DO YOU MEAN THE PERSON AT GUARDIAN AT THIS POINT 
WAS MOST FAMILIAR? 
A NO, I WAS WITH RICHMOND. 
Q I'M SORRY, RICHMOND? 
A YES. I HAD WORKED WITH THIS PROJECT FOR A NUMBER 
OF YEARS, AND OF ALL TITLE COMPANIES, I PROBABLY HAD THE BEST 
OVERALL KNOWLEDGE OF WHERE THE PROJECT WAS, BOTH BUILDMART 
AND SOUTH RIDGE. 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 10 
TO ME OF SOMEONE'S INTENT TO FILE A LIEN, I WOULD PASS THIS 
ALONG. 
3 I Q AND THE SAME IS NOT NECESSARILY TRUE OF GREG SEAL 
4 I THEN? YOUR TESTIMONY IS YOU MIGHT HAVE CONTACTED STEVE URRY 
OR SHIRL WRIGHT AS OPPOSED TO MR. SEAL? 
A GREG AND I WERE NOT IN A DAY-TO-DAY COMMUNICATION 
WITH EACH OTHER. IF GREG NEEDED SOME PARTICULAR INFORMATION, 
HE WOULD CALL ME AND ASK ME FOR IT. IF I KNEW THERE WAS 
SOMETHING THAT WOULD BE PARTICULARLY A PROBLEM FOR HIM, I 
10 I WOULD PROVIDE IT WITH HIM. BUT BARRING THAT, YOU KNOW, THERE 
11 WAS NO REQUEST TO. AND SO NORMALLY I DEALT WITH STEVE URRY 
12 OR SHIRL WRIGHT, AND MOSTLY IT WAS SHIRL WRIGHT. 
13 Q OTHER THAN THE ESCROW INSTRUCTIONS THAT WE HAVE 
14 TALKED ABOUT, DID JEFF WOODBURY EVER MAKE AN EXPRESSED 
15 REQUEST TO YOU ALONG THE LINES, WE WANT TO KNOW OF THE 
16 EXISTENCE OF EVERY LIEN ON THIS PROPERTY? 
17 A NOT THAT I EVER RECALL. 
18 Q DID ANYBODY ON BEHALF OF RICHARDS-WOODBURY OR 
19 TOWER MAKE A SIMILAR REQUEST TO YOU ALONG THE LINES THAT WE 
20 WANT TO BE ADVISED OF EVERY LIEN THAT'S ON THIS PROPERTY 
21 BEFORE WE CLOSE? 
22 A NO, NOT THAT I RECALL. 
23 Q HAVE YOU EVER SEEN GREG SEAL'S ATTORNEY'S OPINION 
24 LETTER? 
25 A I MAY HAVE. I DON'T RECALL IT. IF YOU WANT TO 
EARL AUTHENREITH 
1 this Buildmart loan was made in November of 1984. The loan 
2 actually closed in March of 1985, if that helps you in terms 
3 of chronology. 
4 A Yes. 
5 Q In response to the pressure that you told us about 
6 in this move toward commercial loans, was Tower making a 
7 similar kind of commercial loan on a nationwide basis? 
8 A Not really. It had been involved in some in the 
9 Pittsburgh area, partipating but not originating loans and 
10 not keeping the whole loans themselves. Pretty much relied 
11 on ones that had been generated by Richards-Woodbury. 
12 Q Do you know how Richards-Woodbury came to be 
13 selected as the Tower local person? 
14 A No, I don't. 
15 Q Who would know at Tower? 
16 A Well, I think Mr. Spagnola would know. 
17 Q We have talked in terms of commercial loans. And, 
18 again, to kind of get some common vernacular, how would you 
19 describe the Buildmart Mall loan we have here described as 
20 variously as the Buildmart loan, second mortgage. What 
21 terms are you comfortable with to describe that loan? 
22 A That is difficult to put a name on it or a label 
23 on it. 
24 Q I am having difficulty with it. 
25 A It was a second mortgage, second deed of trust, 
1 but it was treated, I think, by Tower as a bridge loan to 
2 temporarily complete or at least to complete a project so 
3 that it could be marketed. And it was not considered by 
4 Tower, to my recollection, to be a long-term arrangement. 
5 If you can use bridge terms, bridge loan to that extent. 
6 Q Well, I guess,you make sure we are on the same 
7 ground. Can you describe for me what you mean by bridge 
8 loan? 
9 A Normally, bridge loan would be a temporary loan, 
10 just until another loan came along. That is the way I would 
11 look at it. That isn't really the term you would apply 
12 here. 
13 Q Where I am headed to try to get to a sense of 
14 other types of similar loans that Tower was making, I don't 
15 want to foreclose in my question certain things by asking 
16 about bridge loans, second mortages, whatever. So, you can 
17 understand my difficulty. 
18 A Yes. 
19 Q What I need to know, if Tower at about this point 
20 in time, '83, '84, was making other bridge loans, second 
21 mortgages of this type. 
22 A I can tell you that. No. And, maybe that is what 
23 you're looking at. 
24 Q Yes. 
25 A No, Tower was not in the habit of making second 
1 mortgages or second positions. It was normally in first 
2 position all the time. 
3 Q So, — 
4 A It would be unusual. It would be an unusual loan. 
5 Buildmart would be an unusual loan for them. 
6 Q Do I understand, then, that the Buildmart loan 
7 would be an unusual loan for you to make,where, at the time 
8 it was made — would it also have been unusual in your 
9 experience thereafter, did that signify a change in their 
10 policy? 
11 A No. It was still an unusual situation. 
12 Q All right. To your knowledge, was it a unique 
13 situation? Was it the only second mortgage that they had 
14 ever made? 
15 A Commercial second mortgage. I think that is the 
16 only one they ever made. Residential, they might have been 
17 involved in, but small residential. But that would have 
18 been unusual, too. 
19 Q Do you know whether there was a reluctance? You 
20 have not said why that was not their policy. 
21 A Because of the risk, second mortgages have a far greater 
22 risk position then a first deed of trust or first mortgage 
23 position. 
24 Q You will have to forgive me as I go through. I 
2
^ will ask you a lot of questions that may seem silly. The 
1 risk to which you refer is as a result of what? 
2 A Well, see, in your second position you are 
3 dependent on the pay of the first loan position. And, if 
4 there is a default, you always have to be in the position of 
5 paying off the first loan, and a sizable loan with an 
6 institution the size of Tower ,that jeopardizes your loan. 
7 Q Do you know why the decision was made to make the 
8 Buildmart loan, given that it was apparently a departure 
9 from what Tower had been doing? 
10 A Well, you know, these are underwriting things that 
11 Spagnola would have discussed with the Board. My 
12 recollection is that it was pictured as an almost completed 
13 project that needed some more money to complete the project. 
14 It was ready, marketable, and, fact, the buyers were 
15 available, and was goingtobea short-term position, and that 
16 that money was to complete the project. 
17 Q Is your answer based upon just a general sense of 
18 what was taking place, or did you ever specifically discuss 
19 the reasons why Tower made the loan with Mr. Spagnola? 
20 A It's my sense of it, listening to his discussion 
21 and discussion with the Board, as I told you, it was an 
22 unusual loan; and also concerned at that time: Are we 
23 looking at the complete project? Does it look like it will 
24 be marketed? Is there enough money to complete it? 
25 Q How would a loan like the Buildmart loan have been 
1 of the project. 
2 Q For your benefit, those have been referred to as 
3 the complex fabricators' lien, and the Bill Gibson 
4 litigation. 
5 Other than those two items, did you have any 
6 knowledge of any liens of record? 
7 A No, I did not. 
8 Q To your knowledge, did anyone at Tower know about 
9 any liens of record prior to the closing? 
10 A Not to my knowledge. 
11 Q You have had experience with mechanic's lien 
12 coverage or extended coverage title insurance. We have kind 
13 of used those terms interchangeably. Which one are you more 
14 comfortable with? 
15 A Mechanic's lien insurance. 
16 Q You have been familiar with mechanic's liens and 
17 title insurance in the past. 
18 A Yes. 
19 Q It was obtained for the Tower loan for the 
20 Buildmart loan in this case. Was it not? 
21 Q To the best of my knowledge, it was. 
22 Q Did you ever see the final title policy for the 
23 Buildmart loan? 
24 A Yes, I believe I did. 
25 Q Did you review it with a specific purpose in mind? 
1 A To make sure that was covered. I believe so. 
2 Q Were you satisfied that adequate coverage for a 
3 mechanic's lien was in place when the loan closed? 
4 A I was satisfied. 
5 Q Based upon your review of that policy and your 
6 understanding of mechanic's lien title insurance coverage, 
7 would you have understood that policy to have been paid or 
8 satisfied or otherwise taken care of any intervening liens 
9 that had arisen? 
10 A Well, I didn't have anything to be concerned about 
11 at that point as far as I was concerned. We are really 
12 talking about mechanic's liens in the future. 
13 Q Well, my question was, we have been dealing now 
14 with these intervening liens, between the time of the 
15 commitment and the time of the closing, that mechanic's 
16 liens had been filed and made a matter of public record, 
17 other than the two we have talked about? 
18 A We didn't know there were any. 
19 Q I understand. 
20 A As far as I was concerned, we are talking about 
21 mechanic's liens in the future. We were near the middle of 
22 construction, and work done is following the recording of 
23 our second deed of trust. I am concerned at that point that 
24 work done following that is not paid. 
25
 Q Well — 
1 A Then the mechanic's lien insurance should be 
2 applied, is what I was assuming was being done. 
3 Q That was your thought process at the same time 
4 this loan was closed then? 
5 A Yes. 
6 Q Do I understand you to say that the mechanic's 
7 lien title insurance coverage was obtained by Tower to pay 
8 for future liens that might 
9 A Future. 
10 Q — that might occur in the future? 
11 A Yes. 
12 Q After the close of this loan? 
13 A Yes. After the closing of the loan. 
14 Q The question is sometime,let's assume there was a 
15 lien filed. 
16 A I have no reason to believe there was one. I have 
17 no report that says there was. In fact, the instructions 
18 say, don't record if there is one. 
19 Q I understand that. 
20 A Okay. 
21 Q I am not trying to belabor this. I need to draw 
22 this distinction for my benefit. I, at least, think I do. 
23 Using that example of the commitment being made in November, 
24 let's say the painter files his lien that you don't know 
25 about, had no reason to suspect, whatever. On January 10th, 
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he files it, the lien for his painting; the loan closes 
March 20th of 1985; mechanic's lien title insurance is 
obtained at that time. 
Even though you didn't know about that lien, and 
even though you had no reason to suspect it was there, was 
it your understanding that the insurance that you obtained 
would have paid or covered that intervening painter's lien? 
A Not something that I would have anticipated in 
this transaction occurring because I didn't know it existed, 
But, mechanic's lien,you've got a title insurance coverage 
which insures everything, being a second lien. 
Q It should have insured over that intervening 
painter's lien I have described? 
A I should know that it's there. 
Q I understand. 
A That is what troubles me. I don't know that it's 
there. 
Q I understand. Taking that aside, I am interested 
in just the actual legal operation, your understanding of 
that mechanic's lien title insurance policy. 
A I guess I would be looking at it a little 
differently. 
(Whereupon, a conference between the Witness 
and his counsel was held off the record.) 
A I guess I misunderstood your question. 
1 Q That — 
2 A Yes, I guess you're right. I would understand 
3 that to be covered. 
4 Q I don't mean to argue with you. 
5 A Okay. 
6 Q I just couldn't get it across. 
7
 A All right. 
8 Q Are we in agreement? 
9 A All right. 
10 Q That type of intervening painter's lien would have 
11 been satisfied or taken care of by the mechanic's lien title 
12 insurance? 
13 A I would hope that Lawyers Title would do that. 
14 Q In the escrow instructions that I have talked to 
15 you about earlier in that language to the title company, to 
16 take all steps necessary, and I am paraphrasing that, to 
17 make sure that the Tower deed of trust was in a second 
18 position. I want to talk now about that language as it 
19 relates to that type of lien that I have described to you. 
20 Let's assume in the context of that closing of 
21 this loan, that the title company had been made aware of, or 
22 updating its search, as you mentioned earlier, it had 
23 discovered that intervening painter's lien that was filed in 
24 January of 1985; and it had taken steps to satisfy that lien 
*
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 in one of the ways that you have also discussed, payment into or 
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2 II made, there's mention of a sale to third party or group — 
2 II A I think I remember the discussion from 
2 II Mr. Spagnola at the time the loan was being considered. 
4 Q Do you know the extent of Mr. Spagnola1s or 
c Tower's knowledge about that other sale? 
6 || A No, I don't 
7 Q Do you know if that was a consideration in making 
8 
9 
10 
the Buildmart loan? 
A Probably was a factor. 
Q So far as you know, was Mr. Spagnola at Tower 
-Q II aware of the equity involved in the Buildmart property at 
^2 n the time? 
23 || A Well, they had an appraisal, as I recall. That 
24 would establish your equity. 
Q Do you know if they were satisfied there was 
sufficient equity to make the type of loan that was made? 
A I would think so. 
Q Were there any concrete, if you will, lending or 
15 
16 
17 
18 
2g underwriting criteria about percentage of loan to equity or 
20 
22 
24 
thinos of that nature? 
22 A There were underwriting guidelines established by 
the institution for commercial loans. I can't recall the 
23 details of them. I wasn't involved in drafting them. 
Q Underwriting guidelines? 
25 Q There was a document? 
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1 Q Mr. Autenreith, I take it from your earlier 
2 testimony that you believe that the attorney's opinion, 
3 Mr. Seal's letter, should have been a source of information 
4 about the existence of mechanic's liens on the property. Is 
5 that correct? 
6 A That is correct. 
7 Q Can you show me where or relate to me where, 
8 either in the document or the record or history of this 
9 transaction where Mr. Seal was advised that he had a 
10 responsibility to report the existence of mechanic's liens 
11 on the Buildmart Mall property? 
12 A I can't find — I can't tell you anywhere he was 
13 advised to do that. I am assuming he is doing that because 
14 he is rendering his opinion. 
15 Q Your assumption is based upon what? 
16 A Traditionally, what lawyers do and what lawyers do 
17 in real estate transactions like this. He is giving a 
18 letter of assurance. 
19 Q And the letter of assurance deals with many 
20 different areas with respect to the loan and the property. 
21 Does it not? 
22 A It does. 
23 Q Do I understand your testimony to be that with 
24 respect to the mechanic's lien or the state of the title of 
25 t^e property, that you believe an attorney's assurance 
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1 letter should report the state of title to the lender? 
2 A I think it should state if there are mechanic's 
3 liens that are unreported. I think it should report it. 
4 After all, he did go into detail on the two reported 
5 potential problems. Sof I am assuming he went into that 
6 detail. He couldn't reveal the rest of the problems. 
7 Q Were you aware at the time that there were other 
8 matters of record that were being dealt with prior to the 
9 closing of the loan? Let me be more specific. There was a 
10 deed of trust that related to an SBK loan of a significant 
11 amount of money, about $175,000. 
12 A That was being subordinated. 
13 Q Yes. 
14 A I do recall that. That was in the report from 
15 Lawyers. 
16 Q You were aware that the subordination process was 
17 occurring prior to the closing? 
18 A Not unusual, probably, in a land and equity 
19 situation. 
20 Q I guess I am interested in where the line is drawn 
21 between things that are of record that you would have been 
22 concerned about, and things that were of record that you 
23 were not concerned about. Can you speak to that? 
24 A I'm not concerned about — I wouldn't have been 
25 concerned about an encumbrance or lien, whichever you choose 
1 them. 
2 Q All right. 
3 A But that title companies furnish them. 
4 [I Q In your testimony earlier today, well, I suppose 
5 counsel and you have been referred to the preliminary 
6 commitment in November of f84. In the interrogatory 
7 responses, the same document is referred to as an abstract. 
8 That is why I am asking these questions. Do you see a 
9 difference? 
10 A It could be an abstract of the record, showing the 
11 existence of liens and encumbrances from that term. 
12 Q In your experience, are there similar or different 
13 legal obligations on the part of an abstract company and a 
14 title insurance company or agency with regard to an abstract 
15 of title, on the one hand, and preliminary commitment on the 
16 other? 
17 A Well, you know, I think a preliminary commitment 
18 is a recitation of what is of record. That information may 
19 have come from an abstract company who will do the title 
20 search and — 
21 Q Would you say it is a fair statement to say this 
22 title insurance policy is not a commitment but a policy 
23 that reflects the risks that the title insurance company is 
24 willing to insure and those that it isn't? Is that a fair 
25 statement? 
1 
2 
A Yes. 
Q And that an abstract of title is prepared to 
3 II reflect the state of title and history of the title? 
4 A Well, an abstract does reflect that, that is true. 
5 Q Is that the purpose of the abstract of title as 
g opposed to the commitment or title insurance policy? 
7 A To me, an abstract, as I said, is a chain of title 
g showing ownership. 
g Q Now, is Tower or First Federal used 
2o interchangeably in answer to Interrogatory No. 16, which 
22 related to the allegations made in Paragraph 7 of the third 
22 amended cross-claim? Maybe I should — let me read that 
23 for you, if I may. 
24 "LTIC breached their contractual obligation with 
25 Tower in that they failed to exercise the requisite skill 
2g and care under the circumstances by failing to either find 
27 and slash report on all of the claims and slash liens 
28 against the real estate securing the Tower loan." 
29 And then, the interrogatory states the factual 
20 basis for those allegations in Tower's answer. The answer 
22 reflects that, in fact, there are liens of record, and that 
22 the Buildmart loan closed in March of 1985. Are you aware 
23 of any specific liens or Utah notices of lien that were on 
24 file as of the closing of that loan? 
25 A The only liens or whatever I was aware of were the 
1 for Tower at the closing? 
2 A Well, he had been, you know, before that point. 
3 Clearly, there is — we had been acting as co-counsel and 
4 local counsel had been advising me. 
5 Q Before the closing? 
6 A Yes. 
7 Q Jeff Woodbury acted as local counsel for Tower and 
8 co-counsel with you? 
9 A Right. 
10 Q Now, was it your testimony earlier, 
11 Mr. Autenreith, that you did see a copy of that March 13th 
12 letter from Greg Seal to Jeff Woodbury, discussing the 
13 complex fabrication, and the Bill Gibson letter? 
14 A Yes, I did see that letter. 
15 Q Prior or at the closing? 
16 A Prior to the closing, yes. 
17 Q I think your earlier testimony was that you 
18 weren't involved in any decision by Tower with regard to 
19 whether or not to bid in at foreclosure on the project. 
20 A I don't recall that, no, I don't. 
21 Q But, you testified earlier, I believe, that one of 
22 the risks Tower had to look at in taking on this loan, there 
23 was a large prior lien ahead. 
24 A Clearly, yes. 
25 Q Do you think, Mr. Autenreith, that Tower's loss or 
1 claimed loss in this litigation was caused by something 
2 other than the First Security Bank foreclosure on the 
3 project? 
4 A Yes. 
5 Q What do you think it was caused by? 
6 A By the existence, you know — I don't think we 
7 would have made the loan had there been evidence of a 
g problem with the initial construction. I don't think Tower 
g would have been involved in the loan. 
10 Q But, when Tower made the loan, Tower assumed the 
H risk of the senior lienor foreclosing on the property. 
12 Right? 
13 A But, if it's a viable project, that probably 
14 doesn't occur. 
15 Q At the time that Tower made the decision to get 
16 involved, Tower reviewed an appraisal on the property. 
17 Right? 
18 A Yes. 
19 Q Tower would assume the risk that the appraisal 
20 value of the property could be down in succeeding years? 
21 A Right. That is an underwriting decision I 
22 wouldn't make, but that is true. 
23 Q So, if the senior lienor — I'm now talking in 
24 the general sense — if the senior lienor foreclosed on a 
25 property, and the appraised value would have gone down so 
1 the junior — there was no equity left that would be a 
2 risk that Tower as junior lienor would take? 
3 A It's possible. 
4 Q Going back to the procedure, again, 
5 Mr. Autenreith, of the loan package offered by Richards-Woodbury 1 
6 Tower, Spagnola reviewing it, going to the loan 
7 committee — have I so far characterized it correctly? 
8 A So far. 
9 Q You are not involved at this point? 
10 A Normally, not, no. 
11 Q There is, I think you said, usually a preliminary 
12 positive determination by the loan committee, and maybe 
13 Mr. Spagnola visits the project? 
14 A Yes. 
15 Q When do you become involved; after the loan 
16 committee approves but before it is presented to the Board? 
17 A Sometimes it depends. I can't tell you how this 
18 one should be characterized. But, sometime it would be 
19 approved preliminarily by the loan committee, and there may 
20 be a time lapse between the next Board meeting, and Spagnola 
21 would go and look at the project and go back and report to 
22 the Board. And, in that interim, documents might be sent to 
23 me' o r it could have been possible for him to report back to 
24 a preliminary Board meeting, and the Board authorizing him 
25 to go out and look at the project and come back and 
JEFFREY WOODBURY 
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Q In your practice, have you had occasion to represent 
a company known as Richards-Woodbury Mortgage Company? 
A I have. 
Q And for how many years have you represented that 
entity? 
A They've been a client of my firm since the 
inception, and I would guess that I probably worked — began 
working on various projects of theirs when I began work for 
the firm I'm a member of. 
Q Have you represented them in the lending area? 
A I have. 
Q And you personally, what capacity has — what form 
has that taken? 
A In the lending area only? 
Q Yes. 
A Usually in that instance, I would be contacted to 
prepare loan documents after a commitment letter has already 
been signed and prepared by borrowers between the borrowers 
and lenders directly there, and I would then act as attorney 
both for Richards-Woodbury and a lender in preparing the loan 
documents and coordinating, usually with lender's counsel 
those loan document modifications, changes, negotiations 
throughout the transaction until the actual closing of the 
transaction. 
Q You stated that your involvement generally commences 
1 following the issuance of a commitment letter. 
2 A Generally that is the case, yes. 
3 Q On occasion, have you also participated in the 
4 drafting of the commitment letters? 
5 J A I have. 
6 1 Q To the best of your recollection, how many loans do 
7 you believe you've participated in on behalf of 
8 Richards-Woodbury. 
9 A Total since — oh, I'd say — I don't know, easily 
10 I more than 50. I don't know. Easily more than 50. I have no 
11 way of quantifying that, really. Probably I participate in 
12 two or three a month, I'd guess. 
13 Q You stated that you represent Richards-Woodbury 
14 | Mortgage and then a lender also. Can you explain how a lender 
15 becomes involved with Richards-Woodbury? 
16 J A Well, Richards-Woodbury primarily acts as a mortgage 
17 j broker. They will find a loan and then attempt to sell that 
i 
18 loan to a lender, whether it be a lender in Salt Lake City or 
19 a lender outside Salt Lake City. And basically what they do 
20 is they prepare a loan package that is submitted to that 
21 lender, the lender will examine the loan and make a 
22 determination whether or not they want to make that loan. 
23 Q Do you participate or have you participated in 
24 preparing the loan package which is forwarded to the lender? 
25 j A Generally I do not, and I have not ever done so. 
8 
Q Are you familiar with what information is forwarded 
with the loan package? 
A I could guess, but I don't know firsthand. 
Q Once you become involved in the transaction, you 
stated that your involvement is in drafting the loan 
documents; is that correct? 
A That's right. 
Q At that point in time, do you engage in a line of 
communication with the borrower's counsel? 
A Not at that point in time, I do not, usually. The 
process — do you want me to state the process? 
Q Yes. 
A That's not really in answer to your question, but 
the process, usually as I've worked with Richards-Woodbury, is 
Richards-Woodbury will ask me to prepare the documents to send 
to lender's counsel, lender's counsel will then comment on the 
documents usually first, and then they're usually supplied to 
borrower's counsel at this point in time, and at that point in 
time, I will start communicating with borrower's counsel. 
Q When you prepare your initial draft of the loan 
documents, what information is available to you from 
Richards-Woodbury to assist you in the drafting process? 
A It primarily comes in over a period of time. The 
initial piece of information that I obtain is the commitment 
letters themselves, only. Now, when I say it comes in over a 
1 period of time, surveys, title reports, things like that are 
2 usually obtained over — during the process. And sometimes it 
3 requires some modification to the documents after that point 
4 in time. 
5 ! Q Relying on the information set forth in the 
6 j commitment letter, you are generally, then, able to begin 
7 drafting your loan documents? 
8 A Pretty much then I will put together a draft of the 
9 I documents from the commitment, yes. 
10 Q After lender's counsel has reviewed and commented on 
11 the loan documents, what is then the next general step? 
12 A The next general step is the documents are corrected 
13 as to how the lender feels they need to be corrected, if they 
14 i need to be corrected and then they're provided to the 
15 borrower. The borrower, then, will determine who their 
16 counsel will be and provide the documents to whoever their 
17 counsel will be at that point in time. And then usually I 
18 will receive a call from an attorney, you know, that would be 
19 representing a borrower, and we would begin discussing the 
20 j terms of the loan documents. I've yet to be able to work with 
21 an attorney that hasn't wanted to make some changes in the 
22 documents. 
23 Q Mr. Woodbury, I'd like to direct your attention to 
24 November and early December 1984. Do you recall becoming 
25 I involved in a loan with Richards-Woodbury which was being 
10 
placed with Tower Federal Savings and Loan? 
A You mean the loan transaction in this case? 
Q Yes. 
A I'm not sure that it was that early. 
Q To the best of your recollection, when did you first 
become involved 
A To the best of my recollection, it was sometime in 
January that I actually became involved, but it may have been 
— it may have been the end of December. I vaguely remember 
— usually at the end of the year, everybody wants to get 
their loans closed by the end of the year. And I do remember 
a Diane Derr from Richards-Woodbury contacting me about this 
loan before the end of the year, but I don't recall receiving 
the commitment that early. 
Q To the best of your recollection, was the first 
document you received for the Tower loan the commitment 
letter? 
A It seems to me that I received two commitment 
letters. The way Richards-Woodbury does a transaction, they 
have a commitment letter from a lender to them and then 
Richards-Woodbury actually makes the loan to the borrower. We 
do that because of the odd doing business statute in the State 
of Utah to avoid the lender doing business in the State of 
Utah and have a sale of the loan at interstate commerce, 
instead of that. So I received two commitment letters and it 
11 
1 I seems to me that I received a copy of a title report at the 
2 same time that I received that. That's what I recall. 
3 (Off-the-record discussion) 
4 I (Whereupon, Exhibit No. A 
was marked 
5 | for identification.) 
6 I Q (BY MR. KINCAID) Mr. Woodbury, I have here what has 
7 I been marked as Exhibit A, which appears to be a commitment 
8 J letter on Richards-Woodbury's letterhead dated December 12, 
9 j 1984. It's addressed to Mr. Steven Urry. I hand you a copy 
10 J of this and ask if you recognize that document? 
11 A Well, without having looked in my file and 
12 determining whether it's the same one, my guess is that this 
13 is a copy of the commitment letter that I received in this 
14 I loan transaction. 
15 Q Mr. Woodbury, do you recall when the first time was 
16 you saw this letter? 
17 A It seems to me it was sometime in January after I 
18 had been contacted by Diane Derr. I received it — she would 
19 I have probably brought it to my office personally. 
20 j Q Did you have any input into the drafting of this 
21 commitment letter? 
22 A I did not. Let me clarify that a little bit. I at 
23 one point in time had input in drafting a form commitment 
24 letter for Richards-Woodbury Mortgage Corporation, although 
25 I it's pretty significantly different than this commitment 
14 
A Yes. 
Q At the time of this loan transaction, was he counsel 
to the borrower? 
A To my knowledge, he was, yes. He represented he 
was. 
Q And did you have discussions with Mr. Seal in 
relation to the drafting of the loan documents generally? 
A I did. 
Q Did you have any specific discussions with Mr. Seal 
regarding the requirement that he issue an opinion letter 
which included an opinion that the mortgage or deed of trust 
issued to Tower Federal Savings and Loan to secure this loan 
would be a valid second lien? 
A I didn't ever speak with him specifically regarding 
a valid second lien to the best of my recollection. I did, on 
various occasions, tell him that I needed an opinion letter 
from him that conformed with the paragraph in the construction 
loan or in the loan agreement, it wasn't a construction, loan 
agreement, in the loan agreement which contained paragraph C. 
(Whereupon, Exhibit No. B 
was marked 
for identification.) 
Q (BY MR. KINCAID) Mr. Woodbury, you make reference 
to a loan agreement. I have here what has been marked as 
Exhibit B, a copy of a loan agreement between 
Richards-Woodbury Mortgage Corporation and Buildmart Mall, 
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Q Do you recall approximately when you were provided 
with them? 
A It seems to me that I was provided a report that was 
dated before the transaction. It seems to me it was November 
or late November or early December, I can't remember the date 
6 ! of that report, but I was provided a report and it seems to me 
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that I was supplied that by Diane Derr at the time I received 
the commitment letters. I did not obtain an update, although 
I asked for an update of that report, but I was verbally told 
that everybody remained in the same condition and relied upon 
that report in delivering my escrow instructions. 
Q Whom did you ask for a follow-up report? 
A Probably both from Diane Derr and I talked to the 
person at the title company. I heard a name mentioned last — 
Gregory Seal's deposition the name of Tim Krueger. I honestly 
can't remember if I talked to a Tim Krueger or not. But I did 
talk to a male at the title company regarding the title 
report. 
Q Do you recall reviewing the policy of title 
insurance, the final policy? 
A I did. 
Q Do you recall approximately when that would have 
been? 
A It was sometime after the transaction. I don't 
remember exactly when, but it was after the transaction had 
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT 
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closed and been funded. 
(Whereupon, Exhibit No. D 
was marked 
for identification.) 
THE WITNESS: Let me say one thing in that I don't 
— as I think about that last answer — 
(Off-the-record discussion) 
THE WITNESS: Let me just clarify that last answer. 
I don't specifically remember looking at the title policy 
after I received it. I think that I did though, I usually do 
on loan transactions and that's the reason why I answered 
affirmatively that I had seen the title policy after the fact. 
Q (BY MR. KINCAID) Mr. Woodbury, I have what has been 
marked as Exhibit D, which is a preliminary title report dated 
November 23, 1984. I'll hand you a copy of this and ask you 
if you have seen this? 
A I don't think I've seen the one with all of these 
pen marks on it, but I've seen one that is similar to this in 
my file. It is similar to the one I received without the pen 
markings on it. 
Q Would this have been the only preliminary report you 
received prior to the March loan closing? 
A Written report, yes. 
Q Were there verbal reports? 
A Verbally, I talked to the title company at least on 
two occasions. 
PHMPTTTFRTZED TRANSCRIPT 
45 
you have occasion to secure an opinion letter similar to the 
one that's at issue in this case? 
A Grant Square, I did. University Mall, I was — our 
firm was the attorney giving the opinion letter# 
Q Who was borrower's counsel for the Grant Square 
project? 
A It fluctuated in Grant Square, but at the time it 
was an attorney by the name of Scott King. 
Q Is he local? 
A Yes. 
Q Who ultimately issued the opinion letter? 
A He did. 
Q How would you compare the opinion letter in the 
Grant Square matter to the one that Gregory Seal authored in 
this case with respect to the substance of the language on 
lien priority? 
A Well, I think he did make an opinion as to lien 
priority, but he would — he put in exceptions that were 
ultimately approved by lender's counsel. First exception 
being that he indicated that he was relying only on the title 
company's report of title. In addition, he made an exception 
with respect to the law, the title law in Utah, and made some 
specific representations with respect to subordination 
agreements and their enforceability and those type of things. 
Generally, there's a number of other exceptions that 
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I see in lender's opinion letters with respect to bankruptcy, 
with respect to laws of equity. I mean, it's been my 
experience that they give you an opinion and they take it 
completely away and you have to fight tooth and nail to get, 
you know, any substance back into the opinion. In this case, 
there was none of that, though,. Mr. Seal left — did not 
provide any exceptions. There are very few exceptions. 
Q When you received the first draft of Mr. Seal's 
opinion in this case and you didn't see some of those 
exceptiona that you customarily did, did you talk to him about 
that? 
A No. 
Q Did it occur to you that those things were missing? 
A Did it occur to me? Yes, I realized that they were 
missing. 
Q What did you do about it, if anything? 
A Nothing. 
Q Why not? 
A Because the opinion provided what we needed to have 
done. In hindsight, maybe now I'd wish — wish a more 
knowledgeable opinion to come in with exceptions, in 
hindsight, but at the time, I didn't feel that — I mean, it 
said exactly what I wanted it to say, so I didn't feel a need 
for — to educate him, because we were adversaries in the 
transaction is the way I looked at it. 
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Q Why do you characterize yourself as adversaries in 
that? 
A That's probably an overcharacterization, poor choice 
of words, but I felt that he was representing his client. He 
had represented to me several times that he had been working 
with this project for a long period of time and he understood 
clearly the various business aspects and everything involved 
with this project, as well as, you know, representing to me 
that this was just going to be a real quick loan, because they 
had a contract that was going to, you know, purchase the 
property and pay off all the loans. He made a number of 
representations like that. And he indicated to me he was 
quite experienced and that he'd been working with the 
contract, so I felt that maybe he didn't have some of these 
other concerns that you see in a lot of other opinion letters. 
See, I'm going a little too far, but there's two 
different types of situations. You feel as an attorney, at 
least myself personally, if you've been working with a project 
19 | since its inception, it's a lot easier to give an opinion than 
if somebody has just come in to you to hire you to give an 
opinion on a transaction — on a transaction that hasn't — 
that you, you know, you haven't been involved in. And even 
though you do a lot of leg work, you go to the planning 
commission, go to all the various places to gather the 
information for the opinion letter, you still feel a certain 
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A Yes, I did. 
Q The — 
MR. KAY: Are we talking about "You are instructed 
to take all — 
THE WITNESS: That's what I understand. Is that the 
fourth paragraph? 
Q (BY MR. DRAKE) I'm referring to the paragraph that 
starts "You are instructed." 
A Right. 
Q And I'd like to refer you to the concluding language 
of that sentence, "that the trust deed described in paragraph 
No. 1." By that you refer to paragraph No. 1 of your letter, 
do you not, Exhibit E? 
A I think that's consistent. 
Q And you say, is second lien position behind the 
exception set forth as paragraph 17. Do you see that 
language? 
A Right. 
Q What do you mean by the language, "is in second lien 
position"? 
A I mean that our trust deed is second only to the 
exception set forth in the title policy in paragraph 17. 
Q In paragraph 17 of the title policy described — 
A Well, not the title policy. Let me clarify that. 
The preliminary title report or whatever the term is to be 
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used. 
Q I don't mean to mislead you, I believe we're talking 
about the same PR to which we've referred many times? 
A Whatever the term is. 
Q Good enough. But in any event, paragraph 17 refers 
to the First Security first deed of trust, does it not? 
A Yes. 
Q In using the language to which we've referred "in a 
second lien position," at what point in time did you intend 
that that language to obtain? 
A At what point in time? The time the loan closes at 
least, but then I asked for endorsement to protect me against 
liens that arise in the future that could claim they have 
priority. 
Q What do you mean by that? 
A I'm not sure I understand your question. 
Q Nor I your answer and that's the nature of my 
question. You asked for endorsements to insure that liens 
could not arise in the future. Could you explain what you 
mean by that? 
A What I mean is to insure me against liens that may 
or may not arise in the future, to provide me insurance to 
protect my client against other possible liens that might be 
missed by the title company or that may come up in the future. 
Q Where do mechanic's liens fit in? 
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A That's one of those liens that could come up in the 
future. 
Q Do you include in that mechanic's liens of record in 
the title policy? 
A Shouldn't be. If there are any mechanics lien of 
record, they should have told me about them, in my opinion. 
Q Who is they? 
A The title company, or Greg Seal, depending on, you 
know, who knew what. 
Q Who would you typically rely on to tell you about 
those in the the course of a transaction? 
A You have to rely upon everybody in these 
transactions, because very frequently a title company might 
not know something about — know something that an attorney 
may know. You know, a title company, might not be privileged 
to some sort of title problem. So I don't rely just on a 
title company. Now, if an attorney is telling me I only have 
to rely on a title company, you know, that's another matter, 
but in this case, no attorney was ever telling me I just have / 
to rely on the title company. 
Q Are you aware on or about March 13 of 1985 that for 
instance, there was a lien in favor of Staker Paving of public 
record in this case? 
A I was not aware of it in any way. 
Q If that had been the case and assuming for the sake 
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A An encumbrance to me denotes some sort of money 
obligation against a property, whereas a lien I don't think 
necessarily has to be a money obligation. It may denote 
something else. And probably that — if I were to put a 
difference on there, that would probably be it, probably be 
the difference. A lien is something that exists on the 
record. Does a lien exist if it's not on the record? You 
know, potentially it can exist in the future. Is a lis 
pendens a lien? It's not a lien, but for the sake of 
discussion, I think everybody would consider it a type of 
lien. A lien is a type of instrument the same as an 
encumbrance is a lien type of instrument. 
Q In your mind, does something have to be of record in 
order to be a lien? 
i 
i 
i 
A No, it does not.
 ] 
Q Why not? 
i 
A If you have actual notice of something, of a lien or 
an encumbrance on a property, then just because you don't have 
record notice of it doesn't give you the right to lift 
i yourself 
isn' 
you 
Mall 
above i 
t the case, 
Q 
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project? 
A I knew 
t in this state. 
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finished, yes. Whether — whether it was tenant finish, you 
know, the magnitude of that I did not know. 
Q Can tenant finish give rise to a mechanic's lien? 
A Sure it can. 
Q And it could have done so in this case? 
A Sure* 
Q You knew that was in existence at the time in March 
of 1985? 
A I sure did. 
Q Did you tell Tower Federal or Mr. Autenreith that 
that was the case? 
A Certainly did, we've discussed it. 
Q On how many occasions? 
A The nature of the second lien is that way in this 
state and I'm sure we talked about it initially when the 
transaction started, and — the key to the thing was to make 
sure we get mechanic's lien protection in your title insurance 
as well as that we get an acceptable attorney's opinion 
letter, and have acceptable loan documents to protect us from 
the borrower. I believe we were relying upon all the 
documents in the transaction to protect us against that lien 
in the future. 
Q You had knowledge, as did Tower, then, that 
mechanics liens could arise that would be senior to either the 
First Security first or the Tower trust deed at the time this 
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Q Yes, please. 
A Then you don't have to ask the next question. 
Whether I told Mr. Autenreith about it or not, I don't know, I 
don't remember. 
Q Did the existence of that first extended coverage 
policy figure into your actions or anything you did about the 
Tower loan at all? 
A It was one of the factors. How big at the time, I 
don't know, but it was one of the factors that helped me close 
the loan, yes. 
Q Why was it a factor? 
s ^ A Because it indicated to me that there was an ongoing 
effort on the part of the title company to maintain the — and 
oversee the lien situation on the construction of the project. 
Q Did you work with Steve Urry at all personally in 
the closing of this loan? 
A No, I've never met Mr. Urry. 
Q How about Shirl Wright? 
A I've never met Mr. Wright. 
Q Anyone from Culp Construction? 
A I've never worked with anybody from Culp 
Construction, unless they've built something for one of my 
family's projects, but I don't think I've ever worked 
personally with them. 
Q At the time of the closing of this loan in March of 
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19 85, were you aware that there was a pending sale of the 
Buildmart Mall? 
A Yes. 
Q Was Tower, as far as you know, aware of that? 
A Yes, very much so. 
Q Why do you say very much so? 
A Because it was one of the factors that Tower was 
looking into to determine thg st;ahjlitv of this loan. And 
t h a t M r . A^^^V^jJ^lJ2^A jprH^at-pH t-h^t- tr\ mo t-h*h t-hic; j g 
basically a gap loan so that the salg could be closed. 
Q Do you recall any other specific things that he told 
you about the pending sale? 
A We had conversations about it. I don't recall 
anything specifically, other than that was the general gist of 
our conversation, that this is really just a loan to fill a 
gap for the completion of the sale. 
Q Was anything said about the fact that that sale was 
imminent and that the loan would probably be repaid in a very 
short period of time? 
J A Yes, that was said. 
Q To your knowledge was that material in the 
consideration of Tower making that loan? 
A To my knowledge? I think itwas_material. . Whether 
— I think it was material. Whether that really was to Tower 
or not, you'd have to ask Tower. 
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remember anything more specific. 
Q With regard to the assurances he gave you, did you 
ask him for any written confirmation, any documentation? 
A I didn't. It was foolish on my part. 
Q And you never received any subsequent to that 
conversation? 
A Other than the title policy and the escrow 
instructions, I didn't receive anything other than that. I 
relied on the title policy and escrow letter signed on that. 
Q You testified — you went on to testify you obtained 
a preliminary report from the title company and that's the 
document that has become an exhibit in this deposition? 
A Right. 
Q Just to be clear, that's Exhibit D, I believe? 
A Right. 
Q And to the best of your recollection, Mr. Woodbury, 
that's the only preliminary report you recall receiving prior 
to closing? 
A That's the only one I've ever received, other than 
verbal reports, verbal confirmations, but the report is the 
same, that report was the same. 
Q Now, you've indicated in your testimony that you 
asked Mr. Seal to prepare a statement or a document regarding 
the ongoing litigation? 
A That's right. 
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(Whereupon, Exhibit No. G 
was marked 
for identification.) 
Q (BY MR. ORITT) Mr. Woodbury, I've handed you what's 
been marked as Exhibit G to this deposition, which I 
understand is also Exhibit A to Greg Seal's deposition. Do 
you remember ever seeing this letter before? 
A Yes. 
Q Is this the statement that Mr. Seal prepared in 
response to your request? 
A Yes. 
Q So this put you on notice about the outstanding 
litigation on the project? 
A I was already on notice prior to that. This 
explained it for me, for my client. 
Q And subsequent to receiving this letter, you 
discussed this with the title company? 
A I'm not sure whether I discussed — I think I said 
this before, I'm not sure whether I discussed it with the 
title company before I received the letter or after I received 
the letter, it may have come from a discussion I had with Greg 
Seal and I discussed it with the title company. I did discuss 
it with the title company. That was the reason for a very 
heated conversation with the title company. 
Q And subsequent to — and did you testify that you 
received assurances from Mr. Seal and the title company 
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regarding the litigation discussed in Exhibit G? 
A I definitely received it from the title company. 
From Mr. Seal? It seems to me when I discussed it with Mr. 
Seal, Mr. Seal said, Well, call the title company, it seems to 
me is what he said, and see how they've taken care of that. 
It seems to me that's what happened. I'm not so sure they 
gave me an assurance that it was okay. I guess I received 
somewhat of an assurance when he gave me his opinion letter, 
whatever assurance that is. 
Q Subsequent to this assurance you say you received 
from the title company and your discussion with Mr. Seal, did 
you discuss those conversations with Seal and the title 
company with Diane Derr. 
A Probably not. 
Q Did you discuss — 
A Yes, I probably discussed them, but — I don't know 
that — I don't have any specific recollection of that. 
Q And did you discuss them with Earl Autenreith? 
A Yes, I'm certain I did that. 
Q Was Earl satisfied with the oral assurances? 
A Yes. It was our understanding that we were getting 
a policy clear of all of those and that, you know, they had 
indicated that they had taken care of that already. And it 
wasn't a matter on the title policy at this point in time, on 
the title at this point in time. So that I didn't need to 
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ones associated with the pending litigation against Buildmart 
Mall. 
Q Do you recall anything specifically in conversation 
with Greg Seal about indemnification agreements? 
A No, except with respect to the subordination 
agreement, and except to the extent that indemnification 
existed within the loan documents that we were negotiating. 
Q Other than the litigation problems you discussed 
with the title company as evidenced in Exhibit G, the 
subordination agreement, do you recall any other specific 
title problems or concerns related to this transaction? 
A Any other title problems or concerns? I think I 
mentioned in my testimony yesterday that I did have a 
discussion with Mr. Autenreith regarding the nature of a 
second lien in this case, wherein we discussed generally the 
nature of a second lien in this type of project and the 
necessity that the only way for First Federal (sic) to protect 
themselves, other than obtaining the insurance protection that 
we were obtaining and documenting the way we were documenting 
was to be willing to — the only other area of protection that 
they needed was that they would be willing to pay off the 
underlying encumbrance should the underlying encumbrance feel 
a need to foreclose at some time in the future, and we 
discussed that issue with him, but that was the nature of the 
transaction — the risks of the transaction, rather than any 
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specific prob3 em. 
MR . DRA KE i Th< * w:i t i 1 es s sa i d F i rs t Fed e ra 1 . I 
assume you mean. Tower. 
THE WITNESS: I mean Tower. If I said First 
F e d e r a 1 , 1 a p o 1 o g i z e f o i t h a t. 
MR. ROBSON: Those are all the questions I have. 
Thar i k y< :>i; i , Mr. Woodbury, 
MR. KING: We don't have any qu-;.:;tioi: is. 
FURTHER EXAMINATION 
BY MR. ORITTi 
Q I've just got one follow-up to Mr. Robson's 
questions. 
Mr. Woodbuiy, you tt't-tj fled that you * ve had 
experience in a primary lender situation where a title company 
w i I I n i"i a d i sb urs erne n t by di sbu r s eme n t ba s i s , T think you 
said, provide date downs to the lender V Is that, what, your 
testimony was? 
A When T say" exf >er i ercc, I didn't say -- 1 airi aware — 
I have never worked with those physically as an attorney on 
that type of basis. 1 have discussed those with the title 
company hefuii- '.MI VCIJ Ions transact ions and have al so discussed 
them with Richards-Woodbury Mortgage as legal counsel for 
Richards-Woodbury Mortgage as beina = good Idea for them to 
ob t a i i I . N o t o i i « t :i : a n s a c . - - - * i: t a k e, wh e t h e r 
they do that on every transaction,. 1 don't know. I have not 
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gentlemen, Mr. Bettilyon or Mr. Jones? 
A I don't specifically remember reasons, other than we 
— other than it's my general recollection that we believe 
that there were a significant number of unpaid bills and that 
we felt Mr. Seal should have been generally aware of, and he 
should have recognized those issues within his attorney's 
opinion. 
Q You testified yesterday about a conversation — I'm 
going to try it one more time — Mr. Autenreith, about 
discussing the general law related to mechanic's liens and 
what I refer to as relating back. Are you comfortable with 
that description? That is — 
A Sure, I'm comfortable with that. I understand what 
you're saying. 
Q Did you ever provide Mr. Autenreith any Utah law on 
that subject, copies of statutes, cases, anything like that? 
A No. 
Q Are you comfortable in your mind that based upon 
your discussions that he understood that the law in the State 
of Utah is that mechanic's liens could relate back in time? 
A I feel that he was aware of that. Yes. 
Q And he was aware of that prior to the Tower loan 
closing and being consummated? 
A Yes, I feel that he was aware of that. 
MR. DRAKE: That's all, thank you. 
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A Yes. 
Q Do you recall how it was that you were contacted? 
Who was it that contacted you? 
A I received a phone call from August Brand, and he 
proceeded to tell me about the loan. 
Q Do you recall what he told you in the initial 
conversation? 
A He had a request for a second mortgage, just as it 
is broken down. I don't remember the interest at this point, 
There was some — basically, it was the overruns and all, 
and it is here. He mentioned, of course, it was a very 
short time to complete the project. It was his opinion that 
he thought it might be sold off. That was his opinion. But 
it was a short-term loan. Just some miscellaneous facts. 
He mentioned the appraisal of about 
11-million-some-odd dollars. He mentioned there was a first 
deed of trust. If I hadn't heard the words First Security, 
I wouldn't have remembered it today. There was a bank, 
and our loan and the bank's position still had a very low 
loan value ratio. 
So, based on that conversation, his 
recommendation, and the comments, I had him submit the loan. 
We went through our procedures of analyzing it. 
Q I want to take you through that subsequent 
procedure. You mentioned that Mr. Brand said that part of 
t . - ; : i; »rS, . * * l • - . - :«---. .ns, Lhat the 
title * thr F-ildir.art *J". . property .:- ~ everyone i? concerned-
i s t .Vr r.-: 3r: . ' * ..- .__.:. . - • - - ^ -> , - with. 
By titlt, the existence of loans or encjmbrances on the 
property a v tb° tim*^ tr. : , + • ::•;-:. : ie B'jildmart Mall 
"! oan • 
A WelZ , w^ are concerned. We know -_.-.-. ^ — .- -': ~- . to 
: - :•--•* ••• , ab we were tOiG f in a second pcsii-Lcn sc 
we -would be concerned that in the fir.al analysis
 3 that is 
c n. 
Q In the initial contacts with Mr, Brand, he did 
communicate that 1*. w ,13 be .» :.-»cond nw>ri iaqr , rli.i h** n: +? 
A •' That is correct. 
Q Di:; ho discuss the exii-'ten^r uf uther Joai^ .-r 
encumbrances with you? 
A I mentioned, of course, there was a first de-d cf 
trust. 
Q • Anything else communicated to you about the state 
• 'f t i t] e I n that initial conversation? 
A Other than the amount of the first deed of trust. 
Q ' *
 understand it, you have the loan package, 
you contacted Mr, Vnla and dispatched him to go to Utah and 
':.!" M j a p p 1 a i is a 1 , "1 . • hi .1 * 1 *«»r r f ~ f ? 
A- No. He reviewed the appraisal :- r - =• -ffice, v---
Q Did he report back to you? 
1 talking about the typical commercial loan situation — if 
2 the Tower Board did authorize a foreclosure proceeding, 
3 would that authorization be memorialized in the Tower 
4 minutes? 
5 A Should be. 
6 Q In making the Buildmart Mall loan, you indicated 
7 that, of course, you were aware, and Tower was aware, of the 
8 first mortgagee. Is that right? 
9 A Yes. 
10 Q And, in making that loan, did Tower assume the 
H risk of the first mortgagee for any reason initiating 
12 foreclosure proceedings? 
13 MR. O'KEEFE: Objection to the form; it calls 
14 for a legal conclusion. 
15 THE WITNESS: I will have to ask you to 
16 repeat it. 
17 MR. ORITT: I will rephrase it. 
18 BY MR. ORITT: 
19 Q Preliminarily, you indicated that Tower, in 
20 reviewing this loan proposal, was aware there was a first 
21 mortgagee on the project; and that the outstanding first 
22 mortgage was for $7,750,000. Do you recall that? 
23 A Somewhere in that range. 
24 Q Was it your understanding that if Tower were to 
2- make the $750,000 loan, that there was a risk that the first 
mortgagee could initiate foreclosure proceedings at some 
point? 
Mn. G'KEEFE: Same o b j e c t i o n . 
A T y p i c a l of a l l l o a n s , I was aware t h a t anyone 
: o u H rni^Ia+M i f o rnc 1 «~>sur • • r e g a r d l e s s of p o s i t i o n , so we 
u n d e r s t o o d t h a t , N a t u r a l l y , we know * l - ; ] - g a ! s t e p s t h a t 
: - . -=!: , - -.kei : i < : * *' ' >•'" v ;r s-- 1 f . wridtever 
position you might be I n. 
PY MR, OR IT']" i 
Q Given the size of the first position of the 
Puildmart M~1 1 -reject, was there a risk that Tower could be 
rorecl osed :y mt; foreclosure proceedings, if they 
occurred, of :.ne first mortgagee? 
,;:
'
rrr
' ~^ ... 'ejection. 
A There is a-ways a r . c *- w;t.n every mortgagee. By 
: ev iew j. ny !JM L r*'1 "" 1 * i ,ifc rmat l'">;,
 (l ,nri(i ha^ed upr'n Mi" 
appraisal, we felt our equity position was jn pretty good 
shape by virtue c i" Itit aiicil.Lli. c 1' ih(' eJult, sirecic. 
BY MR. ORITT: 
Q L11 J "T'owe r ci : ± c u s s J a J -u' k i r w J e d <-j *. Hit" t i t l
 f -t i r c 
say there is always a risk in a loan? Did Tower acknowledge 
the risk in this case, and then look at its equity pci-:.t.cn, 
and make its decision LO anrrrove the loan? 
MP. O'KEEFE: Same objection. • 
A W^  do thri f in e< ~ * " I d o n ' t know t h a t t h i s 
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EXAM BY HOWELL 
Q IN ADDITION TO THE LIENS THAT YOU HAVE PREVIOUSLY 
MENTIONED AND THE LAWSUITS THAT YOU HAVE PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED 
THAT YOU TALKED TO MR. WOODBURY ABOUT, DID YOU DISCUSS WITH 
HIM ANY OTHER THREATENED CLAIMS THAT WERE BEING MADE BY 
SUBCONTRACTORS OR GENERAL CONTRACTORS ON THE PROJECT? 
A WE DIDN'T HAVE ANY DISCUSSIONS ABOUT SPECIFIC 
THREATENED PENDING LIENS. WE TALKED ABOUT GENERALLY THE 
POSSIBILITY OF LIENS BEING FILED. 
Q WHAT BROUGHT UP THE DISCUSSION OF THE POSSIBILITY 
OF LIENS BEING FILED? 
A MY BEING ASKED TO WRITE AN OPINION SAYING THAT 
RICHARDS-WOODBURY WAS GOING TO BE IN A SECOND POSITION AND 
THERE WOULDN'T EVER BE ANY LIENS FILED. 
Q I THINK YOU'VE TESTIFIED AS TO WHAT YOU TOLD 
MR. WOODBURY GENERALLY. WHAT DID MR. WOODBURY TELL YOU 
CONCERNING THE LIENS AND HIS POSITION IN REGARD THERETO? 
A HIS WAS THAT THEY WERE NOT GOING TO RELY UPON MY 
OPINION WITH RESPECT TO LIENS. THEY WOULD BE RELYING ON 
OTHER WAYS THAT THEY WOULD BE PROTECTED. 
Q WHAT WERE THE OTHER WAYS IN WHICH THEY WERE GOING 
TO BE PROTECTED ACCORDING TO MR. WOODBURY? 
A WE DISCUSSED THE FACT THAT THERE WAS A FIRST TRUST 
DEED IN PLACE AND THE HOLDER OF A SUBSTANTIAL FIRST, TEN 
TIMES THE SIZE OF THE PROPOSED SECOND, WOULD NOT ALLOW 
MECHANICS' LIENS TO INTERFEREWITH THAT FIRST POSITION. SO 
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abstained from voting. 
Q Okay. How was a loan presented to the in-house loan 
committee? 
A The committee is given a loan summary several days 
before the loan meeting. And then the loan officer goes 
through a brief presentation of the loan and then answers any 
questions that may come up. 
Q Did you prepare a loan summary on the Tower loan? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q Do you recall what matters are addressed in that loan 
summary? 
A Yes. First of all the loan amount, the terms of the 
loan. In this case it was a three-year interest only loan. 
The appraised value, in this case the first mortgage, first 
trust deed, the equity in the loan, the financial statements, 
net worth of the borrowers. We always have pictures of the 
project, location, and then other pertinent factors, like in 
this case a potential sale that was in the making. 
Q Would you have included any information about 
leasing? 
A Oh yes, yes. That basically would be the rent roll. 
And in this case if I recall the retail space was leased at 90 
percent, the office warehouse space or the warehouse space was 
leased at 60 percent. 
Q Okay. Did you visit the site of Buildmart Mall prior 
14 
Q Are you presently aware of any facts that cause 
! to believe that payments to the general contractors and 
! subcontractors on the project were delinquent at the time 
j the closi 
A 
Q 
.ng of the Tower loan? 
Not at all. 
you 
of 
From the position of a loan officer what was the main 
attraction or what were the attractions of this loan to 
Richards-
A 
-Woodbury? 
That it was a good investment that we could recommend 
without hesitation to our investor. And being a second 
mortgage# that the interest rate at 14 and a half at that 
was an attractive return for the investor. 
Q Do you recall how many appraisals you looked at 
this property prior to submitting the loan package? 
A 
that was 
Security 
If I recall I think there were two appraisals. 
time 
on 
One 
made at the time of the construction loan with First 
Bankf and another MAI appraisal that we used for our 
underwriting. And I donft recall right now who the appraiser 
is. But 
Q 
appraisal 
I recall the figure of $14,500,000. 
The second appraisal that you mentioned, is that an 
. that Richards-Woodbury obtained from someone else on 
the property just for this loan? 
A 
Q 
Richards-
No, it was part of the loan application. 
Did you do any independent appraisal for 
•Woodbury on this property? 
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ADDENDUM E 
REQUEST NO. 8 Admit that the Tower Policy, by inclusion in 
Schedule B, Part I of Exception 16, excluded coverage of any loss 
or damage suffered by Tower which might arise as a result of the 
existence of FSB's first lien Trust Deed. 
RESPONSE: Admitted. 
REQUEST NO. 9: Admit that Jeffrey K. Woodbury and the law firm 
of Woodbury, Bettilyon & Kesler acted as counsel for Tower and for 
Richards-Woodbury in the closing of the Tower Loan transaction in 
March, 1985. 
RESPONSE: Denied. Jeffrey K. Woodbury and the law firm of 
Woodbury, Bettilyon & Kesler acted as counsel for 
Richards-Woodbury. The fact that Richards-Woodbury contemplated 
selling the loan to Tower did not cause Woodbury to act on behalf 
of Tower. 
REQUEST NO. 10: Admit that Woodbury and the law firm of 
Woodbury, Bettilyon & Kesler obtained from Richmond Title the Tower 
Commitment and the Tower Policy. 
RESPONSE: Denied. Tower objects to the use of the term 
"obtained" in that it is unclear and ambiguous. 
-22-
RESPONSE: Admitted to the extent that on march 16, 1987 a 
Trustee's Sale took place outside the Third District Courthouse and 
that FSB bid the sum of $6,200,000, 
REQUEST NO, 17: Admit that neither Tower nor any of its agents, 
employees or counsel took any action to stop or seek to stop the 
foreclosure sale, 
RESPONSE: Denied to the extent that Request No. 17 suggests or 
implies that Tower had any duty or responsibility to stop the 
foreclosure sale, 
REQUEST NO. 18: Admit that neither Tower nor any of its agents, 
employees, or counsel bid in any amount at FSB's foreclosure sale. 
RESPONSE: Denied to the extent that it implies or suggests 
that Tower had a duty to bid in any amount at the foreclosure sale. 
REQUEST NO. 19: Admit that Tower failed to take an appeal from 
the above-entitled Court's Order, Judgment and Decree of 
Foreclosure dated March 27, 1987. 
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ADDENDUM F 
• O N A l O M. fHANOSCN U Q M . iUi"»»» 
Ofte CAST MU»WT . MOLL*0*T RO*0,SutTC200 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8-4117-5050 AffCA COOC SOI 
March 13, 1985 
Richards Woodbury Mortgage Corporation 
1935 East Vine Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Re: Buildmart Mall 
Gentlemen: 
This letter is being submitted by way of a 
clarification of Section • 2.1(C) of the Loan Agreement 
regarding pending litigation. There are currently no 
actions, suits or proceedings pending or threatened against 
or directly involving Buildmart Mall or the Buildmart Mall 
project in Sandy, Utah, or involving the validity or 
enforceability of any of the loan documents or the priority 
of the lien thereof except the following actions, which 
actions are fully covered by insurance and which, if 
adversely determined, would not substantially impair the 
ability of Buildmart Mall to perform each and every one of 
its obligations under the loan documents. 
BILL GIBSON LITIGATION 
On or about the 18th day of April, 1984, Bill 
Gibson, Inc., a Utah corporation, filed a lawsuit in Third 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County against Steven 
Urry, dba Urry & Company and Buildmart Mall, Inc. as Civil 
No. C84-2349. It should be noted that Buildmart Mall, Inc. 
is a Utah corporation owned by Steven Urry. However, the 
said corporation has nothing whatsoever to do with the 
Buildmart Mall project in Sandy, Utah. The Buildmart Mall 
project in Sandy, Utah is owned by a limited partnership 
known as "Buildmart Mall", which limited partnership has as 
its general partner, Buildmart Mall, Inc.—Utah, an entirely 
separate corporation. 
Bill Gibson, Inc. is the alterego of Bill Gibson, 
a Salt Lake real estate agent. The litigation asserts that 
on or about June 13, 1983, Steven Urry entered into a 
written agreement with the plaintiff wherein Mr. Urry agreed 
to convey ten percent (10%) of his interest in a project to 
construct a mall in Sandy, Utah in exchange for which 
plaintiff was to provide certain services. The complaint 
asks for specific performance of this agreement in the form 
EXHIBIT NO. 
Richards Woodbury Mortgage Corporation 
March 13, 1985 
Page 2 
of a conveyance of ten percent of Steven Urry's interest in 
the present Buildmart Mall project (5 percent of the overall 
project because Mr. Urry only owns fifty percent) to Bill 
Gibson, Inc. Mr. Urry's defense is that Mr. Gibson failed 
to perform the obligations required of him in the written 
agreement. Specifically, Mr. Gibson was required to assist 
in obtaining financing for the project which he failed to 
do. Also, he was to have the primary responsibility of 
leasing the project. Mr. Gibson only obtained two or three 
leases out of some sixty or seventy and Mr. Urry paid Mr. 
Gibson over $20,000.00. 
As the litigation proceeded, it became apparent to 
Mr. Gibson that the wrong parties were involved and 
plaintiff subsequently amended the complaint to include 
Shirl Wright, Buildmart Mall Partnership and Buildmart Mall, 
Inc.—Utah. Plaintiff also added a charge that there was a 
conspiracy between Mr. Wright, Mr. Urry, Buildmart Mall 
Partnership and Buildmart Mall, Inc.—Utah to exclude Mr. 
Gibson. 
Prior to closing the Industrial Revenue 
Development Bond loan and placing the First Deed of Trust on 
the property, a complete disclosure was made to First 
Security Bank. Also a complete disclosure was made to 
Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation of Richmond, Virginia. 
Lawyers Title elected to treat the litigation as spurious 
and insured over the Notice of Lis Pendens which had been 
filed against the project. First Security Bank likewise 
elected to treat the litigation as spurious and allowed the 
Industrial Revenue Development Bonds to close. 
This litigation would not appear to affect the 
loan transaction presently being contemplated for two 
reasons: First, the litigation has been insured over and 
Lawyers Title is willing to continue to insure over this 
action. Thus, the position of the lender in the instant 
transaction can be fully protected by Lawyers Title 
Insurance Corporation. Second, in the event that plaintiff 
is ultimately successful (which is highly unlikely), the 
relief sought would be a conveyance from Steven Urry to 
plaintiff of ten percent of his interest, which conveyance 
would be subject to the liens on the project and would not 
affect the enforceability of the loan documents. 
Richards Woodbury Mortgage Corporation 
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COMPLEX FABRICATIONS, INC. LITIGATION 
On or about December 20, 1984, Complex 
Fabrications, Inc., a Utah corporation, .executed a Notice of 
Lien and caused the same to be recorded against the 
Buildmart Mall project in Sandy, Utah, asserting a claim for 
$57,075.26 on a theory that Complex Fabrications, Inc. had 
furnished equipment to Universal Concrete, Inc., having a 
reasonable value of $185,977.34 and Universal Concrete, Inc. 
had only paid $128,902.08. 
By way of background, Universal Concrete, Inc. 
originally contracted with Buildmart Mall and later 
contracted with Culp Construction, the general contractor, 
to provide the precast concrete panels for the Buildmart 
Mall project in Sandy, Utah. Universal Concrete, Inc. in 
turn contracted with Complex Fabrications, Inc. for the 
construction of a concrete mold which would be adjustable so 
that it could be suited to use in the construction of 
concrete panels of many different sizes, shapes and designs. 
The use in different applications, because the mold was 
adjustable, would make the mold more cost effective for 
Universal Concrete, Inc. because they could use it on many 
different jobs. 
Complex Fabrications, Inc. bid the mold on an 
incomplete set of drawings, but both parties made provision 
for changes that Universal Concrete, Inc. would make to the 
plans as the work progressed. The initial bid was for 
approximately $54,000. Universal Concrete anticipated that 
with change orders, the total cost would probably be around 
$70,000. 
Universal Concrete has in fact paid Complex 
Fabrications $132,679.05 for the mold to date. Universal 
Concrete is refusing to pay any more and feels that they 
have over paid by a substantial amount. 
This dispute, which goes back over one year, 
resulted in the filing of the lien and on or about January 
18, 1985, Complex Fabrications, Inc. filed a law suit to 
foreclose the lien. The lawsuit, filed as Civil No. 
C85-0377, only names Buildmart Mall, Shirl Wright, and 
Universal Concrete. It does not name Culp Construction or 
make a claim against the project bond. 
Richards Woodbury Mortgage Corporation 
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This matter does not appear to affect the lender 
in the contemplated transaction because it can be insured. 
Lawyers Title has committed to insure over this lien and 
litigation. Moreover, on the merits, it appears that there 
is a viable defense on the basic claim and it appears highly 
questionable that Complex Fabrications, Inc. would have the 
right to enforce their lien when their contract was 
basically one of constructing a "tool" to be used by a 
subcontractor on this project and many other projects. 
If you have any questions regarding these matters, 
please feel free to contact us. Likewise, if you would like 
any further information, we would be pleased to supplement 
this letter with any information required. 
Very truly yours, 
SEAL, KENNEDY & FRANDSEN 
^Gregory L. Seal 
GLS:bb 
cc: Buildmart Mall 
ADDENDUM G 
4026095 
NOTICE OF LIEN 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
Nolle* ii hereby given that the underaigned .JUisrx \'?\\rn . — 
doin* buaineea aj JLecrv Mr Urn . and retidinf at 
l.i.oi * cvv> g^.:»>i ma rating «/ ^ 1' ?/>*<» - Statt of Utah, hereby claim—. 
and ,'ntend_ to hold and claim a lien upon that ceruin land and premieea, owned and reputed to be 
owned by .."*«"* ' '* —' '^ * - *B<* 
aituate, lying and bein* in l ir^y, CI »,y. ~ . County of SaLlLJLlilfi 
State of Utah, described aa follows, to wit: 
P R O P E R T Y . D E S C R I P T I O N 
BEG N 1 2 6 1 . 4 1 3 FT 4 E 6 7 9 . 3 1 6 FT FR NW COR OF SEC 1, T 3 3 , * " _ 
IV. S L M; M 89 0 1 * 2 7 - E 9 4 2 . 1 5 3 FT; S 0 8 J 3 3 ' 2 1 " E 3 9 * . 6 9 4 
FT; N 89 22'32-~W 4 1 3 . 3 6 FT TO E LINE OF SAND* PARKWAY; N 
1 2 * 5 7 , 3 5 T W 1 3 1 . 4 3 8 FT; N W U ALC CURVE TO L 3 6 1 . 3 2 1 FT; N 
5 9 ~ 5 7 ' 3 5 ~ W 5 5 2 . 5 8 1 FT; NV'LY ALC CURVE TO L 39 .07 FT; NWLY 
ALC CURVE TO L 1 1 6 . 3 9 2 FT; N 0 _ 5 8 , 3 3 " V 6 1 . 6 2 FT TO IZG. 
13.93 AC M OR L. 5 4 9 6 - 7 5 9 THRU~762, 5448-1132 
to secure the payment of the sum of 2ZS.2*££L Doilara, 
owing to the undersigned fnr <~c -: ^ ^ • * -r- ~C.:. •• > -~ Vn.„ _ 
in, on and about th» c i h .if >v«».^/»- mw,
 0Q ^ ^ ^ nd. 
That the aaid indebtedness accrued and the undersigned fcrzianedMLidiaxttrbU.ti/Xox waa em-
Ployed b y ) *.<rhn T*A T ,^KT • /•> /V-,n» - a r» >r*r ) a rH J ^ 
.who waa tht 
. nwn*r tnd the reputed owner of laid premiaea aa 
aforesaid, under a_a ar:iJ contract made between the ««^ -Hrvvir* < ^ y ^ f ~~,M-V ~-^~\ 
— rinri ""ncM's Mir. Is futtagrj and tht undersigned 
-day of—PC 2w*r 19 tik , by the terma of which tht cnderiigned did agree 
and thm «.,r| O U K . , H '/,fr| . 'I ^ „ „ , ~ - , r , „ ,0 ---» "£>vflp 
did agree to pay the undersigned therefor aa foliowa, to wit:.. 
S7Hgtrn u r 9 n c^nple'-lorL.Qr.. 1 a«_'111 •» tian "f 
' « 0 - | - < p r * f r tM-r .n r \ 
LlnalfMin _ _ 
.and under which aaid contract the under-
signed dld.-luaJLalL«i. the «*•«* «wMffn. 0 B < & % r _w ^ y cf 
-^ lYJ&kQSJC J2W* and did irJLU.ll . the lait__ ?*>•'* *r. on tht 
—.t.?.lh day of—ZavGabar.—IJX.I *,„..and on and between aaid laat mentioned 
daya, did .li.c^ualIx.JlxaUil.llMi^ua>...^.lai^iL.^alx} amounting 
to \h% lum of t7Li.. CQ (rv»ven h'.iP-<-^.fi-'yrHn,' i H ^n.Mnn) Dollar*, 
which waa the reaaonable value thereof, and on which the following paymenta have been made to wit: §• 
LQJ QQJM ^ r 
.05 
leaving a balance o w i n g to the unders igned oL-^V'JXJM ^ 
...... Dol lars after deducting ail j u i t credita and offset*, and for w h i c h £f 
demand the underaigned hold ... and claim.-, a lien by virtue of the proviaiona of Chapter I, of Title p i 
88, of the Utah Code Annotated 1953. r\ 09 
EXHIBIT NO. - J ? ^ j " ° w V •> -J. .— -w 
4060817 NOTICE OF LIEN 
TO WHOM IT MA Y CONCERN: 
%. , , u u _a .u L .i_ J —4— A Mike Farnsworth P a i n t i n g , I n c . Nolict it htrtby firm that tht undtrilgntd ,.,. r.tr^ ~. 
dolm builntu u a-anus »n<* residing at 
Hidvale County - ' S a l t L a k o StaUof Utah, htrtby daimJ?." 
and intand^sto hold tnd data a lltn upon that carta In land ind prtmisti. owntd ind rtpuLed to bt 
owntd B u i l d Mart M a i l , I n c .
 f | | d 
jtfciata. lying ind bting In ., MldVflle ; . County of 5 . a i™™?„ 
State of Utah, docribtd n follow*, to wtt: 
See attached e x h i b i t 
rrw to secure tht payment of tht sura of .J^aJIb.Qu§an.^^ Dollars, 
k 4. . , , construct ion labor and materials j • e 
owinj to tht undersigned for. 
construct ion comoany 
i i - • 
In. on ind tbout «. . " » ' • proper ty improvements and building,,", ^ ™ " 
That tht ti id indebted net* accrued and tht undersigned furnished said materials to (or wis em-
ployed by) B u i l d Mart M a l l , I n c . 
. who was the 
. _ « _ ~ owner and tht reputed owner of said premises aa 
aiortaaid. under a ora l contract madt betwetn tht «»M Bui ld Mart Mal l , I n c . 
— - »"d tht undersigned 
on tht 8 day of .^JL o v e m b e .E.^ 1* J L i by tht ttrma of which tht underlined did agree
 f 
to r»4n<* "Pd otherwise perform serv ices to certa in real property improvements fc 
*nd tht said BtHlrl .M^rf MfllK^Inc 
did agrta to pay tht undersigned thtrtfor II followa, to wU:..whan lnyjolca^WAa^JieiLtA .^ I 
-and under which said contract tht under* 
limed did Provide ^ f\nt wor* »"<* material^ t h | j j } ^ d i y of CM 
_ ^ a v a m h a x ^ . - O S . a . 4 . . a n d did P.rj2Y.i<te tht laatJ^ElL^lJStPJLEiliff tht &> 
« t h . _ d i y o f _. ....?J?5.!!!^£.'....i^.4 and on and bttwetn said last mtntioncd V? 
days, did _PX9.yide j-orje J H l L £ ^ « L l ? i J L amounting £ 
to tht turn of.-JrfQ^TlIQUSAND TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIVE -
 DollarSf >} 
wmch wai tht reasonable value thereof, and on which tht following paymnnU havt bttn madt to wit: 
- 4lon# _ 
Itavint i baimct owint to tht understated of JWajltQUJSMPJISSJJU^^ 
——_~ Dollar! afUr daducting ill Juit crtdlti and offstti, and for which 
dtmind tht undersigned hoid-a and daim-ft. a Hen by vlrtua of tht proviiioni of Chapttr I, af TUIt 
St. of tht UUh Codt Annotated 1853. / * / f/flj/ % /? 
Mike Farnavorth Paintinq~lnc. "*" 
Byi Mirhaoi A. Neidor 
Assistant Secretary 
000134 
STATE Or UTAH, ) 
) ts. 
County of Salt Lake| 
Michael A. Neider being first duly sworn, says that he is 
Assistant Secretary for claimant in the foreqoing Notice of Lien* 
that he has heard read said notice and knows the contents thereof, 
and that the same is true of his own knowledge. 
>^X^4^ 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 1"^  day of 
i-TT 1985. 
<"w 
M^Xzy^rrstf^On .Expires x Notary Puoixc 
/ fr\Oy^^^ Res id ing At: t S . L . Ca^, -\— . Vj^flQi^ ^ 
OCQJ'35 
EXHIBIT 
BEO N 0~02'25 
T 3S. R IW. 3 
CURVE TO R 36 
E 109 FTl S 1 
W'LY LINE OF 
30 FTl N 44~2 
FTl N O f W : 
E 41.171 FTf 
A CURVE TO R 
THAT PORTION 
H
 E 1066.977 FT i E 638.748 FT FR NW COR SEC 1. 
L HI 3 39~57'35H E 522.115 FTl S'LY ALO A 
1.372 FTl S 12~5?'35" E 204.761 FTt N 72~03'39" 
9~09'27" E 170 FTf N 77~02'23" E 263.45 FT TO 
0 U ROW RRf N 08~03'2IM W 959 FTf S 8t~56'39" W 
0' W 234.704 FVI N'LY ALO A CURVE TO R 60.505 
91.994 FTt S 8V~0i'27M W 688.79 FTl S 0~28'46" 
N 89~50'46" W 11.724 FTt S 209.519 FTt S'LY ALO 
207.506 FTl S 30~02'23M W 25 FT TO BEO. LESS 
LYINO INSIDE SANOY. 3.30 AC M OR L 
DEO N 0~02'25" E 1066.977 FT l E 638.749 FT FR NU COR SEC 1. 
T 3S. R 1U, S L Mt S 3?~57'35" E 522.115 FTl S'LY ALO A 
CURVE TO R 361.372 FTl $ 12~57'35M E 204.761 FTl N 72~05'39" 
E 109 FTt S 19*09'27" E 170 FTt N 77~02'25" E 263.45 FT TO 
W'LY LINE OF D & ROW RRi N 0~03'21" W 859 FTt S 91A36'39" W 
30 FTt N 44^20' W 234,704 FTt N'LY ALO A CURVE TO R 60.503 
FTl N 1" W 281.994 FTl S 89~0i'27- W 688.79 FTl S 0A28'46H 
E 41.171 FTt N 39-50'46" W 11.724 FTl S 208.519 FTt S'LY ALO 
A CURVE TO R 207.306 FTt S 30~02'25" W 25 FT TO £>E0. LESS 
THAT PORTION LYINO INSIDE MXDVALE. 16.8 AC H OR L 
•WWT*"^ 
™ * u 
WHEN RECORDED. MAIL TO: 
YWlVm EXCAVATING, INC. 
4655 West 5415 South _ 
....Kearris. .....Utah 8.4US Space Above for Recorder's Use 
4061418 NOTICE OF LIEN 
_ . . , \WIPHI EXCWATTNS. INC. 
The und .^*3icned - -..-.:.-
hereby fives notice of intention to hold a*id ciaim a lien upon the property and improvements 
J J . , , .. nunxwvRT MALL 
thereon owned and reputed to be owned by — — - ~ 
and located in 5*iJ:..£3J<? County, 
Utah, more particularly descnbed as follows: 
Sec Attached "Exhibit A" 
The amount demnjided hereby is $...8.4 .^0J(3..53 owing to *rJie unaersiirned for •furnishing: 
materials used in 'performing- labor upon the 'construction •alteration 'addition to -repair of 
a 'buiidins 'structure 'improvement upon the above descnbed property. 
The undersigned •furnished said materials to 'was empioyed by .... 
CULP CONSTRUCTION COMPANY 
rho w u the 
Original Contractor
 8 U c h ^ ^ d o n e b y ^ 
undersigned under a contract made between . . _ J 5 ^ - . ^ * ^ A ^ £ t L C ^ J t f ^ 
and tlie undersijrned by the terms and conditions of which th 
^ Furnish Material & Equipment 
~1 e undersigned did agree to.. 
in consideration of payment to the undersigned therefore as follows:. 
NET 10TH FOLLOWING MONTH 
I 
and under which contract the first •material was furnished 'labor was performed on the =• £ 
day of _J52^235E . l§. $.3.,. and the last was so furnished or performed oo the JLlttU C« p 
d&y of ...-.!5£E. .'..„., 19.JL5_ and for ail of which •materials •labor the undersigned g§ I 
became entitled to %—..:..:..JJ_..? , which is the reasonable value thereof, and on which pay* S K 
ments have hwen maiie and credits and offsets allowed amounting to t?.?.5L.i:LLJ.9 leaving a w w 
balance owinr to the undersijrned of J..8.4.»JP.J.{L.?&...... after deducting* all juat credits and offsets, g 
?3 and for which demand the under-signed hold., and claim., a lien by virtue of the provisions of E 
-*"
1
 Chapter 1, Title 38. Utah Code Annotated 1963. g i 
I1WTTTH1 BCCAVATOC. INC. P 
• - . « .... „ I 
•3tni«« out uiui««.«ry »oHi U^jJ"—- J. O*—^ j u_^ '£L«-* & 
-"—• :^3finni serenes •r'vicer'TrtfSTc^HK*— ft 
(y ^ ,x ^ ~ ~ ! r 
r O R M 4 0 l - M 0 r i C I O r U l N - M U r CO . I l « m i N W u l * H ( wtaM ' t *\ '• ' j > * P * 
^ . i.u . . . . .. , , . , — . - - . - r ^ - ^ , i _ ! S 
3 
1 
STATE OF UTAH, 
County of ^JilkJ^SSL 
DENNIS JONES 
Vice President of HAKPFH EXCAVATING, INC 
..being flnt duly aworn, aaya that ha la 
fclaimant— In tht foregoing Notice of LJtn; 
that he haj read laid notict and knowi tht content* thereof, and that tht ta/nt If true of hit 
own knowledge. }\Nlpm EXCAVATING. INC. 
M DcnniSyfenes 
Subscribed and nworn to before m« this Z.x. .day 
Noury Public. 
J'«:»l«l I/rj AH tvill i*\Vr> 'V*ifity 
My CSrfrmi^Vjn K^plr*:* 1/20/86 
>Xoy)i 
0G0O7S 
ECHIBIT NAM 
Camence at a point which i s North 1261.413 feet and East 679.816 
feet from the Northwest Corner of Section 1, Township 3 South. Range 
1 West. Salt Lake Base and Meridian and running thence N89°0r27"E 
942.153 feet to a point on the Westerly right-of-way l i n e of a railroad, 
thence S08°03 ,21 , ,E 1030.00 feet along said Westerly right-of-way l ine , 
thence S77°02,26,,W 390.572 feet to a point on the Easterly curb l ine 
of Sandy Parkway, a dedicated s treet as recorded August 3. 1982 in Book 
82-8 of p lats page 65, thence along said s treet NX^357'35,,W 359.351 fee t 
to a point of tangency with a 440.472 foot radius curve to the l e f t 
(central angle = 47°00*00M chord bears N36°27' 35,,TW), thence along said 
curve for an arc distance of 361.321 feet , thence N59°57'35MW 552.581 
f ee t to a point on a 25.00 foot radius curve to the l e f t (central angle 
= 90°00 ,00" chord bears N75o02'25uE 35.355 f ee t ) , thence along said 
curvwj for an arc distance of 39.070 feet to a point of tangency with 
a 215.010 foot radius curve to the l e f t (central angle * 31°00'58" chord 
bears N14031'56"E 114.976 f e e t ) , thence along said curve for an arc 
distance of 116.392 fee t , thence W00°58'33MW 61.621 feet to the Point 
of Cammencerrent. 
7 'Oo 
S*5 if 
000079^ 
1
 w.q'.ffwvvj '..-PA-*1' »in 
4CW07ZZ $ ' 
VHEN RECORDED, HAIL TO: 
Eric C, Olaon 
Van Cott, Baglay, Cornwall W McCarthy 
P.O Box 45340 
I Sa.'t U k t City, Utah 84145 
ft l 
I! 
S 2 l i £ - £ - ^
 lnc..h.r«by brtcacton«» in.0" 
- 679.816 £"tC 
337 feet; running thenca South 89° 01* 27" Vaat 
902.343 feat to tha point of beginning. 
Tha amount demanded hereby is $57,075.26 owing to tha 
undersigned for furnishing equipment used in the construction 
of buildings upon the above described property. 
Tha undersigned furnished said equipment to Shirl 
Wright & Associates and Universal Concrete, Inc., who owned a 
limited partnership interest in the owner of said property and 
were the agents of the owner of said property, such being dona 
by the undersigned under a contract made between Shirl Wright: & 
Associates and Universal Concrete, Inc. and the undersigned by 
the terms and conditions o£ which tha undersigned did agree to 
furnish the basic frame of a structural steel mold for 
fabricating concrete walls together with headgatee, sidagates, 
top haadgatas, endgatas, trusses and hydraulics for use with 
the mold* In consideration, Shirl Wright & Associates and 
Universl Concrete, Inc. agreed to pay $57,687.96 for the baaic 
frame mold and extra chargea ordered by Shirl Wright & 
Associates and Universal Concrete, Inc. including, but not 
limited to, haadgataa, sidagates, top headgataa, endgatas, 
trusses, hydraulics and incidental rtnttl and assembly in a 
total amount of $128,289.38. Under the contract, the first 
equipment was furnished on the 15th day of February, 1984 and 
the last was so furnished on the 8th day of October, 1984 and 
for all of which equipment the undersigned became entitled to 
•!• 
i. V 
$185,977.34, which ia the reaeonable value thereof, and on 
which paymenta have been mada and cradlta and offaeca allowed 
amounting to (128,902.08 leaving a balance owing to the 
underaigned of $57,075*26 after deducting all juat credita and 
offaeta, and for which demand the underaigned holda and claima 
a lian by virtue of the proviaiona of Chapcar 1, Title 38, Utah 
Coda Annotated 1953 (aa amended). 
Complex Fabricationa, Inc. 
By: L^^J^^^TT^ ^yTZ^^r-t 
1-STATE OF UTAH COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
John A. Green being firat duly awoTO, aaya that he la 
preaident of the claimant'Complex Fabricationa, Inc. in the 
foregoing Notice of Lien and ia duly authorized by aaid 
claimant to aign thia notice of lien; that he hea reed aeid 
notice and knowa the contenta thereof, and that the aame ia 
true of hia own knowledge* 
\^^-^/7t/j^ 
/%*HG. C'l?*\ Subacribed and awom to before me thia *3fl"*^ dav 
f im}^ , 1984. 
RU~\- "V. i 
28600 
f $C* , 
r*jl u p mm^m^m^ m^y^"9Sm^^pss" 
otary Public 
• 3 -
-ji..aa"wn'.,..L^ii. u I I H I J I W J i Jin 
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WHEN RECORDED, MAIL TO: 
Eric C. Olson 
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall fc McCarthy 
'""4C P.O. Box 453 0
Salt Laka City, Utah 84145 
NOTICE OF LIEN 
Tha undersigned, Complex Fabricatione, Inc., hereby 
givaa notica of intantlon to hold and claim a lian upon tha 
proparty and improvements thareon owned and raputad to ba ovnad 
by Buildmart Mall, a Utah linitad partnarahip, and locatad in 
Salt Laka County, Utah, mora particularly daacribad AM follova: 
Parcal No. 1: 
Parcal No. 2: 
Beginning North 1261.413 fact and Eaat 679.816 faat 
from the Northwest corner of Section 1, Tovnahip 3 
South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; 
running thence North 89* l1 27" Eaat 942,153 faat; 
thqnce South 8* 3' 21" Eaat 898.694 feat; thonca North 
89* 22* 32" Weat 413.36 feet to tha Eaat line of Sandy 
Parkway; thence North 12* 37'-35".Weat 131.438 faat; 
running thence Northwesterly along tha curve to L 
361.321 feet; thence North 59° 37T 33" Weat 532.581 _ 
foot; running thence Northwesterly along curve to L g 
39.07 feet; running thence Northwesterly along curve CJ* 
to L 116.392 feet; thence North 0* 58' 33" Weat 61.62 « 
feet to the point of beginning. Jjj 
3 
Beginning North 1262.091 feot and East 719.62 feat . S 
from tho Northwest comer of Section 1, Tovnahip 3 * 
South, Range 1 West. Salt Laka Meridian; running 
thence North 29° 55r 34" Vest 82.243 feet; thence 
North 0* 58• 33" West 222.231 feet; running thence 
South 89° 50* 46" Eaat 58.233 feet; thence North 0* 
28# 46" Weat 41.171 feet; running thence North 89 01 • 
27" East 840.386 faat; thence South 8* 20' 37" East 
•1 
*4 
^0-g} 40U390Q 
' II y • • • i l l 
^A\ 
WHEN RECORDED! KAIL TO; 
Erie C. Olson 
Van Cottf Bagley, Cornwall fc McCarthy 
P.O. Box 43350 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84143 
NOTICE OF LIS?? 
The undersigned, Coaplax ?abrlcationa9 Inc., hereby 
glvee notice of intention to hold and claia a lien upon the 
property and iaprovcaents thereon ovned and reputed to be ovned 
by Buildaart Mall, a Utah lialted pertnerahip9 and located ia 
Salt Lake County, Utah, aore particularly deeeribed ae follows: 
Parcel No. 1: 
Beginning North 1261.413 foot and Eaac 679.816 feet 
from the Northwest corner of Section 1, Town a hip 3 
South, Range 1 Went, Salt Lako Base and Meridian; 
running thence North 89* lf 27" Eaat 942.133 feet; 
thence South 8* 3' 21". Eaat 898.694 feet; thence North 
89* 22' 32" Voat 413.36 feet to the Eaat line of Sandy 
way; thence North 12* 37* 33" Weat 131.438 feet; 
F" 
P 
Park
running thence Northwesterly along the curve to L 
361.321 feet; thence North 59° 37? 33" Veet 332.381 
feet; running thence Northwesterly along curve to L 
39.07 feet; running thence Northwesterly elong curve \ 
to L 116.392 feet; thence North 0* 38' 33" Vest 61.62 ] 
feet to the point of beginning. 
Parcel No. 2: 
4-
Beginning North 1262.091 foot and Eaat 719.62 feet 
froa the Northwest eomer of Section 1, Township 3 
South, Range 1 West, 8aIt Lake Meridian; running 
thence North 29* 33? 34" Vest 02.243 feet; thence i 
North 0# 38' 33" Vest 222.231 feet; running thence 
South 89# 30' 46" East 38.233 fast; thence North 0 V 
28' 46" Vest 41.171 feet; running thence North 89* IV 
27" Eaac 840.386 feet; thence South 8* 20' 37" b a t 
'.•m«±dWl.<19!!X*M. 
I 
4041077 
VAN COT?t BACLEY, CORNWALL fc HcCARTHY 
Stephen D» Swindle (3176) 
John A. Snow (3025) 
Eric C. Olson (4108) 
Attorney! for Plaintiff 
50 South Main Street 
Suite 1600 
P.O. Box 45340 
Salt U k e City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT UXl COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
COMPLEX FABRICATORS, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LIS PENDENS 
Civil No. 
UNIVERSAL CONCRETE, INC., 
H. SHIRL VRICHT, 
individually and d/b/a 
SHIRL WRIGHT k ASSOCIATES, 
and BUILDHART HALL, a Utah 
limited partnership, 
Dafaodantit 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that an action hat baan 
commenced in tha Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, by tha above-named plaintiff againet tha 
above-named defendants for tha foreclosure of a lian elaiaad by 
tha plaintiff under that certain Notice of Lien recorded on 
December 20, 1984 in-the Oftic^ of tha County Recorder of Salt 
Lake County, Utah, in Book 5616, paga 2174 as amended at Book 
3617, paga 2477 and Book 5618, paga 3232/ Tha real property ' 
£ 
m 
^mwi'jv •• 
tubjact to said Notica of Llan, dascrlbad in tha Complaint, and1 
affactad by laid foracloiura action, ii tltuatad in Salt Laka 
Countyi Utah and ia aora particularly daieribad in Exhibit "A" 
harato* 
Datad: January /£ » 1985 • 
VAN COTT, BACL2Y, CORNWALL fc MCCARTHY 
Stephen D. Swindle 
John A« Snow 
Eric C. Olion 
Aa€urn¥ya xor PlaincixT*^<-* 
^50 South Malnf Suita 1600 
,?. 0. Box 43340 
-Salt Lake City. Utah 84145 
Talaphonat (801) 532-3333 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: §§. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
0° thii -LSlN*? °* *J*ouary, 1985 * parionally 
appaarad before aa Eric C. Olion, tha iignar of thia foragoing 
inatruaant, vho duly acknowledged to aa that ha axacutad tha 
omainion Expirn: '. 3*US??A*,'" My C a M pirttt j "3>* ll'&lfi* s 
2 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
Parcal Ho. 1; 
Beginning North 1261.413 faat and Zaat 679.816 faat 
froa tha Northwest corner of Section lf Townahip 3 
South, Range 1 Vest, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; 
running thenca North 89J l1 27M East 942.153 feat; 
thenca South 8# 3' 21M East 898.694 feat; thanea North 
89" 22' 32" Vaat 413.36 feet to tha Eaat line of Sandy 
Parkway; thanea North 12° 57* 35" Veet 131.438 faat; 
running thanea Northwesterly along tha curve to L 
361.321 faat; thence North 39* 57T 33" Vaat 332«581 
faat; running thence Northwesterly along curve to L 
39.07 faat; running thence Northwesterly along curve 
to L 116.392 faat; thence North 0* 38' 33" Veet 61.62 
faat.to tha point of beginning. 
Parcal No. 2: 
Beginning North 1262.091 U^t and Eaat 719.62 feet 
froa tha Northweet corner of Section 1, Township 3 
8outh, Range 1 Vest. Salt Lake Meridian; running 
thenca North 29* 55'-34" Vast 82.243 faat; thenca 
North 0° 58* 33" Vest 222.231 feet; running thenca 
South 89° 50' 46" Zaat 58.235 feet; thanea North 0* 
28* 46" Vest 41.171 feat; running thence North 89V01f 
27" East 840.396 fsat; thanea South 8' 20• 37" Eaat 
337 feet; running thenca South 89* 01f 27" Vest 
902.343 f9€t to tha point of beginning* 
29330 
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EXHIBIT -A-
LEGAL DESCRIPTION 
Commence at a point which is North 1261.413 feet and East 679.816 feet frc-
the Northwest Corner of Section 1, Township 3 South, kanga 1 West, Salt 
Lake Base and Meridian and running thence N89°01f27nE 942.153 feet to a 
point on the Weste-iy rignt-af-way line of a railruad, thence S08o03,21,,E 
1030.00 fet?t along said Westerly right-of-way line, thence S77°02'25,,W 
390.572 feet to a point on the Easterly euro line or Sandy Parkway, a 
dedicated street as recorded August 3, 1982 in Book 82-8 of plats page 65, 
thence alo«g said street N12*57'35"W 359.351 feet to a point of tangency 
with a 440.472 foot radius curve to the left (central angle » 47o00,03" 
chord Dears N36D27'35"W), thence along said curve fcr an arc distance of 
361.321 feet, thence N59a57»35,,W 552.581 feet to a point on a 25.00 font 
radius curve to the left (central angle * 90°C0,00" chord bears N75°Q2,25"E 
35.355 feet), thence along said curve for an arc distance of 39.070 feet 
to a point of tangency with a 215.010 frot radius curve to the left 
(central angle - 3rC0'5S" chord bears N1403r56ME 114.976 feet), thence 
along said curve for an arc distance of 116.392 feet, tijence N0C°58,33*W 
61.620 feet co the Point of Cccnencement. 
Contains 15.347 acres, more or less. 
CD 
CO 
4060817 NOTICE OF LIEN 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
.
 k 4. , , , Mike Farnsworth P a i n t i n g , I n c . Notict li htrtbr fiv«n thai tht undarsigned " A ° • *•' 
doing butlntu n *ama « d rtiidlng at 
Mldva le Countr o f _ i * i J L i £ i i £ StaU of Utah, hereby claim.*' 
and InUndJJto hold and dabn a lias upon that ctrtain land ind prtmises. owned and rtputed to bt 
flVM(J1,¥ B u i l d Mart M a l l , I n c . rf 
owned by , _ •"—•• U'":'r'-r—r—~* • u 
jitaata, lying and bting ln_J31dYale : • County of * tJL 
SUU of Utah, described as follow*, to wit: . 
See a t t a c h e d e x h i b i t 
Tr^r to secure tht payment of tht aum of-TrfP^bPjisajn^^Two..I^njrjd^ a n d ^ f i f t;/__ Dollars, 
, , c o n s t r u c t i o n l a o o r and m a t e r i a l s 
owing to tht undersized for , 
c o n s t r u c t i o n comoany 
aa a : 
, J u * «u r e a \ p r o o e r t y imorovemenc3 and b u i l d i n g _ •, , , in, on and about tht . L :,.. , .i : Zon said land. 
That tht taid Indebtedneaa accrutd and tht underlined furnished said materials to (or was em-
ployed by) 3 u i l d Mart M a l l , I n c . 
, — , , who was the 
_ owner and tht reputed owner of said premises aa 
aforesaid, under a aruJ contract madt betwetn tht t»M Bui ld Mart M a l l , I n c . 
. . '"^ tht undersigned 
on tht L _ . d a y of. N o v e m b e r ^ 19 JL1. by tht terms of which tht undenigned did arret 
to p»<nf *pd o t h e r w i s e perform a e r v i c e a to c e r t a i n r e a l proper ty improvementa 
f nd tht said g u i l d - M n r f Mfl lU-Inc^J 
did arret to pay tht underaignsd thtrtfor as follows, to wit:.%when.JjxvJOicja-.WAa_jien.t^ 
..snd under which said contract tht under. 
simtd did P r o v i d e &, / i ^ work and m a t e r i a l ^
 t h f l i f c b d l y o f O* 
—.Uo.uombax^-JL5.S.4..and did PXQYiStS tht IMIJKSJLJULl.JtfJLEii l* the £3 
.?.? t h . _ d t y of PJES£S£.#-...1111 and on and bttwttn snid last mentioned £ 
days, did ~P.SP.Yile J i S ^ amounting £ 
to the sum a/.^MQ..!niDi;SAND.-raQ..HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIVE _
 DoflftI% ^ 
wmch was tht reasonable value thereof, and on which tht following paymnnU have been made to wit: 
— — — Hon* 
ltavint a balanct owing to tht undtrslgntd of JWQ_JZtQU3MBJi^ 
— Dollars sfUr dtducting all Juat crtdlts and offstU, and for which 
dtmand tht undersigned hold~a and claims, a Hen by virtue of the provlsjont of Chapter 1, of Title 
31, of the Utah Code Annotated 1083. 
'[If 
'Mike Farnaworth Painting, Inc. 
Byi Mirhaol A. Neidor 
Aaaiatant Socratary 
000134 
